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The focus of this Article is the challenges faced by contemporary
scholars. The emphasis falls on related experiences rather than on attempted
substantive public policy resolutions. Although examples of the latter are
inevitable for purposes of illustration, they are provided without being overly
argumentative or tedious. The Article is divided into eleven parts. Parts I and
II introduce the reader to influences to which all scholars must acclimate.
Some of these influences have always existed; others have only recently come
into existence. Parts III and IV consider what phenomena prompt students to
pursue an advanced degree and describe some of the choices and pitfalls
facing them.' Parts V, VI, and VII explore which values and objectives
motivate those who pursue scholarship and offer several suggestions for
maintaining greater research objectivity. Part VIII discusses how scholars
may escape the intellectual tides of their day. Part IX explores James
Madison's republican model and why it is frequently distorted today. Part X
contends that scholars do not and should not have the last word on public
policy-making. Part XI offers some brief conclusions.

1.
I make no pretension to thoroughness. I certainly am concerned with contemporary
American legal scholarship, and because I aimed to remain properly grounded researching the
ins and outs of the Second Amendment, I had to explore portions of an earlier article more
thoroughly: William Gangi, A Scholar'sJourney on the Dark Side, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2007).
In some respects, this Article is intended to suggest habits and establish criteria that may help
all scholars and law students maintain an open mind, particularly in the most difficult of
circumstances: namely, when peers consider an issue closed.
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INTRODUCTION

For several years, I have been intermittently 2 immersed in the Second
Amendment literature on a project still awaiting completion. 3 In the course of
this research, certain exchanges between Justices Scalia and Stevens in the
Heller4 case struck me as unusually bitter.5 The two justices questioned each
other's interpretive integrity, 6 and each combatant's admirers undoubtedly

2.
Among the obstacles to scholarly productivity is the ability to carve out uninterrupted
time. My experience has been that scholarly productivity ebbs and flows due to competing
professional obligations (teaching and service to one's department or college), as well as to life's
cross-currents, such as attempting to integrate the "uninterrupted time" into many common
experiences: marriage, raising children, teaching, caring for aging parents, and remaining
fiscally solvent. All such personal circumstances impact the scholar's ability to find the required
uninterrupted time. Over time, however, such activities may enrich one's scholarship. There also
is the matter of personal temperament and the advantages of having a "slow hand," as the Pointer
Sisters counseled, instead of jumping into controversies in a "heated rush"-a bit of advice that
obviously has wider application than the song's lyrics. THE POINTER SISTERS, Slow Hand, on
BLACK & WHITE (Planet Records 1981).
3.
My upcoming article will most likely be titled Do You Hear Me Now: The Second
Amendment and Some Abiding Principles.Simply reading the two Second Amendment cases is

an overwhelming task. See generally McDonaldv. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (202 pages
in the United States Reports); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (153 pages in
the United States Reports). There are numerous opinions and clashes within those opinions over
the Amendment's meaning, history, and purpose, as well as over the soundness of related
American and English precedents, to name just a few of the more obvious topics. Of course, in
those separate opinions, various renditions of the selective incorporation and due process
theories are put forth, all of which generate an untold number of disputes between the majority
and minority opinions, not to mention occasionally even among the majority opinions.
4.
All scholarship must pass through several stages, and only a few are discussed within
this Article. As the university management model in the United States has become more bottomline oriented, some critics suggest that, in the post-tenure evaluation atmosphere, the quality of
scholarship will decline because productivity is increasingly measured over a shorter time span
and thus articles will frequently be of poorer quality (i.e., "fluff'). Gabriela Montell, The Fallout
from
Post-Tenure
Review,
CHRON.
HIGHER
EDUC.
(Oct.
17,
2002),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Fallout-From-Post-Tenure/46063. See also AM. Ass'N
UNIV.
PROFESSORS,
POST-TENURE
REVIEW:
AN
AAUP
RESPONSE
(1999),
https://www.aaup.org/report/post-tenure-review-aaup-response (discussing the proper goals
and function of post-tenure review). These critics suggest that creating arbitrary time frames
for publications sets unrealistic goals for research production or ignores the traditional right of
faculty to determine their own research agendas. See id.

5.

Compare Heller, 544 U.S. at 588-92, 603-08, 620-23 (Scalia, J., majority opinion)

(criticizing Justice Stevens's argument), with id. at 638-39, 643-52, 677-80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Justice Scalia's argument).
6.
By integrity, I am referring to exchanges between Justices Scalia and Stevens,
accusing each other of making statements inconsistent with those made in other cases. Both were
correct. Examples may be offered without distracting the reader. In two of the milder exchanges,
Justice Scalia characterizes Justice Stevens as "betraying a fundamental misunderstanding of a
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believed their respective champion won the day. From my perspective,
however, the Second Amendment cases 7 added yet another layer of
inconsistency to the now long-standing constitutional law "mess."'
But I get ahead of myself. After I had prepared extensive briefs on the
Heller and McDonald cases as well as consumed a fair number of
commentaries, one article had struck me as superior.9 I emailed its author:
I just completed reading your "Second Amendment" article and did
so with admiration. It was insightful and fully anticipated the
McDonald majority.
But, aside from the substance you discussed, what I appreciated
most was its incorporation (if I may use the term) of the best
standards of scholarship and its willingness to confront opposition
arguments, a practice that I find sorely lacking in contemporary
scholarship. Alas,... your insistence on "reading the footnotes" too
often today falls on deaf ears . . . if not characterized as rather "old
school." . . . I also admired your writing style personal, direct and
honest. 10

court's interpretive task," id. at 605, and with respect to interpreting another precedent, he
describes Justice Stevens' point of view as "particularly wrongheaded," id. at 623.
7.
See cases cited supra note 3.
8. See Gary C. Leedes, The Supreme CourtMess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1979).
9.
Jack N. Rakove, The SecondAmendment: The HighestState of Originalism, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 103 (2000).
10. E-mail from William Gangi, Professor of Gov't and Politics, St. John's Univ., to Jack
Rakove, Professor of History, Political Sci. & by courtesy, Law, William Robertson Coe
Professor of History & Am. Studies, Stanford Univ. (Sept. 15, 2015, 7:48 AM) (on file with
author).
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Rakove's article, our subsequent brief correspondence," and the
unearthing of a decade-old manuscript' 2 came together, bringing my
immersion in the Second Amendment literature-and the writing of my
Second Amendment Article, to a screeching halt.1 3 1 could not help myself.
Question fragments began floating in and out of my subconscious or, as on
other occasions, rose into consciousness while engaged in some menial or
physical task or in some other professional obligation. Fearing these
question fragments would otherwise evaporate, I fleshed them out as best I
could. The question to emerge-and thus the inspiration for this Article was
"What is a scholar?"
II.

A FEW DISTINCTIONS

Ten years earlier, I published an article entitled A Scholar's Journey on
the Dark Side.' 4 There, I offered my "impressions of contemporary legal

11. With respect to the discontinuation of our correspondence, I take full responsibility.
I supported Raoul Berger's criticism of judicial overreaching. Rakove acknowledged that
"Berger was not a big fan of my work," and while Berger was "[a]n interesting guy, for lots of
reasons . . . [he was] not wholly reliable intellectually." E-mail from Jack Rakove, Professor of
History, Political Sci. & by courtesy, Law, William Robertson Coe Professor of History & Am.
Studies, Stanford Univ., to William Gangi, Professor of Gov't and Politics, St. John's Univ.
(Sept. 16, 2015, 11:11 PM) (on file with author). This e-mail was in response to an earlier email
where I said that, while I was sure Rakove "would not accept my 'approach as a scholar' [since
I was in Berger's camp] . . [and that I] [fjully appreciate other perspectives[,] . . I [was] not
convinced their shortcomings [we]re less than my own, once I separate[d] my own personal
preferences from my perception of constitutional law." William Gangi, Professor of Gov't and
Politics, St. John's Univ., to Jack Rakove, Professor of History, Political Sci. & by courtesy,
Law, William Robertson Coe Professor of History & Am. Studies, Stanford Univ. (Sept. 16,
2015, 6:58 AM) (on file with author). I did not want to re-engage on that subject. See generally
William Gangi, Judicial Expansionism: An Evaluation of the Ongoing Debate, 8 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 1 (1981) (discussing Raoul Berger's criticism of judicial
overreaching). I also judged that I would be at a disadvantage engaging in any dialogue with
him on the Second Amendment since, at the time, I had just begun research on the topic.
12. Some years ago, a former student, Kenneth L. Grasso (Southwest Texas University),
asked me to write an article detailing the influence of Professor George W. Carey on my
scholarship. The focus of the article eventually changed, however, and it was published as
William Gangi, The Rule ofMen: How Caring Too Much About Important Things Is Destroying
ConstitutionalLaw, in DEFENDING THE REPUBLIC: CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY IN A TIME OF
CRISIS 221 (Bruce P. Frohnen & Kenneth L. Grasso eds., 2008). I unearthed the original draft
in the course of selling my principal residence.
13. As previously noted, the availability of uninterrupted time depends on numerous
factors. See supra note 2. As subsequently discussed, an essential motivator to pursue
scholarship-curiosity also may ebb and flow or shift its focus over one's career. See infra
Part V.
14. Gangi, supra note 1. During my career, I have been inspired by colleagues Raymond
Carol and Henry Paolucci and other scholars including Justice Felix Frankfurter, Yale Kamisar,
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education,"' 5 concluding that, despite lip-service paid to the framers'
intentions, constitutional law scholarship was no longer rooted in its founding
principles. Instead, it drew its contemporary animus from broader theoretical
concerns.1 6 I concluded in this article that many prominent legal scholars
urged members of the judiciary to impose public policies on the American
people thought most consistent with American ideals.' 7

&

Thomas A. Schrock, and Raoul Berger. In this Article, however, I focus primarily on the
scholarship of Willmoore Kendall (whom I never met) and George W. Carey, with whom I
corresponded over several decades and personally encountered some half dozen times. One need
not agree with another scholar to admire their work. As Professor Kamisar wrote to me:
You might like to know, and your students might like to know, that even though Inbau
and I have been bitter professional adversaries, we became good friends in the 1970s
and remain so. I think students should know that lawyers or law professors can rip
into each other in their professional roles but "not take it personally"[-]and enjoy
each other's company over a dinner or over a few drinks. . . .We disagree about most
basic issues, but we like and respect each other.
Letter from Yale Kamisar, Clarence Darrow Distinguished Univ. Professor of Law Emeritus
Professor Emeritus of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., to William Gangi, Professor of Gov't and
Politics, St. John's Univ. (April 5, 1985) (on file with author). Professor Kamisar remains an
appropriate model for scholars to follow.
15. Gangi, supra note 1, at 1. Certainly, one article prompted my early interest in legal
education. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1964). I also taught constitutional law for forty years, and I lectured at several dozen law schools
around the country under the aegis of the Federalist Society.
16. Gangi, supra note 1, at 4. Among the many scholars expressing broader theoretical
concerns are the following: RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Bloomsbury
Acad. 2013) (1977); CHRISTOPHER L. EISENGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(Paperback ed. 2007); OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (2d prtg. 1996); MICHAEL
J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, COURTS (Paperback ed.
2008); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000); Akhil Reed
Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000).
17. See Gangi, supra note 11, at 18-36. Discussed there are nine symbols (words or
phrases conveying one or more lines of argument) that framed portions of the debate between
Raoul Berger and his many critics over the contemporary use of judicial power. For example, of
the nine considered, the following three lines of argument frequently appear throughout the legal
literature: (1) Since the Framers are dead, judges and citizens alike are free to ignore their
intentions; (2) If the legislative and executive branches fail to act appropriately, courts may
remedy any perceived defects; (3) Since Supreme Court Justices are unelected, they are "best
suited" to fill in vacuums created by executive or legislative inaction or to check those branches'
misfeasance or malfeasance. Such arguments frequently are combined with six others (two of
which would include the cumbersomeness of the legislative or amending processes, or the good
results obtained by the Supreme Court's creating new or expanding old rights). In sum, all nine
arguments are closely integrated and in legal literature are put forth independently or in
combination. As each argument is countered, proponents throw another argument into the
breach. As the dialogue shifts from one argument (or groups of arguments) to another argument,
any common interpretive standards shift with it. For example, if an opponent concedes that our
historical experiences do not sustain one line of argument, or perhaps that one line of argument
is overly dependent upon contemporary expressions of the law (e.g., coerced confessions or the
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Overlap between the Journeypiece and this Article could not be avoided,
but the emphasis here falls on scholarly experiences rather than the
substantive resolutions suggested in Journey." Put another way, the
discussions herein are process rather than substantive ones. 19 Both articles, of
course, presume human beings are capable of reason, and decisions based on
reason are usually superior than those based on emotion.20 Confronted by
conflicting evidence, a reasonable person not only will consider arguments

exclusionary rule), a proponent's response often amounts to "So what," meaning that, even if a
critic is correct on the history, the Framers' understanding is irrelevant today and the judiciary
should have the discretion to "adapt" the constitutional text to changing circumstances. In the
Journeyarticle, Gangi, supra note 1, I dealt more with substantive topics and suggested solutions
(e.g., the extent of contemporary judicial power, our preoccupation with rights-a subject we as
a people undoubtedly care about but which I fear today is being interpreted in such manner as
to risk governmental competency and the core value of self-government). Hence, substantive
issues were discussed under the headings, "Caring About Important Things and Its Impact on
Governmental Competency," "We Care About Racism and Inequality," "We Care About
Procedural Rights," "We Care About Substantive Rights," and "We Care About the First
Amendment." Id. at 11-32. That article also discussed other topics subsequently ignored herein,
such as the tools required for a re-founding of constitutional law: "Limits of Judicial Power,"
"The American Political Tradition," "The Problem of Precedents," and "Contemporary
Scholarship." Id. at 33-75.
18. Where overlap is deemed substantial or the focus is on substantive issues rather than
personal experience, the reader is directed to the appropriate citations discussed in the previous
footnote.
19. Some readers may conclude that the "process" examples offered have substantive
consequences. I agree. The examples explored in the text may reflect my conservative
predilections, and if a reasonable analysis finds them to be unduly dependent upon political bias,
they ought to be questioned. That is only fair. But, while a bias might determine the examples
used, I am not convinced it negates the scholarly experience. Hopefully, the examples provided
will prompt reflections from other scholars possessing different political predilections and who
will put forth a broader range of experiences upon which still other scholars might deduce more
sophisticated models.
20. The use of "presume" in the text is of course intended to cover a lot of "buts."
Conclusions are not always reached strictly upon logic. Logic, divorced from a moral compass,
can run amok and lead to policies akin to the "final solution." Emotion also can supplement the
logic associated with decision-making. There is the example of Bertrand Russell's alleged
advice to a nervous investor to "sell" until the investor could sleep well. Or, perhaps by adding
compassion to logic, the ill-effects of unprincipled advocates of a free-market may be tempered.
Logic is crucial to reasoning but in itself cannot establish the truth of the premises used. So,
while reason often is not a perfect basis, it usually is a better one than emotion, which of course
has its own weaknesses. For some thoughtful commentary, see CAROLYN ELLIS & ARTHUR P.
BOCHNER, Telling andPerforming PersonalStories: The Constraintsof Choice in Abortion, in
INVESTIGATING SUBJECTWITY 79 (Carolyn Ellis & Michael G. Flaherty eds., 1992), and
BARBARA KOZIAK, RETRIEVING POLITICAL EMOTION (2000). James Madison certainly thought
so. See infra Part IX.
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pros-and-cons, but he or she will also, somehow and in some manner, weigh
the relative merits of each. He or she ultimately will opt for the best choice. 2
Reasoning is a skill requiring years of training. For example, in law,
when it comes to interpreting a document there are "rules," or as Publius
described them more fully, "rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in
the construction of the laws."2 2 And even then, all of us, including scholars,
reason differently or not always the same way to the same degree on all
subjects-certainly not consistently, or equally, or all the time. 2 3 Greater
maturity also brings an acknowledgment that similar conclusions can be
reached for very different reasons. Finally, whatever one's educational
training, evidence acquired also passes through a variety of perhaps nonsyllogistic prisms that shape and direct our logical thinking and subsequent
judgments. Broadly stated, over a lifetime these influences include our
acquired learning legacy, personality-type preferences, and acquired
attitudes.2 4 The latter often consists of lightning-fast judgments of the
rightness or wrongness of an idea or action, before any intellectual assessment
actually takes place. 25

21. This is of course an ideal description. As noted shortly, there are other factors at play,
including acquired attitudes and personality types. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
22. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 32, at 201, 83, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Willmore
Kendall & George W. Carey eds., Arlington House ed., 1966); see also Douglas Belkin,
Exclusive Test Data: Many Colleges Failto Improve Critical-ThinkingSkills, WALL ST. J. (June
5, 2017, 2:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exclusive-test-data-many-colleges-fail-toimprove-critical-thinking-skills- 1496686662 ("At more than half of schools, at least a third of
seniors were unable to make a cohesive argument, assess the quality of evidence in a document
or interpret data in a table . . . .").
23. E.g., Gangi, supra note 1, at 67 (noting the inconsistency in complaining about
rubbernecking drivers but doing the same when given the opportunity).
24. See generally DAVID KIERSEY, PLEASE UNDERSTAND ME 11: TEMPERAMENT,
CHARACTER, INTELLIGENCE 1-4 (1998) (discussing the vast differences in people and how past
theories have attempted to explain the origins thereof).
25. William Gangi, Three Levels of Human Discourse 1 (1999) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with St. John's University), http://campusguides.stjohns.edu/gangiinternships (select
"E-Reserves; then select article). As noted therein:
More often than not our attitudinal judgements are instantaneous reactions to a
situation "knee-jerk" reactions if you will, come into our consciousness before our
intellect can be brought to bear. In sum: Attitudes shape our response to the ideas,
analyses and conclusions of others. They appear so correct, so natural, that they
themselves often evade intellectual detection-short-circuiting our ability to identify
alternatives. They also govern our lives much more pervasively than do our
intellectual positions.
Id. at 2. See infra note 52 for additional discussion. Broadly stated, some scholars conclude that,
given the complexities involved, reasoning is an illusion, or that objective analysis is impossible,
or that it is doomed to failure. Obviously, they prove too much, since otherwise their analysis
would be a waste of their time. Others counsel that the only proper basis for public policy-
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From the preceding discussion, one might conclude the following: what
some people perceive either as logical or inescapable realities others find
malleable. Just as we know that light possesses an unseen materiality and can
be curved by gravity, others analogously believe that so too is logic or other
realities. That is, for them, something is only real if they acknowledge its
existence. They can also choose to ignore those realities. Over time, that of
course proves to be untrue. Realities eventually triumph over faulty theoretical
constructs that, for a time, had been denied. But it may take some time.26 As
explored below, shifting realities, real and imagined, also influence the
scholar's world. 27

making is self-interest, or perhaps, the focal point should be the group, a collective orientation
determined by wealth, race, gender, or sexual orientation-so called identity politics. I do not
share those perspectives, and so these remarks are subject to criticisms from those quarters. See
infra notes 265-266 and accompanying text.
26. What some describe as practicing statecraft others may view as acting in a dream
world of their own creation. See ERIC VOEGELIN, NEw SCIENCE OF POLITICS 171 (1952)
("measures which are intended to establish peace increase the disturbances that will lead to
war"). Time or changing circumstances are usually sufficient to distinguish one from the other.
Perhaps one example will do. The Kellogg-Briand Treaty contained "two clauses: the first
outlawed war as an instrument of national policy and the second called upon signatories to settle
their disputes by peaceful means." The Kellogg-BriandPact, 1928, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg (last visited Oct. 27, 2018). The treaty
was signed in 1928 and included "most of the established nations of the world," including the
United States, "Germany, Italy and Japan." Id. The treaty proved illusionary. Id.
27. I have noted that, although the disconnect between belief and reality may last for some
time, it cannot last forever. The classic example would be the many failed predictions of the
second coming of Jesus Christ. See generally NORMAN COHN, THE PURSUIT OF THE
MILLENNIUM (1957) (discussing historical millenarian cult movements). Similarly, once
cherished theories may be partially or completely abandoned when compared to subscription to
their tenets during their hay-day: e.g., laissez-faire capitalism, Marxism and Soviet-styled
communism. So, too, one may observe the intensities of religious faith. Other examples might
include subjects such as trickle-down economics, cautions expressed of impending and
unprecedented recession, gold bug or crypto-currency premises, and, of course, climate change.
Not only present in each instance is the question of which side is right (assuming the appropriate
questions are posed), but also, at least in the public sector related resolutions, the question of
prudence (i.e., not knowing the answer with complete certitude). Is it nevertheless advisable to
take precautionary measures? I have no intention of giving these matters additional attention
because they are not germane to the Article. My focus is on the environment in which the scholar
participates.
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III. FOUR CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

While the four challenges detailed below have always posed obstacles to
good scholarship, 2 8 today they are undoubtedly more complex than ever. 29
A.

Keeping Informed

Scholars are perhaps more obliged to keep informed about current events
than ordinary citizens. 30 They need a consistent source of quality information.
Some rules of thumb are easily articulated: it is usually better to consult more
rather than fewer sources, and consulting more diverse sources is presumably
preferable to consulting similar ones. 3' But, the information gathering
environment is not static. Perspectives of trusted sources may change or
calcify. 32 Trusted sources also may become less reliable. 33

28. There may well be more than the four considerations identified herein based on other
experiences and political inclinations. True dialogue or compromise can occur only when each
side articulates its position honestly and clearly. Just because you do not articulate your position
forthrightly (fearing it will be rejected), that cannot prevent the other party from attributing other
motives that may be far more distasteful than the one you withheld. Cf Celeste Headlee, The
Right Way to Have Difficult Conversations, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2017, 2:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-right-way-to-have-difficult-conversations-1504895455
(presenting advice when conversing with people with opposing viewpoints). Effective dialogue
also depends on each party perceiving sincerity of belief in the other. It is upon this basis that
James Madison placed his faith in the hands of the relatively indifferent. See infra note 25 1.
29. I choose here to ignore the more specific challenges posed by modern technology
including any costs associated with accessing digital resources. Such issues are not essential to
the thrust of my remarks. I do understand, however, that others may well think them germane.
Costs certainly can have disparate impact on access. Access through my university's library
portal permits access to a wealth of information that otherwise would be prohibitively expensive.
30. The point is that when current events cross a scholar's expertise there is an implicit
assumption that the scholar's expertise will help other citizens make sense of competing claims.
Some scholars, given their area of expertise (e.g., chemistry), may not feel compelled to express
their opinion on an unrelated subject (e.g., a fair and just tax policy), but since scholars (as do
other citizens) have an unpredictable combination of interests, it is probably impossible to
establish any rules governing professional expertise and their concern for one public policy issue
or another. I agree, however, that they should not misrepresent any applicable expertise. See
infra note 60 and accompanying text. Finally, the types of resources considered here are
traditional newspapers, their digital siblings, and various news delivery systems, including blogs
and social media.
31. That naturally is a rule of thumb, something like attempting to have a diverse portfolio
but without owning too many funds. One can certainly understand the principles involved, but
accomplishing the task is another matter.
32. Here, I again put aside issues such as difficulty of access and cost.
33. That comment covers a lot of ground which I have no intention of exploring. While
liberals, progressives, and even conservatives (without defining those terms) may possess
different perspectives than my own, I trust they have had similar experiences.
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Let me relate my own experience. For as long as I can remember 34 my
political inclinations have leaned conservative (again without defining). 35 For
nearly fifty years, however, as a scholar I considered the New York Times an
essential resource for current events. On any given day, one found there the
text of relevant documents or speeches (frequently in their entirety). Of
course, the editorial opinions of the Times (though usually cogently argued)
often were (though not always) inconsistent with my views. 36 Simply put,

those editorials were too liberal for my taste and so, over the ensuing decades,
I habitually skipped them. Admittedly not very scholarly, but then again, I
was seeking only general knowledge. 37 Still, the Times remained my go-to
current events resource.
Over the last several years, I became disillusioned with the Times'
journalistic integrity.38 Simply put, to my eyes, its reporting became
indistinguishable from its editorials. 39 I increasingly found the reporting
shallow, by which I mean it often ignored questions literally begging to be

34. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 1 (displaying my enthusiastic support in 1960 for the
presidential candidacy of John F. Kennedy.
35. Ignoring for the moment the issue of who would make the necessary determinations,
I assume that what makes American politics quite maddening is that relatively few American
conservatives, liberals, or progressives, or even feminists or environmentalists-or perhaps
racists (again without defining those terms)-are perfectly consistent. Madison of course relied
precisely on that truth. See infra note 265-66 and accompanying text.
36. Perhaps it was my different perspectives on human nature, or how I viewed the use
of physical force, or how my perception of foreign powers differed from theirs. So, too, I
sometimes judged one or more of the essential premises posited by the editors to be nothing
more than unsupported assumptions. Presumably, readers possessing different political
persuasions have made similar judgments, and so, some citizens treat CNN coverage as gospel
and are intolerant of Fox News, and vice-versa. I would venture to guess that in both cases part
of the recoil is due to dearly held attitudes being challenged. I trust each of us on occasion have
been tempted to throw something at our television screens, infuriated at the untruths being
expressed and our helplessness to challenge them. See WILLIAM GANGI, SAVING THE
CONSTITUTION FROM THE COURTS xxi (1995).
37. According to my wife, I engage in other equally reprehensible conduct: e.g.,

habitually skipping the daily comic strips.
38. This is clearly a judgment call an impression that I do not feel compelled to
document, as that would require much more time and energy than I am willing to devote to the
task. See generally Michael Goodwin, The 2016 Election and the Demise of Journalistic
Standards, 46 IMPRIMIS, May/June 2017. These occurrences are common all across the political
spectrum.
39. Of course, we are talking here about perceptions: things, as already noted, that are
malleable because one's own intellectual and attitude biases may shape what is perceived.
Certainly, all print resources were under enormous pressure from digital competitors. Perhaps
publishers sought to reduce subscriber losses by focusing their efforts on retaining what they
identified as its readership's political base. One would love to hear from established reporters,
even anonymously, about experiences and pressures during this period.
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asked, or it failed to adhere to the traditional journalistic mantra of Who,
What, When, Where and Why. 40 Hence, from my conservative perspective,
the Times' reporting became more and more slanted, manipulative, and
unreliable. Beyond such rudimentary journalistic sins of omission, I
occasionally found lapses in the reporter's logic. That is, based on my training
on how to evaluate evidence, these reporters skipped a step between the facts
described and the conclusion reached. Why, I asked, was I failing to
understand what permitted that reporter to reach the conclusions he or she
reached? Had logic been redefined as I aged? Had I missed that something
which would make sense of it all? 4 1My confidence in the Times as a reliable
current events source was shaken. 42

40. See Luke Burns, Additions to the Five Journalistic "W"s, NEW YORKER (Jan. 3 1,
2017), http://www.newyorker.com/humor/daily-shouts/additions-to-the-five-journalistic-ws.
41. Perhaps I am being harsh. Colleagues who have read earlier drafts of this manuscript
have pointed out that news reporting (especially print) has become increasingly subject to
distortion in the context of more responsive competition (digital news services, blogs, and social
media). In fact, compared to fifty years ago, different and conflicting standards exist. One
example might partially illustrate the point, though it is presented out of chronological order. I
refer to the response of Gerard Baker, Editor-in-Chief of the Wall Street Journal, to criticism
that he should have labeled some of Donald Trump's campaign utterances as "lies." See Gerard
Baker, Trump, 'Lies' and Honest Journalism, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2017, 2:21 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-lies-and-honest-journalism-1483557700.
Baker stated:
"I'd be careful about using the word 'lie'. 'Lie' implies much more than just saying something
that's false. It implies a deliberate intent to mislead." Id. Perhaps, like many others, I grew weary
of broadcast news programs where experts not only repeatedly talked past one another but,
perhaps even more annoyingly, attempted to talk over one another. I assume other scholars with
different political perspectives or substantive views have had similar experiences: that is,
publications, or broadcasters, etc. who seem to omit crucial information. Each seemed to have a
thesis to expound as if they presented a lawyer's brief: i.e., presenting only facts and arguments
consistent with their position.
42. The New York Times is sold primarily in larger, particularly coastal, cities, which also
forms the cornerstone of Democratic Party support. In the challenging and competitive
atmosphere that print news find itself today, one understands the need of a newspaper to appeal
to the constituency that purchases its paper. While the Times' publisher might find it difficult to
understand "middle America" or "rural America," rural newspapers also undoubtedly find it
difficult to comprehend coastal city values. Simply put: many middle Americans are unlikely to
be New York Times readers. Others contend that the tailoring of news to suit a paper's purchasers
is part of the contemporary newspaper business environment. See Peggy Noonan, America
Shouts
While Europe Shrugs, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017,
6:31 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-shouts-while-europe-shrugs- 1498170712;
see
also
Goodwin, supra note 38.
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OrganizingMaterialson Complex Subjects

The second challenge facing scholars today is not a new one, but, perhaps,
it is more arduous than ever. For example, how should a scholar approach the
many considerations associated with the right to keep and bear arms? Stated
more broadly, the issue is this: What criteria should scholars use while
pursuing their research, and once that research is completed, how do they
organize those materials so that different but related argument strands may be
separately retrieved? As I draft this Article (and redraft it seemingly ad
infinitum) I often have time between drafts. Sometimes I need a break from
the manuscript because I can't seem to find the words to express what is in
my head, or I struggle with a perceived lapse of logic (my own or others), and
on other occasions, I become aware of my own or another scholar's
unsupported statements. Or, alas, there are times when I am simply not in the
mood to write. I use these occasions to "chart" previously completed readings
on the Second Amendment.4 3
My experience is that such charts have a life of their own, growing as
additional sources are added to existing categories, or as new categories are
created. Organizational issues soon emerge: e.g., should the Heller and
McDonald opinions be treated as one (combining the majority and minority
opinions from each case) rather than separately, so that both perspectives may
be more efficiently contrasted on a long list of pertinent topics?44 Such issues
might include the following: what had been the framers' intent when they used
the Second Amendment language they did? 45 Are there alternate approaches

43. By "chart" I refer to a process by which each item is identified and a schema for
retrieval is developed. Thus, when a reading is completed, distinct lines of argument or
contentions may be identified. Similar arguments and contentions are subsequently grouped so
that at a later time each can be retrieved, separately or collectively, and may be compared. With
specific reference to the Second Amendment, numerous issues come to mind. I already have
mentioned some, see supra note 3, but broader issues would encompass, for example, the
Framers' intentions regarding the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the meaning
of specific phrases therein such as "privileges and immunities," "due process," and "equal
protection." I, for one, am still trying to get a better handle on the breadth and depth of the
majority and minority opinions in the Heller and McDonald cases as they are charted, plus the
innumerable commentaries on every aspect of those two decisions. Several prior attempts to
organize the materials proved unsatisfactory. There are too many lines of argument to recount
here. A colleague has also suggested exploring an alternative perspective on organizing research
materials. See John McPhee, Structure: Beyond the Picnic-TableCrisis, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14,
2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/01/14/structure.
44. That certainly has been my past practice. See, e.g., Gangi, supra note 11 (organizing
the discussion to consider nine symbols upon which interpretivists and non-interpretivists
differed).
45. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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to those taken by the majority and minority opinions in the Heller and
McDonald cases? 46 And beyond such issues there is this challenge: would the

criteria put forth in the Journey article remain viable when applied to a subject
that had been unanticipated when the article had been written namely, the
Second Amendment?47
Adding a contemporary dimension to the usual challenge is the fact that
legal scholarship has become more complex in part because judicial
considerations themselves today often extend well beyond evaluating legal
doctrine or precedent consistency. 48 In sum, today it is not uncommon for
legal scholars to encounter a far broader range of expertise (e.g., philosophy,
theology, sociology, political science) than in the past, and correspondingly
the organizational challenges increase with it. 49

46. Stated broadly, the majority in both the Heller and McDonald cases essentially relied
on a textual analysis of the Second Amendment text, establishing an individual right to keep and
bear arms (for purposes of self-defense in one's home), while the minority focused on national
and state legislatures to address the realities of gun violence. However, the Journey criteria
suggest that alternatives the majority's textual explication are certainly possible. For example,
is it legitimate to interpret the Second Amendment by referencing similar provisions in state
constitutions? Would it be useful to interpret the Second Amendment through the first, or fourth,
or fifth Amendments?
47. Of course, my presumption is that the analyses in the Journey article were spot-on.
Others may disagree. The great danger is, explicitly or implicitly, that I will find exactly what I
am looking for! That was my initial judgment of Justice Scalia's parsing of the Second
Amendment into its prefatory and operating clauses. Scalia posed the question: "Does the
preface fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms?" Dist.
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008). He responds that "[i]t fits perfectly, once one
knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above." Id. To
put the matter another way, why did Scalia pose the question he did? Here, I simply mention
some other observations without significantly detailing them. I have rarely discussed with other
scholars how they organize, keep track of, or retrieve their research materials. As alluded to in
the prior footnote, much work remains on any satisfactory Second Amendment organization and
analysis. My present plan is to begin the Journey analysis and to see whether that analysis holds
up to closer scrutiny. For example, if Scalia's analysis is sound, would state articulations of a
Second Amendment right in effect authorize citizens to partake in revolution by force of arms
rather than the ballot box? Does the Scalia analysis repeat Supreme Court laissez-faire
jurisprudence by also prohibiting both state and the federal governments from taking action
without explicit Constitutional support?
48. That has been my experience if I compare my initial publications to later ones.
Compare William Gangi, Confessions: Historical Perspective and a Proposal, 10 HOUS. L.
REV. 1087 (1973) (providing a historical perspective on the exclusionary confession rule in
seventeen pages); William Gangi, A Critical View of the Modern Confession Rule: Some
Observationson Key Confession Cases, 28 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1974) [hereinafter Gangi, Critical],
(providing a more comprehensive discussion on the exclusionary rule in fifty-four pages), with
Gangi, supra note 11.
49. One becomes somewhat uneasy when judicial determinations depend on the ability
of the Justices to accurately predict future voter sentiment. Justice O'Connor observed:
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These considerations impact every aspect of a scholar's responsibilities,
from establishing the accuracy and pertinence of cited authority to examining
the voluminous body of amicus curiaebriefs and post-decision commentaries.
How do scholars practically isolate and distinguish various argument strands
(often a dozen or more) from each other, and then, at the appropriate point in
their analysis, examine each strand's distinct components to determine how
that strand impacts the others? Put another way, how do scholars sift opinions
in the traditional Aristotelian fashion? 0 Is that model outdated today, and is
another model required to pursue these critical tasks?
C. ExercisingSelf-Awareness Muscles
Few scholars are oblivious of conscious biases. Most try to put these
aside. Many of us have to work very hard at doing so. However, as discussed
below, biases that lie beyond the surface are more difficult to identify and
confront.5 ' The first step, in my experience, is becoming more aware of just
what those biases might be, and then to better understand their experiential or
intellectual source. I refer to three types of communication described below:
intellectual judgments, acquired attitudes and feelings, as well as the
important distinctions between them.52 Added to these considerations would
be greater self-awareness of our personality-type preferences. 5 3 All scholars

[The Court] take[s] the Law School at its word that it would 'like nothing better than
to find a race-neutral admissions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious
admissions as soon as practicable . . . [The Court] expect[s] that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (citations omitted).
50. These developments may well contribute to the scholar's need for access to reliable
and continuous sources of information, a subject already discussed. See supra notes 30-42 and
accompanying text. Even then, one must remain cognizant of shifts in methodology preferences.
5 1. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
52. See Gangi, supra note 25, at 1-2. Briefly stated, intellectualpositions are reasoned
judgments, thoughts, or opinions derived through induction or deduction. Id. at 1. Logic reigns
supreme. Id. Attitudes are acquired through repetition (habit), and not necessarily through
contemplation or logic. Attitudes "embrace judgments about rightness and wrongness," often
without being derived through intellectual scrutiny. Id. Feelings may be described as an internal
response to either an internal or external stimulus. Id. at 2. Feelings have no morality, although
actions taken in their name do. Id. Related to the baggage we possess are our personality type
preferences and life experiences. Ignored, however, are different types of intelligence (e.g.,
spatial and social) as well as non-verbal means of communication.
53. Research related to personality type preferences are associated with the Myers-Briggs
Personality Indicator instrument and related research. Professor Kiersey identifies sixteen major
types based on four preference factors: introversion versus extroversion, sensible (personality
types that prefer relying on data accumulated from the five senses) versus intuition, thinker
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bring this baggage to their craft. Each component contributes or detracts from
the quality of scholarship produced. For example, despite having obtained an
advanced degree more than fifty years ago, remnants of my working-class
heritage remain. Similarly, though Roman Catholic by birth, I had not been
exposed to the Catholic intellectual heritage until college and graduate school.
At least initially, I sometimes continue to filter evidence through those two
prisms, among many others.5 4
Of course, political preferences must be counted among these initial
filtering prisms. Honesty remains the best policy. It is no secret, though by no
means unprecedented, that our political-and to some degree legal
atmosphere has become polarized. Much heat, little light. For some the
stakes are exceedingly high. The disease spreads but, in my opinion, does not
consume most Americans." For most scholars, transparency is probably the
best course of action. I counsel greater awareness of political inclinations:
stating them and letting critics discern if, and to what degree, those biases
impacted one's findings. 5 6
Constitution-making is about forging governing structures consistent with
a people's values and circumstances. 1 Politics is about a people's ability to
sustain the resultant way of life and governing structures in ever changing
circumstances. That is a very difficult task under any circumstances.

versus feeler, and, with respect to bringing decisions to closure, judger versus perceiver. Each
personality type has its strengths and weaknesses. Personality preferences also probably
influence which subjects individuals are attracted to, or which arguments are more convincing
than others and perhaps by what standards documents should be interpreted. The variations are
infinite. See KIERSEY, supra note 24, at 17-22.
54. Like many Americans, I participate in various groups, professional and personal.
Presumably, from the perspective of others (even those members of identical groups as I), my
point of view is obviously defective: it is not Catholic enough or too Catholic; Conservative, but
not quite enough for some and much too much for others; too working class for some, elitist for
others, and so on. In sum, I am a pretty normal participant in American politics, although
certainly some would claim not nearly normal enough or far too normal!
55. Here I contend that the Madisonian schema anticipated such occurrences but did not
embrace them, a subject later considered. See infra notes 235-51 and accompanying text.
56. One model for doing just that, despite contrary political histrionics on both sides, is
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A
REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION (June 2018).

57. Let me add one caveat without further burdening the reader. Speculations about what
would be a better system of government or use of imagination to construct alternate systems of
government (in which different outcomes are assumed) are merely speculations and should be
recognized as such. Unless the necessary authorizationis obtained from the only source that can
provide it (the American people through existing political processes), they remain speculations,
not scholarship.
58. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss2/6

16

Gangi: Scholars and Our Craft
2018]

SCHOLARS AND OUR CRAFT

363

However, during their careers, scholars also must be prepared for partisanship
of varying intensities.59 If possible, scholars should abstain from partisanship
because partisans habitually assume the truth of their public-policy choices.
Some partisans certainly have been proven to be right. But all partisans think
they are right all the time. In fact, most often, the majority of partisans ignore,
deprecate, or dismiss contrary evidence. We need not mince words: there is a
danger that some partisan scholars permit their partisanship to unduly
influence their scholarship. 60
Logic, as well as experience, does not demand that scholarship and
partisanship be mutually exclusive. Honesty, however, requires an
acknowledgment that the mental compartmentalization required to be both
scholar and partisan is unusual, and even then, rarely perfect. Hence, scholars
must be held and hold themselves and each other to the highest standards,
or they no longer serve a societal purpose. 61 So, in exercising their selfawareness muscles they can discern if a partisan sub-text has unfairly
influenced the quality i.e., the reliability of their scholarship.
Transparency contributes to honest dialogue and improves the quality of their
scholarship. 62 One more consideration.

59. For example, one can look at the American Revolution, the Civil War, and the Great
Depression, not to mention the post-2016 presidential election.
60. See Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future
ofAcademic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 165-66 (1999). He observes: "When academics
join forces to send a purely political message, their reputation as truth-seekers will diminish and,
with it, their credibility." Id. With respect to some 900 historians' and constitutional lawyers'
categorization of Justice Robert Bork's interpretive philosophy as "outside the constitutional
mainstream," Professor Devins concludes:
[W]hen a significant number of law professors and historians hold themselves out as
experts when they are not, they mislead, and all academics pay a price. For this very
reason, academics can ill afford another nail to be placed in the coffin of the
dispassionate academic expert. Rather, they must hold politically motivated
professors accountable for abusing academic freedom.
Id. at 166.
61. See id. at 184 ("Linked to the academics' reputation as truth seekers, academic
freedom empowers academics to speak out on public issues without sanction.").
62. Some opponents undoubtedly will attribute all a scholar's conclusions to aspects of
that scholar's attempted political transparency. Many opponents, however, will not. They will
attempt to do what they always have done, separate the wheat from the chaff i.e., weigh the
evidence. There is no way to foreclose that possibility. It is akin to the desire for intimacy and
the fear of vulnerability. You can't have one without the other. Honest and astute opponents will
make the necessary distinctions.
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D. Scholarship and Circumstances
All scholarship occurs in time and space. Different circumstances create
different challenges. Circumstances are not always hospitable. 63 Nothing,
however, prepared me for the 2016 presidential election. Nothing. 64 Any
acquired expertise as a political science professional certainly did not.65 The
2016 presidential election has proven more disturbing to more people than
any election I can recall. 66 Many voters were left numbed, bewildered at the
outcome, and with a growing cynicism and hostility toward the media. 67 The
lingering bitterness, however, has gone well beyond a mere election defeat or
even dashed expectations. 68 Let me add a few words on this phenomenon.

63.

Some of those challenges will be discussed in the body of the Article. See generally

LEO STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING (Univ. of Chi. Press 1988) (1952)

(discussing the challenges associated with the interaction of politics and philosophy).
64. This of course is somewhat of an exaggeration. As a faculty union negotiator and
grievance officer, however, I became aware of due process concerns with respect to faculty
members charged with Title IX enforcement violations. Compare RUSSLYNN ALI, OFFICE OF
CIVIL

RIGHTS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC.,

DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER

(Apr.

4,

2011),

https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104_pgl8.html
(enumerating
the various requirements of compliance with Title IX, including broadening the description of
sexual harassment and requiring the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in
grievance hearings in order to ensure that students' right to education is free from interference
by discrimination), with AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, THE HISTORY, USES AND ABUSES

OF TITLE IX (June 2016), https://www.aaup.org/file/TitlelXreport.pdf (arguing that the
requirements set out by the OCR in its Dear Colleague Letter not only hinder the due process
rights of those accused of sexual misconduct, but also raise distinctive issues of freedom of
speech by broadening the definition of sexual harassment), and Laura Kipnis, My Title IX
Inquisition, CHRONICLE REV. (May 29, 2015), http://5d5.3dd.myftpupload.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/08/My-Title-IX-Inquisition-The-Chronicle-Review-.pdf (explaining her
experience with a Title IX complaint of retaliation and exposing the real threats that these
complaints and requirements, as mandated by the OCR, pose to freedom of expression).
65. Electoral politics is not my strong suit. It usually bores me to death.
66. The 2016 election of Donald Trump was not uniquely disturbing. Historians might
point to the elections of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and perhaps
Franklin D. Roosevelt, all which in some ways were met with a certain degree of concern. But
does the discontent continue longer than usual? I see no need to recount the various twists and
turns in the Trump administration, as that is not the focus of the Article. I have also never
accorded merit to the favorable or unfavorable reaction to our presidential elections from
international foes or allies. Everyone will adjust to the realities that face them because, as
professional diplomats, they must.
67. I repeatedly and wrongly predicted that Trump's campaign would derail.
68. Dewey's defeat by Harry Truman comes to mind. But, while that also was a surprise,
the response was nothing like what the nation has experienced since Trump's election. In 1964,
I was bitterly disappointed at Barry Goldwater's overwhelming defeat perhaps the election
that in some respects comes closest to Hillary's defeat. Her defeat, however, is much harder to
bear because in 1964 there were no illusions of a Goldwater victory (not with a nuclear
mushroom cloud appearing nightly on my television screen while in the foreground a young girl
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When in 2008 Barack Obama had been elected America's first black
President, 69 many liberals-progressivists viewed history as once again moving
in the right direction.70 During his two terms there had been progress with
respect to securing greater race, gender, and sexual-orientation equality,
confirming proponents' expectations. 7 Hence, an indeterminate number of
Democrats and Independents anticipated a forthcoming November romp as
well as the election of our first female president. For those supporters, Hillary
Clinton's subsequent defeat was nothing less than shocking. It undermined an
anticipated future-one that lay just beyond their grasp while placing an
unanticipated obstacle in the path of their vision of an even more open
American society. 72

The post-election disappointment and deepening anger are
understandable. 73 By electing Donald Trump, not only had a minority of
Americans forestalled further advances in the struggle against various forms

discarded daisy petals). There may have been a similar sense of loss between the two elections,
but Lyndon Johnson's victory over Goldwater was overwhelming, both in the Electoral College
and in the popular vote. One certainly appreciates the greater sense of loss for Mrs. Clinton's
supporters because she garneredconsiderably more popular votes than did Trump.
69. Obama had turned what most political professionals had, at the time, considered a
fatal liability, his race, into a critical asset, much as John F. Kennedy had done with his speech
on religious toleration becoming an implicit litmus test of voter open-mindedness about
Kennedy's Catholicism.
70. I repeat, the first wave of progressivism occurred during the turn of the twentieth
century. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
71. Of course, for progressives and others, some Supreme Court decisions proved
troubling because progressives realized that in the wrong hands increased judicial power might
prove maleficent. Two such decisions come to mind: Citizens United v. Fed Election

Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (eliminating prior legislative limitations on political campaign
contributions) and the McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (application of the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms to the states). The more contemporary usage of
the term "progressivist" seems in no small part to have emerged among Democrats during the
2016 presidential election. Though not germane to the Article, my understanding is that
progressivism today connotes advocacy of public policy choices more radical than those favored
by mainstream liberals. I do not feel compelled to detail particulars.
72. For classic statements, see CHARLES FRANKEL, THE CASE FOR MODERN MAN
(Beacon Press ed., 7th ed. 1967); KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed.
rev. 1966); J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO, LIBERALISM: ITS MEANING AND HISTORY (D. Van Nostrand
Co. ed., 1958). But see GANGI, supra note 36, at 108-10, 176; William Gangi, The Exclusionary

Rule: A Case Study in Judicial Usurpation,34 DRAKE L. REv. 33, 105-07 (1984) [hereinafter
Gangi, Exclusionary] (citations omitted).
73. Part of that anger was the anticipation that under a Trump administration there would
be a roll-back or reversal of non-discriminatory immigration policies based on race or religion
and a retreat from Title IX enforcement. Similarly, there was concern that recent advances made
by gays, lesbians, and transgender people in the intervening years under the Obama
administration would be met with executive resistance. I again put aside such issues as not
germane to this Article.
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of discrimination, but they guaranteed Trump at least one, perhaps more,
Supreme Court justice nominations. 74 That is not all. Any prospect of a second
Trump term could have a chilling impact on a variety of policies that had been
secured under Obama. Simply put, many Democrats and Independents
remained incensed that a minority of Americans could do such damage to the
American dream.
What we don't know is the future whether over time a Trump
administration will become more effective, and less divisive, or what, if any,
accomplishments might increase or diminish opposition. Will the "resistance"
prove victorious or eventually fade and fail? Will it prove prescient and will
Americans subsequently endure cycles of alternative resistance? In any event,
some Americans have concluded that something is very wrong with the
American system. Wrong, not simply because Trump's election flew in the
face of historical evolution, but wrong also because, in their eyes, Trump's
election was undemocratic. Trump never won a majority of American hearts,
and some have asserted that he in fact does not "represent" them.75 Dashed
expectations are always painful. 76 In conclusion, for some, Trump's election

74. After the death of Antonin Scalia, the Republican Senate majority leader refused to
schedule hearings on President Obama's nominee to the Supreme Court. A democratic victory
in the 2016 presidential race would have assured a Clinton nomination but not necessarily
Obama's nominee. In any event, a Clinton nomination likely would have strengthened the
Court's liberal wing enough to reverse prior Court decisions on campaign financing reform and
application of the Second Amendment to the states. It was also likely, had that appointment
occurred, that the Supreme Court also would have retained or expanded other liberal policies
believed consistent with American ideals. However, Donald Trump proved the presidential
victor and nominated Neil Gorsuch to replace Justice Scalia. Mr. Gorsuch was subsequently
confirmed by the Senate. Recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement, and
after what may fairly be described as tumultuous hearings, Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed to
replace him. Unquestionably, President Trump's opportunity to shape the Supreme Court for
years to come has caused considerable anxiety among American liberals and progressives. They
now face an unanticipated scenario: A Supreme Court majority that might be willing to reverse
what had been considered settled societal progress. The judicial power they previously supported
to impose desirable public policies on the American people now might be used to undo what
they thought was settled law. Radical shifts are less likely than feared. In such situations, the
Supreme Court usually first chips away at periphery subjects rather than boldly reversing the
core of noted precedents. The direct overruling of precedents, however, would implicitly raise
the issue of how the judiciary differs from the legislature. The classic piece on these
circumstances is Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP.
CT. REv. 211. This should also be considered: the addition of Brett Kavanaugh might also result
in judicial scrutiny to other areas, namely, oversight of administrative agencies. See Peter J.
Wallison, KavanaughMay Restore SeparationofPowers, WALL ST. J. (July 16,2018, 5:59 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kavanaugh-may-restore-separation-of-powers- 1531778378.
75. Here, of course, we speak of perceptions, not legalities.
76. Perhaps this is an experience akin to falling out of love. There may be pain even when
both parties acknowledge the relationship's death.
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not only represented a political defeat, it resulted in significant obstacles being
placed in the path of anticipated progress.
Of course, after the election we have a better idea of how and why Trump
was elected, and why so many "experts" (certainly many possessing a far
better track record than my own) missed national undercurrents that now seem
so obvious. As is common in such situations, pundits subsequently have
explained that the signs were there but were ignored, dismissed, or
mischaracterized. My point is twofold. Scholars, like other citizens, live in
political societies. That too is part of a scholar's reality. Second, societal
realities often clash with perceptions until those perceptions are no longer
perceived as viable-even by former adherents.7 7
In drawing this introduction to a close, it is sufficient to note that the 2016
presidential election divided families, generations, and perhaps genders more

Reconciliations, despite initial sweetness and hope, fail. Again and again such
attempts at reconciliation fail. No one time frame rules. For some the process takes
days, for others, it takes years. However, the break becomes final when for one (rarely
both simultaneously) the pain of continued contact far outweighs the discomfit of
separation. For one, self-esteem is reasserted.
Gangi, supra note 25, at 34.
77. We already have referenced Professor Norman Cohn's seminal work that traces
revolutionary messianic mass-movements from early Jewish apocalyptic movements through
the Protestant Reformation and beyond. See COHN, supra note 27. As a result, there were
periodically believers that anticipated the end-of-times-the Second Coming of Christ which
would usher in a new world where laboring to survive would no longer be necessary. Cohn
observes, for example that
from the Jews and the early Christians-a tradition of prophecy which during those
same centuries took on a fresh and exuberant vitality. In the language of theology
which seems here the most appropriate language-there existed an eschatology, or
body of doctrine concerning the final state of the world, which was chiliastic in the
most general sense of the term meaning that it foretold a Millennium, not
necessarily limited to a thousand years and indeed not necessarily limited at all, in
which the world would be inhabited by a humanity at once perfectly good and
perfectly happy.
COHN, supra note 27, at xiii. Official Catholic teaching took a different view. St. Augustine, for
example, in his fifth century work, City of God, articulated what would become the official
Church position for a thousand years thereafter: "the Book of Revelation was to be understood
as a spiritual allegory; as for the Millennium, that had begun with the birth of Christianity and
was fully realized in the Church." Id. at 14. Nevertheless, outbursts of millennial expectations
occurred on numerous occasions and they often had serious consequences for secular authorities,
namely, that expecting the end of times some adherents refused to labor and perhaps also chose
to ignore religious and secular prohibitions. Why bother the end was near? Professor
Runciman reports (with respect to the Manicheans) that "authorities in that hard bellicose
age . . . could not approve of a faith . . . whereof a considerable number of believers wandered

about, refusing to work, refusing to notice secular regulations, living on the charity of others and
exercising a vast influence on the whole community." STEVEN RUNCIMAN, THE MEDIEVAL
MANICHEE 17 (Viking Press, New York 1961).
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than usual. It has rattled assumptions about America's future and its values.
Some urban, intelligent, and well-educated colleagues of mine were
literally for weeks or longer unable to discuss, analyze, or reflect upon the
election results with a Trump supporter, even a reluctant one. Two years have
passed since the 2016 Presidential election and the Trump administration has
proven to be neither reassuring to Democrats nor promising to many
Republicans. So, for an indeterminate number, the pain, and perhaps anger,
continues unabated.78 Of course, rarely is something unprecedented in
American history, and to a certain extent, that is the point. Scholars always
will investigate and evaluate public policy proposals, supported or opposed,
for cogent or partisan reasons. Scholars, however, have a serious obligation to
minimize the impact of their personal, intellectual, and political baggage on
their research. Their job is not only to illuminate the subjects they study but
also to inform citizens on those subjects. While a "world view" is perhaps the
life blood of an academician, for most Americans public policy decisions
always have some wiggle room. And, as argued in the Journey article as well
as later in this Article, James Madison's republicanism depended on that
fact.79 Contemporary democratic theory is not the same thing.so Unlike in the
Journeypiece," however, my emphasis in this Article falls on my experiences
as a scholar.
IV. WHY BECOME A SCHOLAR? 82

Such decisions are a consequence of varied tugs on the human soul,
imagination, and the creativity of universities. Some students are drawn to

78. Compare Baker, supra note 41 (discussing the criticism for not labeling President
Trump's rhetoric as "lies"), with Richard A. Friedman, Is It Time to Call Trump Mentally Ill,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/opinion/is-it-time-to-calltrump-mentally-ill.html (opining that the psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers
asserting President Trump may be mentally ill might be letting personal beliefs distort their
judgment). I trust that the reader understands that I have no intention of addressing issues such
as Trump's various executive orders on immigration, withdrawal from the Paris Treaty on
climate control, accusations of collusion with the Russian government to release emails
damaging to the Clinton campaign, the firing of FBI Director James Comey, or any other
subsequent developments. My point is that scholars always exist in a political environment,
though perhaps currently one more intense than usual. Many perspectives exist, and this will
always be the case.
79. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 66-72.
80. See Willmoore Kendall, The Two Majorities, IV MIDWEST J. OF POL. SCI. 317, 336-

339 (1960).
81. Gangi, supra note 1, at 5.
82. The focus of this Article is on scholarship and not the typical academic career, which,
in my experience, is a different kettle of fish. True enough, in some premier institutions, research
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admirable endeavors, hoping to better understand the world in which they
live; others desire to reshape the world to be a better place. Some seek to do
both. Though technically distinct, among these students may be counted those
seeking a law degree. 83

is a faculty member's primary responsibility, and the hiring emphasis falls on attracting proven
entities, that is, faculty who already have shown promise of stellar publishing performance. See
Mary Deane Sorcinelli, Faculty Development: The Challenge Going Forward, PEER REV., Fall
2007, at 5. At most other institutions, however, the hiring emphasis falls on newly minted Ph.Ds.,
who commonly begin their scholarly career by publishing portions of their recently completed
thesis-most often researched and written before beginning their career as an instructor. See
Samuel W. Buell, Book Review, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (2012). Before long, however,
once a faculty member begins teaching, they are encouraged to pay greater attention to
improving those skills. There is nothing like looking out at a sea of bored faces in a classroom
to stimulate the need to do so. Other encouragement may come in the form of an uncomfortable
conversation with the head of the department who informs the recent hire of negative student
feedback. Similarly, a recent hire may be taken under the wing of a senior faculty member to
acclimate him or her to the university's teaching culture, including what weight teaching
proficiency will be accorded in the hire's eventual tenure decision. In time, the head of
department-or perhaps another senior colleague will urge the new hire to devote more time
to university service, that is, to increase their participation in department, college, and university
affairs.
Thus, in most institutions of higher learning, cycles of research and publication, teaching,
and service are common and are integral parts of the profession. See Sorcinelli, supra, at 5. The
mix and intensity of each task varies, not only within a university's self-perception of where it
sees itself on the research-teaching spectrum, but also because of external pushes and pulls on a
faculty member, as well as from their personality preferences and lifestyle choices. Rarely is
participation in each of these components (teaching, research, and service) in perfect
equilibrium, and perhaps they should not be, because greater involvement in one category
diminishes participation in the others. At some point (perhaps associated with promotion), a
faculty member's research interests expand beyond his or her initial Ph.D. thesis. At that
juncture, productivity (e.g., publishing) differs from what occurred during the Ph.D. thesis
writing years. All the related tasks (e.g., literature review, reading, subject organization,
assessment, and writing) now take place in the context of other career obligations (i.e., teaching,
service) as well as lifestyle choices (including time spent sustaining a committed relationship
and perhaps parenting). Furthermore, as the faculty member ages, research interests typically
grow broader and more complex.
By the end of one's career, for many but not all faculty, the focus falls on career capping
projects, wherein a lifetime of scholarship is reassessed and perhaps rearticulated. During these
years, "service" may peak and perhaps decline, or it may increase, such as a faculty member
finding a professional outlet within university administration (their own or another) in a final
effort to utilize organizational prowess or interpersonal skills. In the alternative, senior faculty
may apply accumulated expertise and acquired wisdom to the classroom where-after two
generations of service-a challenge develops when instructing students whose values may be
very different than when they began their career.
83. Lawyers are included for several reasons. First, over the years, the number of law
students who do not actually practice law has increased. See Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Debating, Yet Again, the Worth of Law School, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013, 11:44 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/ 18/debating-yet-again-the-worth-of-law-school/.
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Students choosing to pursue an advanced degree are soon compelled to
select an area of concentration. In each generation, patterns of selection are
discernible, with students attracted to some single or related causes. Specific
student choices are in turn frequently associated with having had an inspiring
professor, often also committed to one cause or another (e.g., one form of
equality or another, the environment, climate change). Shortly thereafter,
these young scholars select a dissertation topic and mentor.8 4 In the social
sciences, a wide variety of mentoring styles and methodological decisions
must be made. Those decisions habitually shape initial publications. Make no
mistake, however, thesis topic selection and methodological choices entail
significant effort to master. Such choices are not easily revisited. The best
doctoral training provides students with at least a working knowledge of
competing methodologies as well as familiarity with the multiple tools
required to utilize them. 85

A significant number, I estimate, see the law degree as a universal advanced degree. It opens the
door to varied executive corporate positions that do not involve the actual practice of law.
Rather, specific law expertise is hired. Second, more law students, just as their Ph.D. peers, are
motivated either to understand better or wish to change the world. E.g., Jordan Rushie, I Went
to Law School to Change the World. Did I Make a Mistake? Part One of Two, RIGHT BRAIN
LAW (July 24, 2013), http://rightbrainlaw.co/i-went-to-law-school-to-change-the-world-did-imake-a-mistake-part-one-of-two/. There are many more nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), as well as more traditional public interest and lobbying opportunities than there were
fifty years ago. Third, there has been considerable growth in dual degree programs, wherein one
receives a Ph.D. in a specific subject (e.g., economics) and simultaneously an LL.B or J.D. in
law. See Top 10 Schools for Joint Law Degree Programs, KAPLAN, https://www.kaptest.
com/study/1sat/top-i 0-schools-for-joint-law-degree-programs/. Some students perhaps view the
law degree as providing more job options than those seeking only the Ph.D. or law degree. This
Article, however, emphasizes pursuit of the Ph.D., with which I am more familiar.
84. The focus here is doctoral candidates in the social sciences. Put aside here is what,
for some doctoral candidates, is a tension-filled relationship between a strong mentor and rigid
student, or vice-versa, or perhaps resentments that accumulate on the part of a student unwilling
to risk confrontation with his or her mentor for fear of delaying the dissertation's completion
and the start of their career. One of my professors was fond of saying "there are two types of
dissertations: ones that save the world and never get written, and the second, those more practical
in scope and thus doable." Regretfully, I also am aware of promising students caught between
competing ideological factions within a department who were unable to complete their doctoral
comprehensive exams or dissertations.
85. They encourage students to use the methods most suitable to the subject being
investigated rather than letting the methodology determine the fitness of a subject. Such
diversified training may have become less likely as the behaviorist methodology has come to
dominate the social sciences. That approach is considered more scientific since its design is
dependent on obtaining objective measurements instead of subjective assessments, and
consequently, its results are capable of being duplicated by others: the hallmark of the scientific
methodology. I do not wish to belabor the subject, but the methodological choices made at this
juncture also may constrict what subjects are or are not thought appropriate for study since the
subject chosen or the questions raised must be capable of measurement. But see LEO STRAUSS,
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The DescribedChoices Are More Complex Than They FirstAppear

Here are at least four reasons why:
1.

The historical context often explains why, and for what reasons, scholars
are drawn to, and perhaps pursue (for the rest of their careers) one subject
and not another. That being the case, some scholars become so enamored
with that context that they become blind to what evidence undermines the
broad historical context that birth it or the validity of the particular theses
that sustain it. 86

2.

3.

The historical context also may explain why a particular methodology or
methodologies are presumed preferable, or considered most productive,
for scholarly investigations. 87
Modem technology today makes an unprecedented scope of research
materials accessible. Some of these materials are excellent, others are
poor, but all are easily accessible. That is both a blessing and a curse. It
is a blessing in the sense that obtaining sources is easier than it has ever
been, providing students unprecedented opportunities to escape their
immediate circumstances, that is, the institution and faculty to which they
would ordinarily be geographically tied." Instead, students have access
to academicians all over the world.8 9 By the same token, the ease of
accessibility has not only increased the need for greater thoroughness but,

NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 42 (1953) (the fact-value dichotomy "leads to nihilism or to the

view that every preference . . . [is] as legitimate any other preference."); VOEGELIN, supra note
26, at 4-6 (noting that the subject should determine the method). The earlier a student is drawn
into a methodology, which may in part be determined by personality type, see KIERSEY, supra
note 24, at 17-22, the sooner that scholar's range of vision may narrow, that is, the judgment of
what topics ought to be or are capable of being investigated scientifically. Finally, other
investigative techniques include the desire to take a fresh look at past research as well as perhaps
conduct new research through filters more or less historically ignored by prior generations of
scholars, e.g., race and gender.
86. See Section V. A-C.
87. As noted elsewhere, "[t]his discussion proceeds along traditional analytic lines, and
as such is open to challenge by behaviorists, feminists, critical legal scholars, and
deconstructionists." See Gangi, supra note 1, at 61 n.282.
88. The emphasis here falls on the ease of accessing research materials, recognizing that
cost may pose an obstacle for some, depending on their personal or institutional resources. Not
only can these materials be acquired much faster than in the past, but also with far less effort.
Today one can acquire materials scattered in libraries around the world, and can often contact
the authors through their institutional, social media, or personal web pages.
89. This is another issue I have not discussed with colleagues. How does one know at
what point to stop reviewing the literature and begin (at least for me) the next step: breaking
down the larger topic into component parts and then sifting through multiple sources on the same
subject?
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in addition to mastering a subject, scholars also must acquire the requisite
technological expertise to access the wider range of materials. Hence, on
several levels the burden of scholarly thoroughness has proportionately
increased.90

4.

"[T]ides" sweep the scholar's world as they do similarly, if not
identically, to the fashion world and perhaps politics. 9' Such tides
influence scholarship in varied ways. 92 For example, it is not uncommon
for assumptions dominating research in a subfield of one discipline to be
extended to other subfields in the same discipline, and then adopted by
other disciplines. The same may be said with respect to a methodology or
investigative techniques. In time, however, such assumptions,
methodologies, or investigative techniques, for one reason or another,
become partially or completely discredited even in their field of origin.
Nevertheless, those criteria may continue to hold sway in disciplines that
had adopted them earlier but have not been exposed to the criticism that
resulted in their being discredited. 93 In sum, scholars must repeatedly
separate the wheat from the chaff (sources, arguments, evidence validity),
and to do that they must embrace adequate and appropriate criteria of
relevance. This much is certain: "[M]ore often than not, to one degree or
another, the scholarly criteria used in one generation are eventually found
partially or wholly defective by succeeding generations." 94

90. Elsewhere I noted:
Let me begin by noting that more than ever before, scholars today have enormous
difficulty mastering a specialized field. The problem is not simply unparalleled access
to materials in any one specialty, or even in one discipline: it is the need to grasp the
relationship between one's specialty and the general discipline, and then, between
one's general discipline and allied fields.
Gangi, supra note 1, at 61.
91.

THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 22, at 393 (John Jay).

92. As Publius noted: "They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men must
have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their duration, strength, and
direction and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure." Id.
93. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 61-62; see also infra notes 175-91 and accompanying
text.
94. Gangi, supra note 1, at 61. "Not to be facetious, but law students today must decide
whether the 'tides' they embrace (and which perhaps surround them) are coming or going!" Id.
at 62. While many young scholars may consider that a simple task, it is not if their experience is
like my own. As noted subsequently, research sources may be tainted by unstated or unproven
assumptions. See text accompanying infra notes 117-21.
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B. Digginga Little Deeper
All scholarship occurs in time and place, and to one degree or another, all
scholars must reexamine their professional training, acquired assumptions,
and the conventional wisdom of their day. 95 Over the course of this Article,
several facets of related issues will be explored. For example, among other
topics I refer to challenges such as making unwarranted assumptions, the need
to move in unanticipated directions, and displaying wariness toward
conventional wisdom. 96 However, no pretense is made in what follows to
describe experiences not my own a task that is rightly left to others. Some
could point out that many of the lessons deduced from the related experiences
in fact merely reflect one side of the political divide in which we find
ourselves. I agree, but I assure the reader that these lessons are sincerely and
honestly conveyed. Other perspectives are anticipated.
Some of my college professors, having completed their advanced degrees
prior to or shortly after World War II, counseled me, first, that perhaps the
Constitution's framers had not been motivated entirely by patriotism. Perhaps,
prospects of personal gain was their immediate consideration. Second,
referencing some of the framers' negative comments on the nature of
democracy, my professors also suggested that perhaps the framers were not
as committed to popular government as earlier scholars had proclaimed.
Finally, these professors contended that, rather than providing checks on the
powers exercised by the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary's
primary contribution to the separation of powers was to permit judicial

95. Two intersecting considerations are at play. The first is associated with the existing
conventional wisdom, that is, the "tides" of one's generation that unduly influence contemporary
scholarship, or as just noted, whether contemporary "truths," or the criteria of relevance
employed, are coming or going. Scholars may have to make the requisite choices because in a
particular time and place no consensus may exist on the appropriate methodology to use, or,
among other issues, disagreements may persist on which standards to apply when evaluating
evidence. But this is hardly a revelation. See James M. Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153, 153 (1926) ("Conceptions,
doctrines, theories, apparently embedded in fundamental law, fade, dwindle, and sometimes
die."). One additional consideration is this: at what point in a scholar's career did the body of
convention first make its impact? The longer the scholar has practiced his craft under an existing
"tide," the less likely that "tide" will be abandoned during his or her career. It is difficult to
challenge the precepts upon which one has been trained. It is not very different than one's
reaction to deeply instilled attitudes. Someone not similarly trained may perceive your reactions
to be disproportionate. See Gangi, supra note 25, at 7-8.
96. See infra notes 117-21, 122-29, and 131-33 and accompanying text. Other topics
would include assessing one's theoretical tools (infra notes 135-43) and keeping an eye on what
the people do in order to clarify what the people meant by the words they used (infra notes 14565).
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monitoring of the dangers associated with majority tyranny, that is, to protect
minorities from oppressive legislation. 7

97. The causes and justifications lie beyond this inquiry. For example, see the series of
essays in L1BERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM: THE CONTINUING DEBATE IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 277-380 (Willmore Kendall & George W. Carey eds., 1966) [hereinafter
LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM], with respect to changing perspectives on judicial power.
Some scholars then asserted that the primary purpose of the separation of powers was to facilitate
judicial protection of minorities from oppressive legislative majorities. In 1938 that perspective
was expressed in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Pertinent
language included the now famous footnote four: "whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). A subject
discussed shortly.
Utilization of the Carolene Products criterion accelerated during the Warren Court,
particularly with respect criminal rights and reapportionment cases and in subsequent years with
respect to privacy, gender, and sexual-orientation issues. One might claim that the legacy
continues with the Second Amendment cases. I insist, however, that a distinction must be made
between the desirability of the noted public policies and the authority of the Supreme Court to
impose them. Other scholars reject that distinction as unimportant, instead defending such
impositions as part of modern judicial review (although frequently conceding that it is different
from the one championed by the Framers), still other scholars champion expanded conceptions
of interpretive application, or they believe the good results associated with the imposed policies
more than justifies any concerns over the legitimacy of their imposition. Perhaps a brief
comparison of these views may be offered without unduly burdening the reader. Professor Perry
suggests:
I wonder which is stronger among contemporary constitutional theorists: the belief
that the Supreme Court should maintain a strict fidelity to the original understanding
of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment or the desire to have the Court continue to answer
"[F]ourteenth [A]mendment" questions by reference to traditional and emergent
societal ideals. . . . My guess (hope?) is that most constitutional theorists will forsake
the belief that the Court should be faithful to the original understanding. While they
may not forsake it openly, many will do so silently, by declining to call for the Court
to overturn all [F]ourteenth [A]mendment doctrine plainly not rooted in the decidedly
limited original understanding of the amendment.
Michael J. Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 704 (1978) (reviewing RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977). Elsewhere I observed:

This criticism of Berger is multi-faceted and integrated and is dependent upon three
apparent premises which may be briefly summarized: (1) our 'history must not be the
sole or even the predominant factor in determining the legitimacy of the Court's
performance,' (2) the Constitution is an 'empty' vessel into which meaning may be
poured and (3) . . .the Supreme Court is best suited to resolve contemporary public
policy issues.
Gangi, supra note 11, at 33 (first quoting Louis Lusky, Government by Judiciary: What Price
Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 415 (1979); then citing Arthur S. Miller, The
Elusive Searchfor Values in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 499
(1979)). Substantive discussions on these topics lay beyond the scope of this paper.
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Putting off a substantive discussion of my professors' contentions (i.e.,
that perhaps the Framers were prompted by immediate monetary gain and
insincere in their professed democratic beliefs),98 we focus here on their third
assumption described above, namely, that the primary purpose of the
separation of powers was to permit judicial monitoring of minority rights.
Soon after beginning my teaching career, I ran across an article which
challenged the idea that the Framers' doctrine of separation of powers was
intended to expand the judicial function.99 In this article, Professor Carey
contended that the primary purpose of the separation of powers, as understood
by the framers, was to make instances of "governmental tyranny" less
likely.1 00 Publius defined tyranny as consisting of the consolidation of

As detailed later in this Article, from approximately 1890 to 1930, progressive critics of
the Supreme Court also attempted to impugn the moral integrity of the Framers and the Supreme
Court majority. They instead sought to empower state legislatures and Congress to address
economic stresses, including working conditions in the coal mines and elsewhere, as well as to
challenge prevailing legal doctrine on worker liability for industrial accidents. Justice Benjamin
Cardozo suggested legislatures should enunciate broad policy goals that judges would keep in
mind when the principles were applied. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text; see also
GANGI, supranote 36, at 97-99.
98. Martin Diamond poses the issue thusly:
But if what the Founders considered to be defects are genuine defects, and if the
remedies, without violating the principles of popular government, are genuine
remedies, then it would be unreasonable to call the Founders anti- or quasi-democrats.
Rather, they would be the wise partisans of democracy; a man is not a better democrat
but only a foolish democrat if he ignores real defects inherent in popular government.
Thus, the question becomes: are there natural defects to democracy and, if there are,
what are the best remedies?
Martin Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsiderationof the Framers'Intent,53
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 56 (1959).
99. George W. Carey, Separation ofPowers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the
Critics, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151 (1978) [hereinafter Carey, Separation]. The essay appears
in GEORGE W. CAREY, IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (Liberty Fund, Inc. 1995) (1989)
[hereinafter CAREY, DEFENSE], to which subsequent citations will be made. In a book of
collected essays, LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM, supra note 97, the authors contrasted
liberal and conservative views on topics such as judicial power, the First and Fifth Amendments,
and whether the Communist Party posed any danger to American society. In the mid-1960s,
another pervasive theme was the inequality of treatment between white and racial minorities and
between the wealthy and poor. See generally Yale Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney
General Behind? The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration
of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 464 (1966) [hereinafter Kamisar, Letters] (discussing letters
between Chief Judge David Bazelon and Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach regarding
poverty, equality, and criminal justice). For a powerful statement on the subject, see Yale
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 3 (A. Howard ed., 1965).
100. Carey, Separation, supra note 99, at 154.

Published by Scholar Commons,

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
376

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 347

legislative, executive, and judicial power into a single hand.' 0' Although the
tendency was common to all forms of government (e.g., monarchies,
aristocracies, and democracies), it was a tendency particularly dangerous in
popular governments because the legislature, who made the law, naturally
predominated. 102
At the Philadelphia Convention, many Antifederalists expressed concern
that if the newly proposed national government was granted the powers
proposed by the Federalists, those powers could be used by the national
legislature to tyrannize all citizens. Even Thomas Jefferson expressed concern
over consolidations of power already occurring in some state governments,
including his beloved Virginia.1 03 Would the danger posed not be even more
acute in a yet untested government? The framers were keenly aware of the
danger. Although they insisted on a national government possessing adequate
powers to meet any contingency, they took as many practical precautions as
feasible to make the consolidation of powers less likely.

101. Publius observed: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 22, at 301 (James Madison).
102. Publius notes: "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, supra note
22, at 322 (James Madison). He continues:
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and
to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their
common dependence on the society will admit.
Id. Simply put: Kings and aristocracies ultimately depend on loyalty to the idea that they are
entitled to rule or have been ordained by God to do so. The bond between ruler and ruled may
deteriorate. In popular governments, however, the legislature is empowered to make the law and
direct the many to use their physical power against its enemies, real or imagined. Thus, some
believe, popular governments are potentially the most dangerous because the republican
principle of majority rule can be combined with the physical might of the populace against
minorities.
103. Thomas Jefferson noted:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the
legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition
of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised
by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. 173 despots would surely be as
oppressive as one.
Thomas Jefferson, The Constitution of the State and Its Several Charters?, in NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA 126 (Frank Shuffelton ed., 1999) (1785).
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First, the states ceded to the national government only those powers
perceived as essential to accomplish the limited objectives assigned to it. 104
All residual sovereign power remained in state hands.' Second, those
powers lodged in federal hands were then dispersed (separated) among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and each were given sufficient
power to assure the powers granted could be protected by each respective
branch.1 06 Third, since in a popular government the legislature was the branch
most likely to attempt a consolidation of power (they made the laws), the
framers took yet another precaution: conditioning use of the extensive powers
granted the Congress upon the cooperation of the House of Representatives
and Senate, structuring the chambers so that each had different terms of office
as well as, in some cases, distinct responsibilities. 107 The framers believed
such precautions would reduce the likelihood of consolidation yet preserve
the requisite governmental vigor on both the state and federal levels. 08

104. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 22, at 153-54 (Alexander Hamilton).
105. The allocation of all governmental powers between the federal and state governments
usually is referred to as the division of powers. The federal government is commonly understood
as possessing only the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, while states
retain all other residual sovereign power. Publius comments:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises
to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 323 (James Madison).

106. Id.
107. Membership in the House of Representatives was based on population, each member
was elected from a distinct district where he or she resides and was to serve a two-year term,
while members of the Senate (at the founding) were named by their state legislature and would
serve staggered six-year terms.
108. Publius refers to six different "classes" of powers: "1. Security against foreign danger;
2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper
intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of
the States from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers."
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 22, at 256 (James Madison). I do not address other specific
constitutional provisions alluded to in the text, such as the fact that all revenue bills must
originate in the House of Representatives, or the requirement of the Senate's advice and consent
to the making of treaties. Equally ignored here are the possibilities of impeaching the executive,
or the potential of both houses of Congress to override a presidential veto, or the consequences
associated with staggered legislative terms, or the need for the House and Senate to cooperate
to make any law. Also ignored are other precautions such as the creation of an independent
judiciary capable of striking down legislation or actions inconsistent with the Constitution (i.e.,
judicial review). With respect to the last, however, the scope of the power granted deviated from
what presently exists. It was confined to actions that exceeded the powers granted, as understood
by those who ratified the document. The power of judicial review did not include secondguessing the wisdom or morality of legislation enacted if it was within the bounds of the powers
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But, if what my professors had taught me was incorrect, and the purpose
of the separation of powers was to forestall not majority but governmental
tyranny, then how did the framers anticipate addressing the danger posed by
the majority's use of governmental power against a minority of citizens? I
again was forced to re-examine my assumptions. The danger of majority
tyranny, the author explained, was an issue distinct from the one posed to all
citizens by a consolidation of powers. It could not be remedied by a structural
provision because any proposed structuralsolution, Publius argued, would be
inconsistent with republican government: majority rule.' 09 And so, the author
reminds us that the framers' cure for majority tyranny was the same cure
suggested for the protection of religious rights: reliance on the multiplicity of
interests and an extensive territory. 10

granted. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 33-36. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 22, at
467 (Alexander Hamilton).
109. For at least two reasons, the Framers at the Philadelphia Convention rejected a
proposed Council on Revision (i.e., a Council at least partially consisting of members of the
judiciary empowered to pass on the constitutionality of legislation prior to its implementation).
First, they thought it was sufficient that the judiciary would have the power to interpret the law.
(Here we put aside their perception of the scope of that power or the judiciary's inherent
weaknesses, or their expectations that interpretive rules would be observed). Second, when it
came to assessing the wisdom or efficacy of legislation, the Framers thought members of the
judiciary possessed no powers of discernment distinct or superior to those available to
legislators. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300-06 (1977). For additional

discussion and references, see GANGI, supra note 36, at 128-35. I leave a great deal unstated,
including specific constraints on Congress both within the original text and the subsequent Bill
of Rights. In creating the judiciary, the Framers also purposefully took a distinctly un-republican
path appointment during good behavior rather than election. See generally CHRISTOPHER
WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? 6-10 (1991)

(discussing the Framers' intent to not create a strict democracy or republic). This choice was
guided by their desire to better assure that the executive and legislative branches would not
exceed the authority granted to either. There are distinct differences between what the Framers'
envisioned as legitimate exercises of judicial power and what today is defended in its name. See
Gangi, supra note 11 (arguing that arguments for an expanded judicial power are unsupported
by evidence). The structural precautious taken by the Framers have already been mentioned. See
supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. As Professor Bridwell observes:
This schizophrenic attempt to equate results with legitimacy in particular instances,
but to generally preserve majority rule as an option, presumably as insurance against
a Court disposed to injustice, is at best a considered gamble resting on pragmatism
rather than an intellectually definable principle. It is a gamble that only those who are
dissatisfied with majority rule, with democracy, at least on some levels, ever decide
to take.
Randall Bridwell, The Scope ofJudicialReview: A Dirgefor the Theorists ofMajority Rule, 31
S.C. L. REV. 617, 639 (1980).
110. Publius states:
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests and in the other in the
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So, as you can see, scholars regularly work in minefields of conflicting
viewpoints, grand theories, and assumptions (stated or unstated), with some
coming into being, others gaining or losing popularity, while still others-for
one reason or another-completely falling out of favor. All this occurring, of
course, in addition to the ebb and flow of other tides, such as those respecting
appropriate research topics and methodologies. Simply put, scholars must
remain cognizant of the intellectualfashions of their day, even though it is
unlikely that they can escape such prisms completely. " From this
experience, coupled with those noted above, scholars exploring historical
materials should follow four fundamental investigative precautions: (1)The
principles or words used by historical figures should be conveyed as the
figures themselves understood them; (2) Any meaning those principles or
words acquire after the period being studied should be exorcised from
purported reconstructions of the period examined; (3) If, during the period
studied, the principles or words had several usages, scholars should determine
which view dominated and how influential those were who shared that view.
Accordingly, scholars should not focus on minority points of view even if,
having the benefit of hindsight, one knows they become dominant sometime
in the future; and (4) Perhaps most importantly, scholars should test the
word's alleged meaning against actual practice. Scholars should not be
satisfied with logical explications; they must zero in on the action. A people's
actions provide a crucial context for the interpreter, just as, in adjudication,
concrete facts provide a more appropriate setting than do hypotheticals.
Students should be leery when discrepancies between belief and action are
characterized as ignorance of the words' true meaning, or are due to the
people's alleged hypocrisy.112
But let's start closer to the beginning of a scholar's journey.
V.

WHAT SHOULD PROMPT SCHOLARSHIP?

Curiosity!

multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number
of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country
and number of people comprehended under the same government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 324 (James Madison).
111. This Article is written from the perspective of a normative political scientist, and as
such, may not apply to other fields: e.g., chemistry. There also is a divide between the so-called
hard and soft sciences that rests on the nature of the subject matter or methodological preference.
112. Gangi, supra note 1, at 65 (contains an earlier expression of these principles). I put
these suggestions forth without presuming universal adherence. These matters are perhaps
inherently intertwined with substantive issues. I will leave the reader to consider alternatives.
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Although many scholars, upon reflection, admit that some moral or
ethical injustice prompted their initial subject interest, persistent curiosity tips
the scales towards greater objectivity. 113 Many scholars fail to completely
escape their own biases, but striving to do so enriches the quality of their final
product.11 4 To have a lasting impact on one's research, curiosity must be
sustained, but, in my experience, it instead often waxes and wanes. That too
has taught me valuable lessons.
Skill acquisition requires persistence. When, as a Ph.D. candidate, I
obtained two of Willmoore Kendall's "Vanderbilt Lectures" (originally
delivered at the University of Dallas), I skimmed them briefly, found them

113. This section is perhaps more autobiographical than analytical. It certainly reflects my
earliest scholarly endeavor a master's thesis: William Gangi, Justice at the Expense of Truth,
(Apr. 25, 1965) (unpublished master's thesis, St. John's University) (on file with St. John's
University Libraries). I recall Professor Yale Kamisar expressing a similar sentiment that
whatever the dictates of the law, at some point a judge's conscience would compel him or her
to exclude evidence acquired through outrageous police conduct. Yale Kamisar, "Comparative
Reprehensibility " and the FourthAmendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1987).
114. The trickier question for scholars is for how long and to what degree does curiosity
direct their scholarship-an issue discussed in greater details elsewhere. Gangi, supra note 1, at
11-32. The greater an emphasis is placed on felt injustices, the greater the tendency toward
advocacy and action (political or otherwise) rather than presenting different perspectives as
objectively as possible. See generally Aileen S. Kraditor, On Curiosity: or, the Difference
Between an Ideologue and a Scholar, 15 INTERCOLLEGIATE REv. 95 (1980) (describing an
ideologue as someone who ignores information contrary to their hypothesis and a scholar as
someone seeking the truth). Professor Devins also observes: "Academics . . . have an obligation
'to speak truthfully about the issue at hand, because they have a detached cast of mind as well
as a large stock of relevant and reliable knowledge on the subject at issue."' Devins, supra note
60, at 168 (quoting Edward Shils, The Academic Ethic, in THE CALLING OF EDUCATION 3, 107
(Steven Grosby ed., 1997)).
Of course, some scholars are capable of both detachment and advocacy. Few, however, do
it very well. For many, the moment of truth comes when their scholarship drives them to
conclusions inconsistent with past political preferences, or when their scholarship runs contrary
to that championed by their usual allies. For example, my understanding is that Justice Oliver
Holmes personally subscribed to the belief that laissez-faire was a superior economic
perspective; yet, he nevertheless authored his famous retort that "[t]he [Fourteenth] Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Although personally supportive of a woman's right to an
abortion, Professor John H. Ely expressed grave reservations about the constitutional legitimacy
of the Roe v. Wade decision (striking down a state anti-abortion law), at least as the majority
opinion had been written. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 923, 947-49 (1973). Professor Gerald Gunther, like Ely, personally
supported abortion legislation but described the Roe v. Wade decision as "an abomination, an
outrage, one of the worst Supreme Court decisions in terms of constitutionally mandating what
ought to be legislatively mandated responses to political pressures." Henry Steele Commager,
The Constitution and OriginalIntent, CENTER MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 4, 17. I would add
that, after decades of correspondence with Raoul Berger, a severe critic of various modern
Supreme Court decisions, his personal political philosophy remained decidedly liberal.
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intriguing, but put them aside. Other priorities beckoned (a doctoral thesis).
Several years later, now teaching, the lectures were published in book form
(Basic Symbols)."' Reading that book I was initially troubled because when
I contrasted their explication of The Mayflower Compact (Compact) language
with my copy of that document, some of the words the authors quoted did not
appear in my copy of the Compact.
Am I being conned, I contemplated? (A fear I later realized common
among Brooklyn-bred boys.) By chance, I noticed that the volume of
important American documents I was using was an edited one, and once I
obtained an unedited copy of the Compact, the authors' scholarship proved
impeccable. For some reason, the editor of the edited volume had excised the
very words which the authors of the Basic Symbols thought particularly
significant, presumably because the editor thought those words extraneous.116
From this experience, and from the Basic Symbols' book, I offer five
suggestions which scholars might adopt to improve the quality of their
research.
A.

Be Wary ofMaking UnstatedAssumptions

Kendall and Carey warn scholars not to rely upon, or unintentionally
create, "thesis books," books wherein important unstated assumptions are
made that in effect predetermine the outcome of their research before they
begin. Put otherwise, assuming the truth of their assumptions, these authors
focus more on explicating the internal logic of their thesis (consisting of one
or more often related assumptions) than on the evidence encountered." 7
Consequently, thesis book authors fail to recognize that if encountered
evidence is viewed from another perspective, that evidence may in fact
partially or completely undermine the thesis they are trying to logically
explicate. In sum, there is a tendency among thesis book writers either to

115. WILLMOORE KENDALL & GEORGE W. CAREY, THE BASIC SYMBOLS OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1970).

116. The problem I encountered is a common one-the tainting of a generation of research
materials because of the injection of unsupported assumptions. Professor Voegelin observes
that:
[D]amage is . . done through interpretation. The content of a source may be reported
correctly as far as it goes, and nevertheless the report may create an entirely false
picture because essential parts are omitted. And they are omitted because the
uncritical principles of interpretation do not permit recognizing them as essential.
VOEGELIN, supra note 26, at 10.
117. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 9.
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ignore or to otherwise diminish the importance of the encountered evidence,
that is, to characterize such evidence as being unimportant or irrelevant."'
Still, the thesis book writer must be differentiated from an author
committing intentional fraud knowingly ignoring or purposely excluding
evidence that even they acknowledge (to themselves) as relevant. The mistake
thesis book writers make is clearly unintentional. It is due solely to the fact
that they had focused so intently on their thesis content, or on the effort and
concentration required to logically explicate that thesis-or on describing how
that thesis contributes to the shaping of the present that these authors
become incapable of viewing evidence from outside their assumed
assumptions. Encountered evidence partially or completely undercutting their
thesis simply does not register to them or, it is perceived as unimportant or
irrelevant. 119

Unintentional or not, however, thesis books can damage a body of
scholarship for several generations. The extent of the eventual damage
depends on when it occurs in the creative cycle of formation, early adoption,
critique and ultimate abandonment. Hence, if the injection of what over time

118. For example, with reference to the words omitted from the Compact, the editors
apparently believed (we would have to ask those editors) that references to the colonialists' faith
were largely irrelevant as to why the document was important to our tradition. One must fully
grasp how powerful adherence to one's thesis may be. Scholars may sense that something is
amiss when they encounter evidence that contradicts their thesis. But, the contradiction may be
paralyzing because one is not ready (if they ever are) to let go of a thesis that, to one degree or
another, may in fact form the cornerstone of their career. That is why I suspect such evidence is
subconsciously ignored or diminished. Conscious acknowledgment of the evidence's relevancy,
coupled with an unwillingness to fairly address the inconsistency may approach-but not yet
constitute purposeful suppression of evidence.
119. Cf Gangi, supra note 1, at 23 (citations omitted) (observing that the Justices "ignored
an entire body of scholarship which contends that to fully understand what a people hold dear,
it is important to establish correlations between their symbolic expressions and their perceived
embodied truths, as well as between those symbols and the actions of the people."). For example,
coming, as I did, with a different set of interpretive principles, I had a different perspective on
the relevancy of some subjects than did my peers:
When students probe the First Amendment faith they will find that it rests on little
more than the logic of John Stuart Mill and his creative successors. These free speech
theorists (or worshipers) usurp federal and state legislative power, and ultimately rest
on unconvincing scholarship. Let me go further. Even if one embraces all their
doctrines and assumptions as perfectly true, they would still not provide a
constitutional standard. All they amount to are sub-constitutional arguments. They
may be brilliant, they may be reasonable, they may be logical, and they may even be
convincing, but they still are not compelled by the Constitution. Congress and state
legislatures can reject their dictates or reasoning. They also, of course, can embrace
them, and by statute or amendment, direct courts to apply them. But I deny that courts
have ever been authorized to impose them.
Id. at 28 (citing Gangi, Exclusionary, supra note 72).
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proves to be a false thesis occurs early in the noted cycle (if not soon
corrected), will do the greatest damage over the longest period. The damage
is so extensive because its originators-or early contributors-intensively
speculate on the breadth and depth of its possible application. If thesis books
come late to the body of scholarship (just as critical appraisals of that thesis
either begin in its field of origin or to other fields to which it had been initially
applied), they naturally do the least damage. In practice, however, the time
between initial thesis criticisms and rejection of that thesis as partially or
completely defective, is indeterminate. The damage done in the interim can
corrupt a body of scholarship for several generations because, as noted above,
a thesis book of one generation often forms the jumping-off point for the next
generation of scholars building upon and expanding the original thesis.1 20 in
sum, a defective thesis is embedded further in a body of literature until at
some time in the future it is revisited. These occurrences are perfectly
understandable. Thesis book creators often are innovators with scholarly
reputations otherwise beyond reproach. Often the timing is right and the
audience is receptive to the consequences of the thesis, which then becomes
so widespread in the field that it is considered to be beyond question. We will
return to this and another facet of this topic later in the Article. 121
B. Be Preparedto Move in UnanticipatedDirections
The rub of course is that such errors are unavoidable since all scholars
must make assumptions. If anything, scholarship is about the accumulation of
a body of knowledge over a sustained time period, inherently creating fertile
ground for error accumulations. One might suggest that scholars are as likely
to add as to subtract from the accumulations. On the one hand, good
scholarship requires scholars to identify their own assumptions and prejudices
and to prevent them from adversely influencing their substantive research
conclusions. On the other hand, for the same reason, that scholar must
carefully identify their opponents' prejudices and assumptions, stated or
unstated. The very juggling of these two considerations may prompt a
reexamination of one's prior conclusions. That in turn may cause the scholar
to consider another perspective, one prompted by the opponent, or another
perspective, perhaps only partially attributable to that opponent. In either case,
these circumstances may stimulate the scholar's curiosity, and he or she might

120. See Landis, supra note 95. I already established that the error is an unintentional one.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 174-81, 189-90 and accompanying text.
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consider a topic, an approach, another point of view, or insight, they had not
before anticipated or had given credence.
To illustrate my point, I again recount my own experience. After
publishing several articles, subject curiosity drew me to the origin and
rationale of the exclusionary rule. Having nearly completed that research, I
ran across a brilliant article whose authors brushed aside as inconsequential
the rule's history, and the fact that until recently the rule had been understood
as a mere rule of evidence admissibility lacking constitutional status. Instead,
the authors forthrightly defended the proposition that judicial imposition of
the rule should be understood as a corollary exercise ofjudicial review.1 22 The
authors labeled their approach the "judicial integrity argument."1 23 As
recounted elsewhere, the argument dazzled me. Instinctively (perhaps a
synonym for refusing to let go of my historical evidence), I knew they were
wrong, but for the life of me I could not cogently refute their reasoning. I also
could not withhold it from my students because in class I had acknowledged
the argument was a powerful one, and during the course of the semester I had
repeatedly chided them about the need to confront opposition arguments! So,
for a few semesters thereafter when lecturing on the exclusionary rule, my
confidence was undermined, and that certainly contributed to some of my
class room surliness. 124
Drawn deeper and deeper into the related literature an even broader issue
came into focus: in the American system of government, what is the proper
role of the Supreme Court? Recognizing (not too graciously, mind you) that
my theoretical and historical tools were deficient, I abandoned research on the
exclusionary rule and instead turned my attention to this new subject.1 25
Having one's research taken in unanticipated directions forces scholars to
once again confront, re-embrace, or abandon assumptions that perhaps are
near and dear to his or her heart.
Finally, even if one successfully explores his or her assumptions on one
subject, it may still draw criticism on another-even from unexpected
quarters. I recall, not long after publishing an article on competing interpretive

122. See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Upfrom Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 311-12 (1974).
123. Id. at 325 (explaining the judicial right to refuse to sanction illegal police conduct).
124. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 4.
125. See Gangi, supra note 11, wherein I side with Raoul Berger's rejection of a more
powerful place for the judiciary in the American system of government. See also William Gangi,
RaoulBerger'sImpact on ConstitutionalLaw, 3 BENCHMARK 189, 191, 196 (1987). Three years
after publishing the Expansionism article, I returned to the exclusionary rule debate. See Gangi,
Exclusionary, supra note 72 (concluding that the exclusionary rule is not mandated by the
Constitution).
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perspectives, Professor Carey sent me a letter,1 26 forthrightly challenging my
characterization therein of the Constitution as a "mixed regime."1 27 He chided
me and pointed out that Publius1 28 certainly did not share that view, and had
instead contended that the American Constitution was unique in its day since
every branch ultimately remained dependent upon the people (unlike, for
example, in Great Britain, where the monarchy named members of the House
of Lords). Although I did not realize it then, Carey's comment reinforced the
caution against scholars making unsupported assumptions, eventually
compelling me (having been frequently nurtured by defective scholarship) to
reexamine my understanding of both the idea of a "mixed regime" and the
already mentioned purpose of the separation of powers.1 29 At least that is how
I process his criticism today; then, unfortunately, some of the suggestions I
now make eluded me: "Whatever," I thought at the time, rather flippantly.1 30
C. Be Wary of Conventional Wisdom
The third lesson deduced from Basic Symbols is distinct but related to
Kendall and Carey's thesis book concern. 131 I refer to their coining of the
"official literature" phrase,1 32 that is, literature consisting of secondary
sources that purport to explain the significance of our primary national
documents (The Declaration of Independence, The FederalistPapers, the
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights). Succinctly put, the official literature
teaches that our political tradition began with the Declaration of
Independence, and since that time primarily consists of a continuous

126 I refer to the JudicialExpansionism article. See Gangi, supra note 11. Unfortunately,
at the time of my writing, I have not been able to locate this letter. If located in the coming
months, I will place it on file with South Carolina Law Review.
127. See Gangi, supra note 11, at 60 (describing the Constitution as a "mixed regime")
(citing MARTIN DIAMOND ET AL., THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 11 (2d 1966)).
128. "Publius" is the common pen name used by the three authors of The Federalist
Papers. THE FEDERALIST, supranote 22, at xi.
129. See Gangi, supra note 11, at 60-61 (citations omitted); Carey, Separation,supra note
99, at 53. The issue of the Supreme Court's use and abuse of symbol utilization is outside this
inquiry.
130. Cf William Gangi, The Supreme Court: An Intentionist's Critique of NonInterpretive Review, 28 CATHOLIC LAW. 253, 289-96 (1983) (analyzing Kendall and Carey's
Basic Symbols). But Carey's minor criticism planted a seed that would grow over the next
several decades, eventually compelling me to reread Basic Symbols yet again, this time still more
carefully, better appreciating its critique of contemporary scholarship and its contributions to an
understanding of the Framers' design.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
132. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 10.
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expansion of equality and personal rights. Such assertions, however, are
difficult to reconcile with the facts. 133
Official literature assumptions continue to dominate the academy which
is precisely the authors' point. 134 To clarify, the authors used the adjective
"official" not to refer to the legal status of liberties or equality assertions, but
rather to describe the pervasiveness of those secondary source assertions as
providing prisms through which many academicians view the associated
primary sources. Consequently, those same prisms dominate teaching on
associated subjects in secondary, college, graduate, and law schools-so
much so that it is difficult for students to find an alternative view in many, if
not most, American Government college textbooks.1 35

133. Detailed elsewhere are the Basic Symbols authors' recounting of five contradictions
that undermine the official literature thesis. These may be briefly articulated by raising five
questions: (1) Why at the Philadelphia Convention did the Founding Fathers refuse to include a
bill of rights? (2) Where did God go between the Declaration of Independence and proposal of
the Constitution? (3) What happened subsequently to the Declaration of Independence's stirring
proclamation "'that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."' (4) Does
the post-revolutionary behavior not fly "in the face of the Declaration's description that "'all
men are created equal,"' and finally (5) After the Revolutionary War was won, what happened
to the rights of Englishman that we allegedly fought the war? GANGI, supra note 36, at 3-6. I
also ignore the body of scholarship detailing the racial and gender discrimination that existed
during the founding period, because it is impossible to discern how a lack of discrimination
would have altered the ratification debate. Some talented and imaginative scholars certainly
might speculate on the subject, but we can never know what would have happened. I am not
enamored with approaching history as if it could be undone. I understand that some scholars
take satisfaction in bringing such discriminations to the public's attention and perhaps
condemning the perpetrators for their lack of morality. I do not view that perspective as
particularly fruitful for contemporary scholars. Instead, I want to focus on the historical context
of the times, as well as what rights meant then to the people, both before and after the Revolution.
See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text and sources. After all, something must have
happened in the years preceding the Revolution to entice a good portion of them to risk, as noted
in the Declaration of Independence, their lives, fortunes, and sacred honor. See generally Caitlin
Fitz, Lives Lost for Their Countries, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2017, 6:27 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/lives-lost-for-their-countries-1499812053
("History judges the
spy Nathan Hale a martyr for liberty, and the Loyalist Moses Dunbar a traitor. But what if the
Revolution had failed?"); John F. Ross, ColonialAmerica's FinalBattle, WALL ST. J. (July 9,
2017, 6:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/colonial-americas-final-battle-1499638797
(noting the French and Indian War's influence on the American tradition).
134. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 10-17 (summarizing the relevant questions
that official literature fails to answer).
135. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 40-41 (noting that college textbooks often distort
America's history). The "official literature" prism also influences how particular aspects of the
Constitution are viewed, including the free speech clause in the First Amendment and the equal
protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. The more one appreciates the pervasive
influence of thesis books and the thrust of the official literature, the more one realizes how
damaged our understanding of republican theory has become. However, these comments can
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D. Are Your Conceptual Tools Sufficient?
Scholars must continuously test the validity of their conceptual tools. The
Basic Symbols authors did precisely that. They forthrightly challenged official
literature assumptions that a concern for liberty and equality formed the
cornerstone of the American political tradition.1 36 Exclusive focus on those
values resulted in our historical experiences being weighed through an
implicit evolutionary lens (did this or that experience expand or contract the
nation's commitment to liberty and equality)? Furthermore, an inherent
tendency emerged to condemn predecessors for, at best, lacking an
understanding or commitment to the values assumed, or at worse, for being
hypocrites (touting associated values but in fact acting contrary to them).

easily morph into contemporary substantive interpretative differences that are not germane to
our inquiry.
In terms of providing the reader with historical context using a single example, by the midtwentieth century, leading American democratic theorists advocated that our political parties
should move closer to the European parliamentary model by offering clear programmatic
differences. Compare The Need for GreaterParty Responsibility, by THE COMMITTEE ON
POLITICAL PARTIES OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION [reprinted
in LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM, supra note 97, at 403 (arguing that America needs a
stronger two-party system, including better integrated and more responsible parties)], with
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, TWO-PARTY STALEMATE: THE CRISIS IN OUR POLITICS (1960)
(arguing that societal problems are a result of America's weak two-party system namely, that
a system doesn't appear to exist) [reprintedin LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM, supra note
97, at 429]. I am unaware of another volume that contains such rich resources and such evenhanded treatment as does Liberalism Versus Conservatism volume. See comments note 97,
supra.
The 1966 date of publication of LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM, supra note 97, is
significant, since it occurs during the heyday of the Warren Court, which is to say, during the
period when the Supreme Court redefined republicanism and sought to nationalize and expand
the meaning of various Bill of Rights provisions. See, e.g., ARTHUR GOLDBERG, EQUAL
JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972) (recounting the equality theme
during the Warren Supreme Court era). For an example of a modern college text book on
American Government, see generally DAVID B. MAGLEBY ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE
PEOPLE (2012 Election ed.), infra note 194, at 108-35 (discussing "The American Political
Landscape"). Today, each appointment to the Supreme Court is a high stakes proposition,
because so many have vested so much power in the Court without fully realizing that the
judiciary can overturn the work of its predecessors.
136. What assumptions a scholar brings to his or her investigations are of course crucial.
Elsewhere, I detail how the distinctions made in the text impacted my insistence that secondary
sources be historically grounded in precedents and contemporaneous scholarship. See generally
Gangi, supra note 1, at 36-66 (arguing that some scholars can unintentionally distort history,
hence, successive scholars must ground their assertions in precedent and contemporaneous
scholarship so as not to continue to skew future research). Subsequently, I will discuss some of
these materials insofar as they relate to good scholarly practices.
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Instead, the authors suggest that once historical events are viewed through
a different theoretical prism,1 37 self-government and not liberty and
equality emerges as the core of our tradition. Put another way, the selfgovernment prism better explains our history as a nation, and while the themes

137. I put aside here, as not germane, a subject discussed elsewhere, namely, that the
authors in Basic Symbols also introduced students to a set of theoretical tools crafted by Eric
Voegelin. Gangi, supra note 1, at 42 n.203. He suggested (I simplify here) that once a people
perceive themselves as a people distinct from another people, they engage in "selfinterpretation," that is, they use myths and symbols to illuminate the "truth" of their society.
KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 23-24 (quoting VOEGELIN, supra note 26, at 27).
Voegelin rejected the existing perspective that myths and symbols are useful tools for smart
people to manipulate the masses. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 19-26 (citing
VOEGELIN, supranote 26, at 27-28). For an example of a scholar perceiving myths and symbols
as means of manipulation, see generally THURMOND ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
(5th prtg. 1948) (discussing the use and utility of myths and symbols). I would contend that
today Arnold's assumptions permeate many modern Supreme Court decisions. As I have stated
elsewhere:
In every First Amendment case I have examined, not one Justice stated more than an
elementary appreciation of symbol utilization. All have ignored an entire body of
scholarship which contends that to fully understand what a people hold dear, it is
important to establish correlations between their symbolic expression and their
perceived embodied truths, as well as between those symbols and the actions of the
people. Instead the Justices persist in viewing symbols solely as potential tools of
manipulating the masses. This much seems self-evident: whoever defines our
symbols, defines us as a nation. So again I raise the issue: in whose hands would the
framers have placed that responsibility?
Gangi, supra note 1, at 23 (citations and emphasis omitted). As examples of these permeations,
I would include Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the defendant could not be
convicted for flag burning despite the fact that the flag is recognized as a symbol of nationhood),
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding a statute that criminally punished any person
who, intending to intimidate another person or group by burning a cross on another person's
property, highway, or public place, unconstitutional since the statute may have required that any
such cross-burning is primafacie evidence of an intent to intimidate), R.A. V v. City ofSt. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding that a city ordinance outlawing racially motivated symbols
violated the First Amendment) and UnitedStates v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1989) (finding
that the defendant's conviction for flag burning should be overturned, regardless of the flag's
status as a national symbol). In all these cases the majority may be criticized for inadequate
symbol analyses. For critical comments, see Gangi, supra note 1, at 19-32.
One also might observe that those decisions rely heavily on "official literature" precepts,
which substitute parts of actual history with parts steeped in values its proponents think our
history should have emphasized. Again, we are moving into more substantive issues best
avoided here. See Douglas Adair, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: "History, Democratic
Theory, and the United States Constitution, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF EARLY AMERICAN

HISTORY 141-44 (Ray Allen Billington ed., 1966) (discussing the nature of the Constitution and
what form of government the founding fathers intended to create).
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of equality and personal rights remain important, they were not always our
primary concern.1 38

Because details remain outside the scope of this Article, a few brief
corollaries must suffice. Once the right to self-government is put center stage,
our history becomes more comprehensible because it no longer focuses
exclusively upon the expansion of personal rights and equality, as advocated
by proponents of the official literature. Instead, experiences such as our legacy
of slavery, as well as other forms of discrimination, are put into the context of
our complex republican political structures and its ultimate dependence upon
human beings. It is a history far from perfect but better than most-in which
our governing structures intersect with fallible human beings.1 39 It is at that
intersection that we depend on scholars and statesmen to illuminate the past
so that we may better understand the present and prepare for the future.
Application of a new set of theoretical tools to an existing body of
scholarship often introduces new perspectives and insights. And the clashes
between those today who put liberty and equality center stage and those who
resist doing so, or perhaps elevate other values, certainly contribute to the
existing political rancor. On both sides, some view various policy choices
or even Supreme Court picks-as a high stakes zero-sum game where one is
either a winner or loser.
Here, however, our focus is on understanding the articulation of a
perspective different than those suggested in the official literature.
Accordingly, once self-government is put center stage, students are no longer
encouraged to view our predecessors as possibly hypocrites. Instead, they are
encouraged to better understand why perhaps some Americans believed one
thing and did another.1 40 Simply put, those who have adopted self-government

138. See generally KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 38,48, 64-66 (discussing major
American documents from the Mayflower Compact to the Virginia Declaration of Rights and
recognizing that these documents were either silent on individual rights or more limited than
scholars would have readers believe).
139. In sum, we are back to the deliberations at the Philadelphia Convention and in The
FederalistPapers.
140. Admittedly, the condemner derives some moral satisfaction in pointing out such
inconsistencies. Presumably, the lesson is to instruct us on how to handle analogous situations
(present and future), although human nature being what it is, the ability to recognize alleged
analogies as identical often remains elusive. However, the actual dilemma is never confronted:
how can popular governments (dependent as they are on majority rule) be reconciled with ethical
or religious values not universally shared? Many contemporary scholars, I suggest, have
implicitly or explicitly abandoned both the Framers' design and their faith in the people and
instead have turned to judicial impositions. Until recently, they never seriously contemplated
that the judicial power might one day be in what they consider hostile hands. See supra notes 97
and 133 and accompanying text; see also Edward Rothstein, Atoning for America's 'Original
Sin' at James Madison's Montpelier, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2017, 5:03 PM),
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as the center of the American tradition suggest they provide a better contextual
understanding of the discriminations in which we as a people engaged, while
at the same time minimizing arrogant accusations of citizen hypocrisy or
stupidity.141

Finally, Kendall and Carey suggest students should be discouraged from
imaginatively rewriting history (that is, by applying twenty-first century
moral assessments retroactively to condemn eighteenth century perceptions
of societal structures or beliefs), as if by doing so something insightful or

https://www.wsj.com/articles/atoning-for-americas-original-sin-at-james-madisonsmontpelier- 1496869382 (emphasizing James Madison's difficulty reconciling slavery with the
ideals of the Revolution).
Finally, as Voegelin observed, for some time a sense of moral outrage has been a harbinger
to a claim to political power:
In order to start a movement moving, there must in the first place be somebody who
has a "cause.". . . In order to advance his "cause," the man who has it will, "in the
hearing of the multitude," indulge in severe criticisms of social evils and in particular
of the conduct of the upper classes. Frequent repetition of the performance will induce
the opinion among the hearers that the speakers must be men of singular integrity,
zeal, and holiness, for only men who are singularly good can be so deeply offended
by evil. The next step will be the concentration of popular ill-will on the established
government. This task can be psychologically performed by attributing all fault and
corruption, as it exists in the world because of human frailty, to the action or inaction
of the government. By such imputation of evil to a specific institution, the speakers
prove their wisdom to the multitude of men who by themselves would never have
thought of such a connection; and at the same time they show the point that must be
attacked if evil shall be removed from the world. After such preparation, the time will
be ripe for recommending a new form of government as the "sovereign remedy of all
evils."
VOEGELIN, supra note 26, at 135-36.

141. Although the substance of these issues is outside the scope of this Article, please
permit a brief observation. I reject those scholars who contend that the Framers intentionally
included abstract or open-ended phrases in the Constitution to permit the judiciary through
interpretation to fill in those blanks, or other scholars who contend that one of the judiciary's
primary functions is to adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances. I also reject as
unsubstantiated implicit or explicit claims that the people agreed to ratify a Constitution which
in the final analysis would be incomprehensible since in the future an unauthorized institution
could change its meaning. More specifically, with respect to the dispute between Raoul Berger
and his critics, on the right to adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances, see Gangi, supra
note 11, at 18-22. Among more contemporary proponents of the "living constitution" is Akhil
Reed Amar, Professor of Law at Yale Law School and prolific legal scholar. Although I have
not yet studied his works in any detail, one source suggests that he utilizes several arguments
rejected herein. See BRUCE P. FROHNEN & GEORGE W. CAREY, CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
AND THE RISE OF QUASI-LAW 2-6 (2016). Professor Blinka also points to Amar's
characterization of the Founding Father's thoughts as being "strangely obtuse." Daniel D.
Blinka, "This Germ of Rottedness": Federal Trials in the New Republic, 1789-1807, 36
CREIGHTON L. REv. 135, 136 (2003) (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 110 (1998)).
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practical is accomplished. 142 Such speculations miss the point. All Americans
should own our history, and work harder to fully understand it and to avoid
repeating the mistakes of those who preceded us.' 4 3 Perhaps most importantly,
the self-government perspective discourages students from viewing their
participation in the body politic (implicit in the official literature perspective),
almost exclusively in terms of rights possessed or denied. Instead, students
are encouraged to consider the legacy of freedom bequeathed to them, to
embrace that legacy, and to accept the awesome responsibility to define today
who we are as a nation, to defend that meaning, and to pass the legacy of selfgovernment onto successive generations.1 44

142. See William Anthony Hay, Jefferson in the Flesh, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2017 6:23
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/jefferson-in-the-flesh-1498775017
("It is better . . to
understand Jefferson's world and his place in it than to judge him by the standards of a later
day."); see also Melissa Korn, University of Mississippi Will Remove Name of White
Supremacist from Building, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2017, 11:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/university-of-mississippi-will-remove-name-of-white-supremacist-from-building1499440359 (quoting Chancellor Jeffrey Vitter) (concluding that the person for whom a building
was named was "distinctly unworthy of honor," but further stating that "[c]ontexualization is an
important extension of a university's responsibility to educate and provides an opportunity to
learn from history"). The applicable principle was articulated some time ago by Leo Strauss:
"Our most urgent need can then be satisfied only by means of historical studies which would
enable us to understand classical philosophy exactly as it understood itself, and not in the way
in which it presents itself on the basis of historicism." See STRAUSS, supranote 85, at 33 (1953).
143. Such judgments, in this vale of tears, are dependent on our sense of justice in the
context of our republican regime.
144. Although the Federalists and Anti-federalists vehemently disagreed over what
governmental structures would secure a legacy of self-government and individual liberty, both
were keenly aware of an obligation to leave their successors the best legacy they could. Publius
observed:
Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human race, they pursued a new
and more noble course. They accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no
model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great Confederacy, which
it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray
imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure
of the Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the work which
has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you
are now to deliberate and to decide.
THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 22, at 104-05 (James Madison).
On the Antifederalist side, for example, would be George Mason: "The convention, though
comprising so many distinguished characters, could not be expected to make a faultless
government. And [Mason] would prefer trusting to posterity the amendment of its defects, rather
than push the experiment too far." JOHN LANSING, GEORGE MASON AND LUTHER MARTIN
(FROM MADISON'S RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION) 20 JUNE, 1787, reprintedin THE

ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 7, 10 (W. B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds., 1985). Similarly, Cato,
another Antifederalist observed:
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What Did the People Mean When They Used the Words They Did?

The four preceding sections express scholarly cautions. This last lesson
also suggests a methodological check, that is, how scholars can better
understand how the people of a particular era understood the words they used.
Scholarly misinterpretations most often occur because all relevant evidence
has not been considered, or because authors stress one and not another reason
for the people's actions, or because, as previously noted, authors remain so
focused on their thesis that that they are unaware that other explanations exist
or elude them.
But, if not already hard enough, scholars must be cautious when
extraditing themselves from those minefields. Even if scholar X suspects
scholar Y's conclusions are tainted by one or more of the dangers described
previously, he or she cannot, on the level of principle, systematically ignore
or discard the entire body of scholar Y's research. Rather, scholar X must
proceed cautiously. Even research based on a defective premise may contain
insights integral to a more comprehensive understanding of the investigated
subject. Succinctly put, it may take one or more generations of scholars to
undo the damage wrought by the original thesis book writers and their
successors. It takes time to unravel unjustified assumptions or unsustainable
theses. 145 In order to minimize such mistakes, Kendall and Carey suggested

You are then under a sacred obligation to provide for the safety of your posterity, and
would you now basely desert their interests, when by a small share of prudence, you
may transmit to them a beautiful political patrimony, which will prevent the necessity
of their traveling through seas of blood to obtain that, which your wisdom might have
secured. It is a duty you owe likewise to your own reputation, for you have a great
name to lose.
CATO, LETTERS V, VI, AND VII, N.Y.J., 22 Nov., 1787, 3 Jan., 1788, reprinted in THE
ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, supra, at 201-02.
145. The example is a rather a simple one. In the wake of the ebb and flow of political and
scholarly fashions, it is likely, as previously noted, that the stature and authority of original
sources may suffer a similar fate. A more specific example is provided later in the Article. See
Part VI. Understanding the Context of Original Sources, infra. While thesis books often initially
create new perspectives on subjects (perhaps exposing neglected insights in a body of existing
scholarship), it is not uncommon over time for those insights to eventually be considered as
having been exaggerated. Subsequently, the body of scholarship stabilizes, incorporating to one
degree or another the insights, but partially or completely rejecting the perceived exaggerations.
In the same manner, concepts or methodologies that had been successfully employed in their
field of origin and subsequently applied to another field of study, are often eventually at least
partially discredited in their field of origin. See supra notes 91-94, 119-20 and accompanying
text. Many Supreme Court decisions are replete with assumptions of progress, including such
phrases as "evolving standards of decency." See GANGI, supranote 36, at 102-03 (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). By the time the Warren Court emerged, such assumptions
had become so embedded in Supreme Court adjudication that Chief Justice Earl Warren used it
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this succinct rule of thumb: "Unless we can see a correspondencebetween the
symbols we have in hand and the people's action in history, the symbols we
have in hand do not in fact represent that people and we must look a second
time for the symbols that do in fact represent them."' 4 6 It is a suggestion that
has far-reaching consequences.
Perhaps it is best to illustrate that assertion by using concrete examples.
In the first example, a scholar asserts that a phrase in the Bill of Rights (e.g.,
"freedom of speech") was intended to protect certain actions, but during this
same period the government prosecuted seditious libel, blasphemy, and
pornography. Kendall and Carey suggest it would be inappropriate to contend
either that the government or the people of that era were slow-witted (did not
then understand the logical implications of free speech as we understand them
today), or that they were hypocrites because, although professing allegiance
to the idea of freedom of speech, they nevertheless engaged in inconsistent
behavior (that is, by supporting the noted prosecutions). Kendall and Carey
suggest that, at best, either judgment would be premature.
Instead, what is far more likely is that our investigating scholar did not
consider what the noted prosecutions might reveal about the scholar's
assumptions about the meaning of freedom of speech. Had the scholar focused
more on the people's action rather than what the scholar thought a logical
explication of what the words should entail, he or she might have better
understood what the people meant when they used the words they did (i.e.,
freedom of speech). In sum, during the founding period, the people's view of
"freedom of speech" did not preclude such prosecutions because, once that
language was put it in its textual context in the Constitution, such prosecutions
were thought not to "abridg[e]" the freedom of speech right.1 47 Put another

without attribution. See id. at 103 n.77. As mentioned there, there is no need to accuse Chief
Justice Warren of plagiarism, only the need to better appreciate the nature of unstated
assumptions. Id. Perhaps, in this category one also might add Justice O'Connor's previously
noted prophetic statements. See supra note 49.
146. KENDALL & CAREY, supranote 115, at 26. The theoretical foundation included there
partially shaped my approach to topics such as the exclusionary rule, judicial power, and the
Fifth and Sixth amendments. See generally Gangi, Exclusionary, supra note 72 (outlining my
approach to the exclusionary rule); William Gangi, The Sixth Amendment: JudicialPower and
the People's Right to Govern Themselves, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 71 (1988) [hereinafter Gangi, Sixth
Amendment] (outlining my approach to judicial power); William Gangi, The Supreme Court and
Coerced Confessions: Arizona v. Fulminate in Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493
(1993) (highlighting my approach to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Self-government is more
about the power possessed by the people than it is about (as the official literature would have us
believe) our admittedly important legacy of individual rights or an alleged judicial power to
create new rights or to expand existing ones.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . ."). I purposely dropped the reference to "government" for two reasons. First,
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way, the noted offences (blasphemy, seditious libel, and pornography) instead
were considered abuses of the freedom of speech right: i.e., taking license
with the legitimate concerns of that right, namely attempts by government
officials to suppress political speech. Understood thusly, our investigating
scholar unjustifiably substituted a meaning he or she believed freedom of
speech should mean (or came to mean subsequently) instead of probing the
meaning the people of the time embraced. Simply put: our scholar permitted
his or her assumption (i.e., thesis) to misconstrue what the people meant when
they used the words they did.1 48
Our second example further fleshes out the far-reaching effects of
integrating the people's actions with the words they used. Basic Symbols
carefully examines major colonial documents, among which is the
Massachusetts Body ofLiberties (1641). When viewed critically, the authors
observe that all the liberties conferred therein (many of which today persist in
identical language and would be called "rights") had been procedural,
adopted over time as a result of prior monarchical or judicial abuses in
England.1 49 The authors observe, however, that "there is [in the document] no
hint of any right that limits the power of the legislature."' Furthermore, when
considering the specific liberties we today would consider sensitive, the
document contained "escape clauses" that authorized the legislature to make
exceptions from how those liberties were usually applied.'
Granting the legislature the power to modify rights' application is foreign
to contemporary scholars who would probably ask, "if the legislature is
granted the authority to make exceptions to liberties' application, how can
these provisions still be considered liberties?" These scholars would maintain

criminal prosecutions are usually cast as "The people of the State of _, versus the defendant.
Second, if a sufficient number of voters were dissatisfied with such prosecutions the remedy lay
with the ballot box.
148. The most obvious examples revolve around contemporary First Amendment
interpretations upon which I have already commented (see comment, supra note 137) and again
refer the reader elsewhere since the substance does not here concern us. See Gangi, supra note
1, at 21-32 (using the Texas v. Johnson and Virginia v. Black holdings to maintain that when
defining freedom of speech, the Supreme Court majority substituted what a majority thought it
should mean for the meaning understood by the First Amendment ratifiers.
149. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 51 ("Similarly, paragraph 43 appears to be a
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment; 42 a guarantee against what we today call
double jeopardy; 6 a guarantee against involuntary servitude; and 18 seems to be a guarantee of
habeas corpus. . . ."); see also Gangi, supra note 1, at 43-45 (providing a more substantive
discussion on the Massachusetts Body ofLiberties).
150. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 53.
151. Id. at 52.
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that they would no longer qualify as rights.1 52 Put another way, should we
distinguish the right of the Massachusetts' legislature to grant exceptions to
normal liberty application, from our more contemporary understanding today,
when we speak of rights versus liberties?1 53 One resolution for contemporary
scholars, I suggest, is to view the Massachusetts' liberty provisions as being
a primitive form of what we understand as rights today, that is, they assume
that originators of these liberties did not fully grasp their import or
evolutionary potential. Put yet another way, given the early date of the
document, they assume that today we have become savvier about the nature
of rights. 154 I think their perspective is faulty as well as arrogant.
Let's examine the legislature's power to grant exceptions in the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties more carefully by offering a specific
application. The Body of Liberties prohibited "involuntary servitude," 15 but
as with other sensitive issues, the "General Court" was empowered to make
exceptions.1 56 Modem rights proponents certainly would sneer at the fragility
of such a protection, one that lodges a dangerous discretion in legislative
hands. Yet, unless it is assumed that in "unanimous[ly] consent[ing]" to these
provisions, the good citizens of Massachusetts were dullards (not quite
capable of understanding the nature of liberties) which needless to say
would reveal considerable arrogance on our part the prudent scholar would
look for a more credible explanation. 57
And, to do so, we must step outside the prism of the official literature.
Even at that time, Massachusetts citizens recognized (in modem parlance) that
"s*** happens." Confronted by a natural disaster (again, in modem parlance),
a nor'easter adversely affecting significant portions of the state and population
(the storm washing out roads and bridges thereby inhibiting the ability to aid
storm victims, or, as a result of these conditions, commerce throughout the
colony is crippled), citizens expected their legislature (i.e., General Court) to

152. Of course, I am speaking of contemporary advocates of personal rights since the
Warren Court.
153. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 61 (discussing the shift in rhetoric from
liberties to rights); see also Gangi, supra note 11, at 39-43 (emphasizing the exchange between
Raoul Berger and his critics about various individual rights).
154. The question that remains outside the scope of this Article is this: Did those who
eventually ratified the Bill of Rights view those "rights" differently than citizens of
Massachusetts viewed liberties?
155. KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 51.
156. Id. at 51-52 (indicating, in Massachusetts, the General Court refers to the legislature,
not the judiciary).
157. Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted).
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do something to ameliorate the situation.' 8 Volunteers would undoubtedly
appear and attempt to take corrective measures. But, what if, for whatever
reason, the number of volunteers or required equipment fell short? Citizens
certainly did not expect their legislators to wring their hands and bemoan the
decline in civic participation. Representatives were elected precisely to
address situations such as this, and bring their collective wisdom to bear, with
respect to what measures were required to resolve the emergency.
While the good citizens of Massachusetts understood that in ordinary
times citizens should not be imposed upon, I suggest that they also understood
that in extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary measures might be
required. In sum, they authorized legislators to ignore ordinary liberties and
instead mandated even unwilling citizens to participate in road repair for the
sake of the general good. The stakes may be perceived to be so high that
legislators would not brook interference from resistant citizens claiming that
being forced to help against their will was contrary to the Body of Liberties
provision against involuntary servitude. 159 Understood from that perspective,
the inclusion of escape clauses makes perfect sense. It is neither hypocritical
nor inconsistent with the protection against involuntary servitude.1 60
The two examples offered above reasonably demonstrate why examining
what the people did helps scholars better understand what the people meant
when they used the words they did. But, at the risk of nibbling at more
substantive contemporary issues, I thought it worthwhile to further illustrate
the consequences of the Basic Symbols approach by turning to this far more
complex Massachusetts Body of Liberties provision:

158. That is no less true today than it was then. It is a common occurrence in America that
when emergencies arise, citizens spontaneously respond before more formal, governmentdirected, relief comes to bear. Presumably, that might generate enough volunteers to address the
situation at hand. Even so, locally available resources may be insufficient. My favorite example
occurred after a major blackout occurred in New York. A newspaper article recounted how a
robed monk directed traffic on a main Manhattan thoroughfare. NEW YORK TIMES STAFF, THE
NIGHT THE LIGHTS WENT OUT 46 (A.M. Rosenthal & Arthur Gelb eds., 1965); see also
Alexandra S. Levine, Memories of the Night New York City Went Dark, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/nyregion/new-york-city-blackout-40-years.html.
159. I speculate. I am curious if citizens indeed resisted such calls to civic responsibility
and whether or not some form of criminal or civil punishment was imposed for those that refused
the call. Also, had the legislature been unable to authorize exceptions, the power would have to
be lodged elsewhere, most likely the executive branch, and the people may have been less
comfortable with that option.
160. Publius points out that the withholding of such discretion may well lead to the
undermining of the Constitution. Fear that Congress would abuse its power is labeled a
"secondary" concern. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 22, at 288-89 (James Madison).
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No man shall be forced by Torture to confesse any Crime against
himselfe nor any other unlesse it be done in some Capitall case, where
he is first fullie convicted by cleare and sufficient evidence to be
guilty, After which if the cause be of that nature, That it is very
apparent there be other conspiratours, or confederates with him, Then
he may be tortured, yet not with such Tortures as be Barbarous and
inhumane. 161
Can you imagine the vociferous reaction to the sentiments expressed in
this passage? Contemporary rights proponents would label ludicrous any
characterization that such a provision guaranteed a liberty never mind a
right. Where, they most assuredly would ask, is the unchanging substantive
protection from legislative whim? Was the Massachusetts judiciary not
authorized to intercede, declaring illegal such arbitrary behavior, or surely
they were authorized to intervene against this capricious interference with that
liberty? But and I cannot overemphasize this point the quoted provision
was not only demanded by the good citizens of Massachusetts, but, when
enacted, was perceived not as a diminution of a right but rather as advancing
(securing, existing, and expanding further) our English liberty heritage! 162
Most importantly, citizens did not find the granting of such legislative
discretion inconsistent with that legacy. 163 Why not? Because at the next
election, a majority of voters could remove any legislators that did not deserve
the discretion entrusted to them. 164 in sum, citizens fully embraced their

161. THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, DECEMBER, 1641, reprintedin
RICHARD B. MORRIS, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 11, 13-14 (rev. ed. 1965).
162. In 1641, the populace certainly considered themselves English. This remarkable
document was penned only some twenty years after their arrival.
163. As Carey observes, "the Massachusetts Constitution is generally conceded to be the
most 'advanced' or sophisticated of the early State Constitutions." George W. Carey, Liberty
and the Fifth Amendment: OriginalIntent, 4 BENCHMARK 301, 301 n.1 (1990). My inclination
would be to study the document more closely to better understand our tradition of liberties rather
than to make assertions, as practitioners of the official literature commonly do, about the nature
of rights while simultaneously ignoring context or inconsistent evidence. After all, when
examined closely, official literature practitioners merely affirm what is most consistent with the
assumptions they bring to the investigation. In sum, they seem to always find what they are
looking for!
164. Basic Symbols puts the matter in a larger context, stating:
And the breath-taking powers attributed to the General Court must be understood in
that context: The General Court that is to pass laws on the delicate topics touched
upon, to pass laws in the sensitive areas from the standpoint of freedom, is to be made
up of servants of humanity, civility, and Christianity, sitting as a deliberative body,
and subordinate to the "call" of humanity, civility, and Christianity.
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power of self-government, and, properly understood, the quoted passage
recognizes today what most American citizens instinctively understand (if
properly inoculated): that few, if any, substantive rights exist in all times and
circumstances. There is a perpetual need to balance competing concerns.1 65
VI. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF ORIGINAL SOURCES

Having absorbed after some three decades or more-the preceding
lessons, The FederalistPapersbeckoned me. 166 The timing seemed right. For
more than two decades, I had immersed myself in Supreme Court decision
polemics. I paused, feeling the need to take stock of my intellectual baggage,

KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 55. I have not investigated whether at that time recall
also was available with reference to members of the Massachusetts General Court, or whether
the terms in office served were one year or less.
165. See GANGI, supra note 36, at 8-9. I do not imply that the judicial branch is or should
be the appropriate or sole balancing institution. There is one additional substantive question
asked and at least partially answered by Kendall and Carey, yet still ignored here because it is
once again beyond the scope of this Article. Did the discretion accorded the legislature in the
Massachusetts Body ofLiberties carry over to Congress once many of the statutory "liberties"
contained therein were subsequently (often in identical language) added to the Constitution or
the Bill of Rights? As a general proposition, in Basic Symbols the authors contend that the
change in expression, from the use of the word "liberties" during the colonial period (such as in
the Massachusetts Body of Liberties), to the use of the word "rights" coincident with the
American Revolution (such as in the Virginia DeclarationofRights), did not portend a change
in substance. See KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, at 63-67. Put otherwise, as important as
individual liberties or rights were to our predecessors, they singularly or collectively were not
considered superior to the right of self-government. The right to self-government may, as ours
does, authorize a people to create and define individual rights on both the statutory and
constitutional levels, on both the state and federal levels.
For purposes of clarity, the text also requires several additional observations. First, the text
is not intended to imply that Bill of Rights provisions stand on no higher ground than statutory
or common law rights. On the contrary, I believe the specific understanding of what protection
was afforded by specific constitutional language at the time of adoption must be respected today
and always by Congress and defended by the courts. See Gangi, Sixth Amendment, supra note
146, at 73, 86 n.69; GANGI, supra note 36, at 236-48. Second, among other subjects, this Article
explores a scholar's responsibility to convey the Framers' understanding of constitutional
provisions, even should they run counter to their personal preferences. How I resolved associated
issues are a matter of public record, but they are not germane here. The varied perspectives on
these issues are at the heart of the divide among contemporary constitutional law scholars. They
include the scope of the federal judicial power and the nature and limits of interpretation. Third,
here I also put aside issues such as application of the Bill of Rights to the states through such
doctrines as selective incorporation.
166. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 22.
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especially my understanding of the founding era.1 67 Before recounting some
specific suggestions of how to approach the Papers, I want to bring to the
reader's attention some fundamental concerns regarding all original
sources. 168
As a graduate student, The Federalist Papers had been mandatory
reading. At least I think it was.1 69 My far-better-prepared Ph.D. candidate
classmates certainly were more familiar with it and other original sources than
I. But, as we all know, reading is one thing, immersion another, and mastery
is often an elusive lifetime goal. I recall only this: at the time of publication
and for a considerable period thereafter, the Paperswas universally admired
for its practical political wisdom.1 70 Yet, college and graduate professors and
fellow students rarely mentioned The FederalistPapers.Why the disconnect?
Since then I have realized that scholars must explore past perceptions of
original sources before the sources can be accorded proper weight. Once
again, historical context is necessary. After the Civil War, borrowing concepts
originating in biology (more specifically the research of Charles Darwin), '7'

167. See generally Gangi and Critical, supra note 48 (discussing coerced confession
development; Sixth Amendment, supra note 146; Gangi, supra note 72 (discussing development
of exclusionary rule); and Gangi, supra note 11 (discussing the expansion of judicial power).
168. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
169. I cannot recall if it had been a course assignment or recommended by a professor or
fellow student.
170. Professor Christopher Flannery observes:
Writing to Hamilton in the midst of the ratification struggle, George Washington
asserted that "[w]hen the transient circumstances and fugitive performances which
attended this Crisis shall have disappeared, That Work [The Federalist]will merit the
notice of posterity; because in it are candidly and ably discussed the principles of
freedom and the topics of government, which will always be interesting to mankind
so long as they shall be connected in Civil Society." Thomas Jefferson, writing a few
months later to Hamilton's collaborator Madison, joined in this high appraisal. The
Federalistwas "the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was
written." Jefferson's respect for The Federalist endured, even though the party
struggles of the 1790s and the Revolution of 1800 to the end of his life. In the course
of his last great life's work, the establishment of the University of Virginia, Jefferson
listed The Federalist second only to the Declaration of Independence as one of the
"best guides" to "the distinctive principles of . .. the United States, . . . being an

authority to which appeal is habitually made by all, and rarely declined or denied by
any as evidence of the general opinion of those who framed, and of those who
accepted the Constitution of the United States, on questions as to its genuine
meaning."
Christopher Flannery, The Federalist, TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY (Sept. 2, 2009) (second,
third, and fourth alterations in original), http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/newsletter/
200909-2.
171. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Paul Barrett & R.B. Freeman eds.,

N.Y. Univ. Press 1988) (1859). As already noted, scholars must be particularly cautious when
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some scholars combined them with French economic theory, creating what
eventually became known as laissez-faire capitalism.1 72 Hence, natural laws
such as the Darwinian one (that only the fittest species survive environmental
changes) were analogously brought to bear on societal economics, such as the
natural law of supply and demand, or the natural law that all capitalists are
compelled to maximize profit. Understanding these natural laws was thought
to illuminate the natural economic conflicts between capital and labor.
Accordingly, French Physiocrats suggested that to maintain a vigorous
economy it was best if the government remained neutral, permitting these
natural economic laws to sort out resulting conflicts-naturally! These
assumptions formed the cornerstone of laissez-faire capitalism (nongovernmental interference in the market place) and was widely adopted. As is
commonly the case, it captured "the imagination of the American
intelligentsia-including its judges," creating a prism upon which nearly a

applying criteria developed in another field to their own, as well as assessing whether that criteria
is still considered viable in its field of origin. See supra notes 84-85, 92-94 and accompanying
text.
172. Two proponents are notable, although their views are not necessarily consistent:
Auguste Comte in Europe and Herbert Spencer in the United States. See THE POSITIVE
PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE (Harriet Martineau trans., 3d ed. 1893) (1853) [hereinafter
AUGUST COMTE]; HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO
HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (Robert Schalkenbach Found.
1991) (1851). John Stuart Mill, an admirer of Comte, presented his analysis in JOHN STUART

MILL, AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM (Palala Press 2016) (1865). Crucial to Comte's thesis
was that history consisted of three successive stages (Theological, Philosophic, and Scientific),
each of which was inevitable and superior to the former. See AUGUST COMTE, supra, at 131.
For another perspective on such theorists, particularly with reference to speculations on
successive stages of history, see GERHART NIEMEYER, BETWEEN NOTHINGNESS AND PARADISE

44-59 (1971). This subject was given a more detailed treatment in Gangi, supra note 1, at 4548. With respect to the era generally, see ERIC GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A
HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM (1952); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL

DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1955). See also Thomas C. Leonard, Origins of
the Myth ofSocial Darwinism: The ambiguous Leacy ofRichardHofstadter'sSocialDarwinism
in American Thought, 71 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 37, 39 (2009) (contending that Hofstadter's
disparaging use of the term "Social Darwinists" was misplaced since the term had been used
only sparingly prior to publication of his book). Furthermore, Leonard claims that although
Hofstadter's political sentiments were further left than other activists of his day, he downplayed
other portions of the Progressivist philosophy, including "racism, eugenics and imperialism."
Id. at 37. With respect to the French Physiocrats, see William G. Sumner, The Conquest of the
United States by Spain, 8 YALE L.J. 168 (1899); Physiocrat, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA,

https://www.britannica.com/topic/physiocrat (last visited Nov. 5, 2018); and C.W.,
the
Physiocrats?,
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
11,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/10/economic-history-0.
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Hence, from the late nineteenth to the third decade of the twentieth
century, Supreme Court majorities used laissez-faire justifications to strike
down "state and federal legislation [which had] attempt[ed] . . . to ameliorate

the ill effects of modem industrialization.... [And by doing so] imposed
upon the American people the . . . intellectual prejudices of their era."1 74
Moreover, these Supreme Court majorities insisted that not they but rather
the framers had embedded those economic principles into the Constitution.
All the justices did, they claimed, was remind Americans of their obligation
to adhere to the principles their predecessors had sworn allegiance to
uphold. 75
But what does all this have to do with why The FederalistPapersfell out
of favor? The answer to that question is to be found in the academic response
to the above-noted laissez-faire contentions, that the framers had incorporated
these economic precepts into the Constitution. 176 Some specifics must be

173. Gangi, supra note 1, at 7 n.34; see generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
174. Gangi, supra note 1, at 7-8 n.34 (citations omitted).
175. The logic of course is that, by ratifying the Constitution, the people had consented to
judicial enforcement of its alleged ratified intent. Under laissez-faire theory, the Supreme Court
believed the Constitution should be read to include:
the freedom of private or public individuals and groups (of any legal entity) to
form . . contracts without government restrictions. This is opposed to government
restrictions [on such public policies] such as minimum wage laws, competition
laws, ... [or] price fixing. The freedom to contract is the underpinning of laissezfaire economics and is a cornerstone of free-market libertarianism. [Freedom of
contract grants] individuals . . . a general freedom to choose with whom to contract,
whether to contract or not, and on which terms to contract.
Freedom of contract, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedomofcontract (last
visited Nov. 5, 2018); see also Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large:
Contract Law though the Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT
25 (F.H.
Buckley ed., 1999); Freedom of choice, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedomof choice (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). For a broader
historical view on the impact of the Progressivists' perspective on legal concepts, see Charles E.
Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State
Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property.," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891)
(suggesting laissez-fairests redefined constitutional terms to be consistent with their beliefs). I
think personal rights advocates are doing the same thing today. For example, see also Carey,
supra note 163, on the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
176. We cannot here recount the interpretative techniques utilized, including deducing a
liberty of contract from the Fourteenth Amendment language. The beginning of this approach,
at least on the federal level, is attributable to the dissenting opinion of Justice Stephen Field, in
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), and in cases such as Lochner v. New York, 198
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provided. Scholars are aware that time has a habit of nibbling at, if not
consuming, intellectual tides. So, it should come as no surprise that having
peaked toward the turn of the twentieth century (a vantage point this writer
enjoys), the tide began to shift away from the laissez-faire perspective. As is
usual, these challenges began in the academy and eventually found their
political expression. 177 We may group these academic critics under the
general banner of Revisionists. 178

U.S. 45 (1905), which lie beyond the scope of this inquiry. For a penetrating analysis at the end
of the nineteenth century, see Shattuck, supra note 175.
177. For a variety of reasons, scholars criticized Supreme Court decisions alleging that
laissez-faire opinions had been mandated by the constitutional text. By the early twentieth
century, political pressures also began to take hold. Eventually, the laissez-faire Supreme Court
5-4 majority shifted, disrupted by Justice Owen Roberts switching his vote, from the laissezfaire majority to the former four-vote minority, thereby creating a new majority that offered the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt greater legislative flexibility in addressing the
Depression. See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 16, 18 (1957) (describing the shift of Justice Owen Robert's vote
as the "switch in time [that] saved Nine"). Details are far beyond the scope of this Article,
including providing the reader with a broader historical context that included contemporaneous
advocacy by socialists and communists.
I can report this much: In 1963, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963), the
Supreme Court formally repudiated its laissez-faire legacy. Delivering the opinion of the Court,
Justice Hugo Black stated, "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation." Id. He went on
to say, "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws." Id. at 730. Also noteworthy at this time is that progressivists viewed the states as social
laboratories where its citizens could experiment with various public policies: e.g.,
unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation. As Professor Gilmore astutely
observes, however, the change was more "a change of course, not a change of goal." GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 90 (2d ed. 2014). He concludes that the New Deal
philosophy was perhaps more accurately "not much more than a changing of the guard." Id. at
78. See also Maurice J. Holland, American Liberals and JudicialActivism: Alexander Bickel's
Appeal from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J. 1025, 1036 n.23 (1976) (discussing scholarly
attacks on judicial review). He notes that while the Realist-Progressivist movements rejected the
substitution of judicial preferences for those of the legislature with respect to national economic
and social policy, before long (late 1930s, early 1940s) they began to use judicial power to set
national policy goals in three other areas. Id. at 1027 n.6, 1044 n.42 (setting policy goals for
educational equality and voting opportunities).
178. Revisionists attacked Supreme Court opinions on several grounds, but the overall
thrust of their objection was that contrary to Supreme Court assertions, laissez-faire precepts
were not mandated by the Constitution. Some judicial critics also "claimed laissez-faire
economic principles were incompatible with the American people's sense of fairness-including
the teachings of Christianity." Gangi, supra note 1, at 45-46. Professor Holland observed that
Felix Frankfurter, later Justice of the Supreme Court, "was one of the formulators of Robert
LaFollette's platform plank in 1924 which called for a constitutional amendment giving
Congress power to override Supreme Court invalidations of federal statutes by a two-thirds vote.
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Some Revisionists chose not to directly challenge laissez-faire economic
assumptions; instead they sought to achieve the same result by attacking the
Framers' prestige.1 79 That approach probably proved attractive for at least
three reasons. First, on the national level, laissez-faire precepts had become
so associated with Supreme Court decisions that an attack on one was
perceived as an attack on the other.'o Second, some Revisionists undoubtedly
embraced as accurate contentions that the framers had, in fact, subscribed to

Frankfurter even advanced the modest proposal of excising the due process clause from the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment." Holland, supra note 177, at 1036 n.23 (citations omitted).
179. CAREY, DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 3-11 (recounting multiple Revisionist
contentions, such as the Constitution possessed an undemocratic character and the Framers were
motivated by personal gain). Of course, we are compelled to paint this picture with very broad
brushstrokes. Also, put aside as not germane to our inquiry are those Revisionist criticisms
directly challenging the truth of laissez-fairest so-called natural economic law principles. Here
we also must also perhaps ignore earlier decades when the Framers were considered demi-gods.
Our focus instead, though briefly, is on the tactics designed by Revisionists to undermine the
authority of the Supreme Court.
180. As alluded to in the previous note, by this time Revisionists contended that the
Framers' real motive in putting forth the Constitution had been personal gain, a viewpoint quite
different than what prior generations of Americans had been taught. One of the most recognized
scholars to do so was Charles Beard. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (reprt. 1914) (contending that
the framers were motivated by self-interest). One suspects that the economic assumptions of the
Progressivist era made Revisionists more receptive to Beard's assertions, some of whom were
clearly enamored of the works of Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels and perhaps other so-called
Utopian socialist theorists. Professor Carey, however, rejects the Revisionist assertion that The
Federalist Papers contain "mutually inconsistent positions and values" that masked the
Framers' undemocratic motives and instead suggests that:
[A]uthors who focus on the political-economic dimensions, .... are [also] prone to
read Publius as saying that the "first object of government is the protection of
property per se, rather than, as [Publius] states it, the protection of "the diversity in
the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate."
GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 27 (Illini
Books ed. 1994). Publius' more complete statement was:
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence
on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is
not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these
faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and
unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds
of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments
and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different
interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;
and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to
the different circumstances of civil society.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 78-79 (James Madison).
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laissez-faire principles. Third and finally, some Revisionists charged that the
framers actually had been hostile to democratic government as well as to the
principle of majority rule."s8 In this context their strategy was simple: by
undermining the framers' moral standing, they simultaneously undermined
the moral authority of the Supreme Court and vice-versa. Thus, a rising tide
of scholarship (purporting to reexamine the founding period more objectively
than in the past) soon allegedly established that the framers were not nearly
as noble or public-spirited as Americans had been led to believe. Instead,
motivated by personal self-interest, they craftily hid their undemocratic
intentions from the electorate. 182
Particulars do not concern us here. The lesson scholars must employ is
this when examining any original source, to properly understand it, one
must assess whether past scholarship is more meritorious than present
scholarship, and how assumptions, past and present, may influence those
determinations. 8 3 One might pose this additional line of inquiry: Why has the
Revisionist criteria continued to unduly influence contemporary scholarship
with respect to the framers' constitutional motivations? 8 4 Hasn't the time

181. Among some of the most influential Revisionists were James Allen Smith, Herbert
Croly, and Charles Beard. See generally BEARD, supra note 180; HERBERT CROLY, PROMISE
OF AMERICAN LIFE (6th prtg. 1919); J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

(3d prtg. 1911). In this Article, I use the term progressivists to mark the transition from academic
criticism of laissez-faire economic principles to remedial political action. Revisionists,
Progressivists, and Liberals all sought simultaneously to undermine the authority of the Framers
and to challenge the Supreme Court majority's one-dimensional laissez-faire economic
perspective. However, all these critics advocated political action, turning to the federal and state
legislatures to address any felt public policy deficiencies. As a private citizen, Felix Frankfurter
sought political remedies. See supra note 178. However, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he
cautioned, in a concurring opinion, that "[t]he Court is not saved from being oligarchic because
it professes to act in the service of humane ends." Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1949).
182. See CAREY, DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 3, 11, 13-14. Presumably, the Senate and
judiciary also were categorized as anti-majoritarian institutions as would be the Electoral
College presidential election system.
183. Professor Carey provides a careful recounting of these developments. See generally
id. at 3-17 (discussing the Revisionist movement and analysis of influential authors). Among
critics of Beard's thesis, see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Greenwood
Press 1979) (1956) (arguing that Beard's thesis lacks support); FORREST MCDONALD, E

PLURIBUS UNUM (2d prtg. 1965); and see also Martin Diamond, The American Idea ofEquality:
The View from the Founding,38 REV. POL. 313 (1976).
184. As noted elsewhere:
The initial charges made by Revisionist scholars nevertheless continue to cast a long
shadow over an accurate understanding of the framers' design, despite . . . within
their fields of origin their conclusions have been discredited. Exposure continues
through the back door, that is, the Revisionist findings still appear in college textbooks
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come for the founding period to be re-reexamined without both the laissezfairest and Revisionist veneers? 5

(and in other scholarship) in which the authors seldom explicitly reveal the authorities
upon which they rely. Students sense that something is going on. I for one have
experienced it. Some professors believe the original Revisionist conclusions are true
(ignoring the counter evidence) because ultimately, those findings better square with
their own prejudices. Somewhat like Sally, [referring to the film When Harry Met
Sally] they "fake it," that is, they give students the impression that such matters are
well settled and only an idiot (and a naive one at that) would dare question
[them].... So when your professors make some sweeping generalizations about the
[F]ramers' distrust of the people, or that they lined their own pockets, ask them to cite
their sources. Surely such assertions should be supported by evidence.
Gangi, supra note 1, at 47-48 (citing WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Castle Rock Entertainment
1989); other citations omitted).
185. See id. at 45-47. Carey also details which scholars were subsequently influenced by
the Revisionists and identifies other scholars that challenged such reliance. I omit such
information here. However, let me draw on my own experience teaching an Introductory
American National Government course. I habitually assigned a leading college text, namely
Government by the People. MAGLEBY, supra note 135. I did so because it was representative of
texts dependent upon the "official literature." See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
In the book, the authors quite cleverly put forth the Revisionist legacy by referring to the
participants at the Philadelphia Convention as "well-read, well-fed, well-bred, and often wellwed ..... Id. at 37. But beyond that characterization, students were not provided any evidence
upon which to evaluate whether the characterization either was sustainable or significant.
Students, for example, were not provided a forthright evaluation of the lack of black
representation. Compare Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution:Past and Present, in HERBERT
M. LEVINE, POlNT-COUNTERPOINT: READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5 (4th ed. 1992)

(noting the Three-Fifths compromise did not provide for complete representation in line with
the Framers' intent to create a more perfect Union), with William Bradford Reynolds, The
Wisdom ofthe Framers, in LEVINE, supra, at 9 (recognizing that, while the Constitution required
correction for lack of equal representation at its initial conception, such correction does not
undermine the enduring intent to obtain natural rights of men). I pointed out that the authors
knowingly or unknowingly engaged in a sleight of hand, because they substituted contemporary
definitions of democracy instead of attempting to understand the Framers as exponents of
republicanism. Indeed, that text explores and sets out the "conditions" of contemporary
democracy before even discussing the political perspectives of its day and did so without
exploring the pros and cons of such an approach. While the text authors undoubtedly were well
intentioned, I remained unclear about how students can be adequately grounded in politics when
history was apparently faulted for being history (what could they possibly do about it?). Even if
one assumed the purpose of the text authors' approach was to teach students to avoid making
the same mistakes our forefathers had, the approach selected hardly illuminated the period
studied and made no attempt to discern what would have been the immediate and long-term
consequences of a refusal to ratify the Constitution because of its implicit sanction of slavery.
Regarding the latter, of course, no one can know. But, assuming the Constitution had never been
ratified, other questions abound: e.g., would slaves have been better off? Yes, they were free in
a few states but discriminated against in most states, particularly in the South where the majority
of blacks lived. So ultimately, no, their immediate prospects were dim; how dim, I don't know.
Can we imagine that circumstances could possibly have been different? Possibly, but is that
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When approached in the above context, students soon grasp why The
FederalistPapers today no longer engenders the respect in the academy that
it once did. Unfortunate, but correctable. Still, why do an indeterminate
number of scholars continue to embrace the flawed Revisionist analysis? Is it
because doing so enables them to suppress questions that if raised might
unravel other dearly-held but defective theses? 8 6 One today could perhaps

what we want to teach students, that centuries from now they can imagine our time could have
been different?
But, for the moment, let's consider an alternative: that at the time social mores were indeed
different than they in fact were, and blacks were equal to whites, or at least had the right to vote.
Can we assume the vote on ratification of the Constitution would have gone otherwise than it
did? I put "what if' historical speculations, as well as those made above, in the same category
as social contract theorists, that is, speculation on the state of nature, which itself is a speculation,
because no witnesses exist for the period. How far do we go until we recognize the wisdom of
Publius's remark:
If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of government, until every part
of it had been adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would soon
become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of
perfection to be found?
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 22, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton).
186. From what I can discern, the body of scholarship repudiating the Revisionist view of
the founding still remains largely unknown, and even more telling is its continued relative
absence in examined college texts. See generally DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 1-13. While the
matter must be left to others far more qualified than I to resolve, some preliminary observations
may be offered.
In THEODORE J. Lowi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: FREEDOM AND
POWER (6th ed. 2000) the authors rely most heavily on Beard's thesis. Id. at 22-23. They modify
such a reliance by describing the founding as "[a] Marriage of Interest and Principle." Id. at 37.
The analogy is closely associated with contemporary views of democratic theory, not
republicanism. In any event, the authors recount Beard's thesis in some detail, including Beard's
assertion that the Framers "recognize[d] the claim of property to a special and defensive position
in the Constitution." Lowi & GINSBERG, supra, at 22 (citing BEARD, supra note 180, at 32425); but see infra note 189. Furthermore, Lowi and Ginsberg recount Beard's conclusion that
"about three-fourths of the adult males failed to vote on the [Constitution's ratification, with no]
more than one-sixth of the males doing so." Lowl & GINSBERG, supra, at 22-23. The alleged
great divide, as Beard had proposed, "was between substantial personality interests on the one
hand and the small farming and debtor interests on the other." Id. at 23. But, as far back as 1956
(more than forty years prior to publication of the American Government text), Robert Brown had
challenged Beard's conclusions, observing that while Beard gave the impression that his book
was "an arid catalogue of facts," in fact "nothing could be further from reality." See Robert E.
Brown, The Constitution: A Democratic Document, reprinted in LIBERALISM VERSUS
CONSERVATISM, supra note 97, at 54. Furthermore, Brown asserted that "[i]f historical method
means the gathering of data from primary sources, the critical evaluation of the evidence thus
gathered, and the drawing of conclusions consistent with this evidence, then we must conclude
that Beard has done great violation to such method in his book." Id. Brown had countered:
"Present evidence seems to indicate that there were no 'propertyless masses' who were excluded
from the suffrage at the time." Id. at 56. He then concluded, "If historians insist on accepting the
Beard thesis in spite of this analysis . . .they must do so with the full knowledge that their
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acceptance is founded on 'an act of faith,' not an analysis of historical method, and that they are
indulging in a 'noble dream,' not history." Id. at 58. Although beyond the scope of this Article,
Brown observed that one might suspect Beard "of using only that evidence which appeared to
support his thesis," and even then, "the conclusions which . . . [Beard] drew were not justified
even by the kind of evidence which he used. If we accepted his evidence strictly at face value,
it would still not add up to the fact that the Constitution was put over undemocratically in an
undemocratic society by personality." Id. at 55. Lowi and Ginsberg do not mention Brown,
although they cite one of Forrest McDonald's books. Lowl & GINSBERG, supra, at 49.
In EDWARD S. GREENBERG & BENJAMIN I. PAGE, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 33
(7th ed. 2005), the authors focus on the colonialists' desire to "acquire and enjoy private property
rights," mentioning that before long "the popular culture was growing increasingly hostile to
privilege of any kind, whether of social standing, education, or wealth." They describe delegates
at the Convention as "not common folk. There were no common laborers, skilled craftspeople,
small farmers, women, or racial minorities in attendance." Id. Greenberg and Page then describe
Beard as having "had legions of defenders and detractors" (providing a list of various
commentators, including Brown and McDonald). Id at 34. They concede, however, "Beard
overemphasized the degree to which the framers were driven by the immediate need to 'line
their own pockets,' failed to give credit to their more noble motivations, and even got many of
his facts wrong." Id However, Greenberg and Page further noted that Beard "was probably on
the mark when he suggested that broad economic and social-class motives were at work in
shaping the actions of the framers." Id. at 34-35. The authors do not suggest that the Framers
were unconcerned with such topics as "national interest, economic stability, or the preservation
of liberty," only that those concepts were understood in the context of them being "fully
compatible with their own positions of economic and social eminence." Id. Specific opposition
arguments that might impact their assessment are ignored. For example, Robert E. Brown had
observed that "[i]f the members of the Convention were directly interested in the outcome of
their work and expected to derive benefits from the establishment of the new system, so also did
most of the people of the country." Brown, supra, at 56. Greenberg and Page dodge such
common-sense observations and instead apparently assume that it is class that is determining,
not individual participant choices, the former being a very modern assumption. As noted above,
Brown claimed that Beard's thesis was unsupportable even on the secondary information Beard
had used. Furthermore, Brown's conclusions had been based on original, not secondary sources.
See supra. Robert E. Brown also denied that most voters had been disfranchised or were
"propertyless." See earlier comments in this note; Brown, supra, at 56. Intriguing, of course, as
mentioned by Brown, is that even in 1913 several of Beard's book reviewers noted that Beard's
book was "replete with interpretation [instead of being an "arid catalogue of facts"], as Beard
had sometimes stated . .. [or] implied." Brown, supra, at 54. As previously mentioned with
respect to the Lowi & GINSBERG text, Brown claimed that the sources used by Beard could not
sustain Beard's thesis. Id. at 55. And, as also mentioned previously, Beard's thesis was more
"an act of faith," not an analysis of historical method, and that those who accepted that thesis
were indulging in a "noble dream, [and] not history." Id. at 58. In all fairness, however, once
one personally places oneself in the intellectual milieu of the time (i.e., the applicable "tides") it
is easy to understand why Beard's thesis was so widely accepted. Intellectuals of the day were
focused on the contemporary evil-the Supreme Court majority's imposition on the American
people of laissez-faire economic theory accompanied by the assertion that the Framers' design
prohibited the national or state legislatures, of both, from addressing the economic crisis through
ordinary sub-constitutional processes. In the air also was the unbounded hope that the world
would be reformed under, by that time, a long legacy of socialist theorists as well as the program
championed by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels.
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attribute such omissions to the unprecedented volume of information available
to all scholars today, not to mention pure chance (that is, whether the period
proves attractive to one or more contemporary scholars). Possibly this may be
the case, but such explanations do not satisfy me. When reading the legal
literature or conversing with colleagues, these omissions are jarring,
especially when no apparent desire or effort is made either to acquire
additional information or to demonstrate familiarity with the contrary
arguments presented, or, more importantly, to present evidence repudiating
them. The body of scholarship repudiating Revisionist assumptions raises the
"look for a thesis" red flag. 187

In the third examined text, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN POLITICS: CLASSIC

AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Samuel Kernell & Steven S. Smith eds., 6th ed. 2015), the
authors credit Beard with resurrecting Anti-federalist charges made during the Ratification
debates. The authors claim that later scholars have relied on Beard to berate the Madison model.
Id. at 35. While this text incorporates the Revisionist assumptions through authors such as James
Allen Smith, Charles Beard, and Herbert Croly, see supra notes 180-81 for references, they also
rely on scholars who redefined democratic theory from how the Framers understood it. Second,
the text makes no mention of those authors who challenged Beard and his successors, including
Brown, or McDonald. I also would urge the reader to compare the authors' understanding of the
quotes from The FederalistPapers, the purpose of the separation of powers and Madisonian
model, with discussions provided in this (text accompanying notes 96-112, supra) or in the
Journey article. Gangi, supra note 1, at 45-51.
In the final examined text, KAREN O'CONNOR AND LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (2004 ed.), the authors put forth Beard's thesis,

noting however that in the 1950s it was challenged (mentioning Brown). Id. at 45 (citing BEARD,
supra note 183). The authors also recount a subsequent rebuttal to those critics by those partially
supporting Beard (e.g., Jackson Turner Main and Gordon S. Wood). Wood, they mention,
"concluded that the Framers were representatives of a class that favored order and stability over
some of the more radical ideas that had inspired the American Revolutionary War and break
with Britain." Id. (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,

1776-1787 (reissue ed. 1993)). Space does permit a more extensive analysis, or to raise
questions such as whether those conclusions stemmed from unstated assumptions or are
sustainable by any evidence presented. The implication of O'Connor and Sabato's remarks, at
least to me, is that somehow the more radical ideas were inherently purer (better, more noble).
And who determines that? Not only is Publius' response sufficient, see supra note 185, but with
respect to some of Beard's successors (although there is no desire to judge them solely on that
ground), they are further discussed in CAREY, DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 7-13, and CAREY,
supra note 180, at xxxi-xxxiii nn.5-1 1.
I want to express my appreciation to Joesph Telano for his research assistance in acquiring
samples of college texts and chasing down several citations.
187. Certainly, a realistic view of human nature should prepare us for such occurrences.
Scholars are no less human than others, and as we all know, long established attitudes frequently
guide our intellect rather than the other way around. See supra note 25. And, as noted previously,
we may observe the love affair one often has with one's thesis, an observation that applies
equally to the author.
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CONSIDERATION

Recall, we have cautioned the reader of the danger posed by being guided
by unstated or uncritically accepted assumptions-or perhaps, utilizing theses
that are not well-grounded in historical fact-or when a scholar ignores what
the people did when trying to determine what the people meant when they
used the words they did.
Even if one acknowledges an abstract obligation to examine original
sources, questions remain. When is that necessary: Always? Sometimes? It is
impractical to ask scholars to ignore their accumulated expertise each time
they embark on a new research project. Shortcuts are inevitable. After all,
most scholars consider some sources fundamental, rock solid, reliablesacred texts if you will.

1'

Let's view the issue from another perspective. Students are usually
introduced to a subject by an inspiring professor, one who more probably than
not intertwined his or her expertise (including unstated assumptions) with
perhaps embedded value preferences. Professors rarely differentiate the two
components, and students today, perhaps more than ever, are rarely
encouraged to distinguish acquired expertise from desirable outcomes. 189
When in turn these students themselves become budding scholars, their
understanding of original sources begins where their mentors' own
understanding left off. Sometime in the future, however, these emerging
scholars may be compelled by circumstances (e.g., during advanced graduate
work, writing their doctoral dissertation, exposure to competing viewpoints,
years of diligent research) to reexamine the original sources upon which their
professor's expertise had been at least partially based.
The quality of that reexamination may well depend on the quality of their
initial training (perhaps from the same inspiring professor) or upon other
training or research experience subsequently encountered. If the standards

188. I have obviously recounted some of mine, and I hope critics will offer some of their
own. Doing so makes true dialogue possible. Like most acquired attitudes, it is difficult to
partially or completely abandon them.
189. Scholars commonly credit opponents with a shared expertise but still disagree upon
what evidence is pertinent, or how the evidence should to be weighed, or upon what basis
conclusions should be reached. One characteristic of the American legislative process-as well
as its common law heritage-is that compromise is possible even where opposing parties
disagree. The common law clearly has an incremental character. Academics are less suited to
finding a common ground than are politicians. Hence, academics view politicians as
unprincipled and politicians view academics as unrealistic or out of touch. Socrates certainly
recognized that even philosophers make mistakes. That is human. Socrates, however,
condemned the Sophists, not because they taught error (everyone is capable of that), but because
they knew they were teaching error and accepted pay for doing so!
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their inspiring professor initially provided prove adequate, the reexamination
of original sources will still likely enrich their craft for no other reason than
they now bring to the reexamination more knowledge than what was available
to them as students. Thus, such reexaminations simply may affirm their
professor's assessment of those original sources.
However, as is frequently the case, the reexamination may to one degree
or another alter the perception of those original sources inherited from their
inspiring professor. Perhaps greater familiarity with the literature or even new
research enables them to detect inconsistencies or the importance of evidence
which heretofore had eluded them. In brief, the reexamination may result
either in a partial or complete rejection of what their professor had taught them
about an original source. This scholar must decide if their tainted
understanding of an original source has adversely impacted their past research
and conclusions. If it has, they must decide if the perceived shortfall can be
corrected and the resultant errors addressed. This course of action may require
a pause in the scholar's research agenda and a need to expend energy to
address these newly discovered gaps in expertise. 190
In my own reexamination of The FederalistPapers,I found Kendall and
Carey's "Introduction" invaluable, permitting me to understand that my initial
exposure to it had been faulty.191 Let me count the ways: (1) Scholars and
students alike should read all the Papers and not just Nos. 10, 51, and 78,
copies of which often are conveniently included in the typical college text
book. And they should read each Papercarefully. Only then can one assess
whether what a professor taught that Publius had said corresponds with what
one now reads. Too often my professors had interpreted Publius' words either
through the "official literature" or Revisionist prisms, paying little or no

190. If scholars do not reexamine their understanding of original sources or expend the
requisite time and energy to correct their initial understanding (should that prove to be
necessary), their future research may be equally tainted. While it is certainly true that good
research enriches good teaching, I have encountered great teachers who are not necessarily great
researchers or are not presently great researchers. As an undergraduate, I had several inspiring
professors, but upon later reflection I realized they had relied too heavily upon secondary
sources. Had my education ended with my B.A. degree, it might have been sufficient. But as I
advanced through graduate work and was exposed to far better-grounded students and
demanding professors, embarrassment (and a wee bit of competitive spirit) drove me to burn the
midnight oil. Despite deficiencies that persist, I learned early in my career that there was a lot to
learn from great scholars, even from those with whom you disagree, eventually emerging from
my thesis years with both a body of expertise and a deep respect and admiration for some
opponents. For further discussion, see Gangi, supra note 1, at 2-5.
191. The essay entitled "How to Read 'The Federalist"'is part of the introduction to an
edition of the Papers. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, at v-xx. A copy of this essay, "How to
Read 'The Federalist,"' (with George W. Carey) also may be found in WILLMOORE KENDALL,
CONTRA MUNDUM 403 (Nellie D. Kendall ed.,197 1).
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attention to an alternate interpretation or what evidence challenged their
related assumptions; 92 (2) Scholars and students alike should subject two
other assumptions to close (one is tempted to write "strict") scrutiny, namely:
(a) "The Mischiefs of Factions," that "[a]ll individuals pursue their selfinterest, seeking advantage or power over others"' 93 adequately addresses our
political history and (b) that since Publius supported judicial review an
important constitutional feature he endorsed the contemporary assumption
that the framers endorsed a general judicial discretion to resolve public policy
disputes; 9 4 (3) After a careful reading, scholars and students alike should be
able to evaluate whether the Papers, as some scholars claim, are "mere
propaganda, a mere 'school-teacherish' explication of the Philadelphia
Constitution;"' 9 5 (4) A similar reading also permits scholars and students alike
to judge Revisionist characterizations of the Papers as being simplistic and
unsustainable.1 96 Instead, as Kendall and Carey argue, the Paperscan be fairly
described as "a 'basic document' of the American political tradition."' 97 In
fact, we should view them as "a re-enactment, in miniature, of the miracle of
the Philadelphia convention itself ....
(5) I eventually grasped another insight that eluded me for decades, namely,
the fact that Hamilton and Madison's subsequent expression of divergent

192. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, at v (Introduction). See comment accompanying
note 191, supra.
193. MAGLEBY ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 144 (22 ed.). See also Gangi, supra

note 1, at 37.
194. MAGLEBY ET AL., supra note 193, at 408 (quoting Hamilton for authority) and
claiming that it is the function of the Supreme Court to "resolve . . issues such as abortion
rights; the death penalty; the rights of prisoners of war; protection from pornography; and basic
freedoms of the press, religion, and speech." Id. at 409. See also comment accompanying note
216, infra.
195. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, at xiii.
196. See id. at vi-ix, xiii-xv.
197. Id. at xv.
198. Id. at xii (emphasis in original). They added:
The Constitution became possible because, increasingly, the delegates were willing
to ask themselves not "[w]hat do I, personally, think the Constitution ought to be?"
but rather "[h]ow much of what I think can I insist on with any hope of getting others
to go along with me?" and "[h]ow much of what we can all get together on is there
any hope of getting accepted by the American people?" . . . The Federalist, we are
saying, re-enacts that political miracle--as, we would add, with the exception of the
tragic years that produced the Civil War, American political life has re-enacted it over
and over again ever since and eventuates in a public act that became possible only
because the authors were prepared to submerge their individual personalities, their
individual political philosophies, in the common enterprise.
Id.
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views on a variety of issues was largely irrelevant to an understanding of
the Papers. 99 Their later disagreements do not diminish the unity of
explication contained in the Papers, a unity that the long-lived Madison
never repudiated.200 Scholars and students should embrace this guideline:
"[T]he holistic perspective of The Federalist... holds out the best
prospect for identifying, illuminating, and comprehending these and like
concerns surrounding the foundations of our system." 201
(6) Finally, I now reject as unsustainable the Revisionist assertion that the
Papers contain "mutually inconsistent positions and values that masked
the "Framers" undemocratic motives. 202
For these reasons, I better grasp today why too many political scientists and
legal theorists have ignored or depreciated, with the notable exception of the
tenth Paper,the continuing relevance of the Papers.203
VIII.

ESCAPING SCHOLARLY TIDES

On several occasions, I have cautioned readers that scholarly tides are
frequently in a state of flux. 204 Those discussions focused on their character

and provided examples of their occurrences. In the last instance, it provided
some explanation of why some scholars dismiss the relevance of The

199. See id. at ix-xiii.
200. See generally George W. Carey, Publius-A Split Personality?, in CAREY, DEFENSE,
supra note 99, at 18 (examining writings of Madison and Hamilton and concluding evidence
of their differences are not present in The FederalistPapers).
201. Id. at 33.
202. CAREY, supra note 180, at xiii-xiv.
203. In making their case, Revisionist scholars and their successors had turned to
Federalist Paper No. 10 because of its notable discussion of factions, although ignoring
Madison's much broader explanation for their existence (i.e., human nature), and instead
focusing on Madison's acknowledgment of the importance of property. But see supra note 180.
In part, the Revisionists focused on property because it fit well with Karl Marx's economic
theories, an association not terribly surprising since those theories had been part of the
contemporary academic climate ("tides" of that era). See Douglas Adair, The Tenth Federalist
Revisited, 8 WM & MARY Q. 48, 61 (1951). One other point: most, if not all, participants at the
Philadelphia Convention were practicing politicians, and many also had been veterans of the
Revolutionary War. These participants understood only too well, as the quoted portion in the
text makes clear, that if they had failed to obtain a consensus acceptable to the people, any such
schema produced would, like so many others in the past, have been heaped on the junk pile of
history. See also the seminal piece by JOHN P. ROCHE, THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A REFORM
CAUCUS IN ACTION (1962), reprintedin L1BERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM, supra note 97,
at 33.
204. See supra notes 92, 111, 176 and accompanying text.
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FederalistPapers. However, those prior discussions offered little practical
assistance when the broader and perpetual challenge is approached: How may
scholars escape the intellectual "tides" of their day? Frankly, in all probability,
most of us can't. But having absorbed some of the preceding lessons, a few
practical suggestions may be offered.
A.

PeriodicallyReview the Elements of Your Craft

There is no substitute for the years of reading, reflection, and writing
integral to acquiring expertise. That process is repeated during periodic
immersions in another body of literature, immersions that to one degree or
another, disturb past subject certainty. Avoid the natural inclination to push
aside those challenging your point of view. Read opposing literature more
carefully than that of those agreeing with you. Then, read them again. Be
thorough without being obsessive.205 By sifting carefully through the opinions
you encounter, soon you will identify those who focus on evidence rather than
placing an emphasis upon obtaining desirable results. Gravitate toward
scholars evincing greater evenhandedness. Reflect. After identifying superior
scholars, examine cited sources. Read and compare those sources to others
you've encountered. Organize the arguments. Separate the different
arguments within a single strand. That act sharpens your skillset, permitting
you to separate the wheat from the chaff: that is, it helps you distinguish which
scholarship is obviously motivated by short term agendas from those seeking
greater understanding and perhaps driven primarily by curiosity. 206 Finally,
mastering opposition points of view has a tendency to moderate
conclusions. 207 These practices should stimulate you to look beyond
immediate consideration of the consequences of your musings, and perhaps
help to free you from the conventional opinions that may surround you.

205. This is a tricky call. The rule of thumb I use is to quit when the reading gets
increasingly repetitive-a saturation point. Subsequently, I may again review other previously
consumed literature or examine some of the references suggested therein. Sometimes as the
reading becomes more and more extensive, I might pause to narrow my focus, choosing to
exclude subjects that I might have included earlier my mentor's advice still ringing in my ears.
See supra note 84.
206. Of course, that does not mean that a source is completely tainted (useless) because of
one defect. The source still may contain important insights.
207. The process is akin to Madison's insistence on having fewer elected representatives
in contrast to the Antifederalist's desire to have a greater number of elected representatives
reflecting discrete interest groups. Madison believed that with fewer representatives,
representatives would be tugged among competing interests, and since such representatives
would be hesitant to alienate the more moderate members in any group, that would have a
moderating effect on that representative's voting record. See infra Part X.
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B. PracticeHumility
Acknowledge the debt owed to those who nurtured your craft and assisted
in acquiring your expertise. 208 You will often find humility in the works of
outstanding scholars and are likely to find an honesty and meticulousness in
their works, especially when examining respected opponents. 209
C. Express Your Conclusions Honestly and Forthrightly
After weighing opposition arguments, superior scholars report their
findings as clearly and forthrightly as possible. They don't run from a fight. 210
If scholarship is about anything, it is about the obligation to be honest with
yourself and your opponents, a particularly difficult task when conclusions
prove to be inconsistent with your public policy preferences or run counter to
21
those of your usual allies. 1

D. Respect Our Legacy ofSelf-Government
American scholars have an obligation to accurately discern and respect
the republican principles as understood by the generation that enacted them.

208. In one of Carey's publications, the dedication is to his friend and colleague Willmoore
Kendall, KENDALL & CAREY, supra note 115, and in another it is to Charles S. Hyneman,
CAREY, supra note 180. He had acknowledged the latter's influence in an earlier work,
Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey, The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory, 62
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 5, 5 n.* (1968) [hereinafter Kendall & Carey, Intensity]. Citations to the
article's appearance in Kendall, supra note 191, at 471 n.1 and elsewhere credit Hyneman's
contribution for perceiving the possible consequences of the Supreme Court's desegregation
decisions, namely, "whether the Court would be so bold as to take upon itself the task of
correcting the presumed 'political failures' of elective branches." CAREY, DEFENSE, supra note
99, at 4-5.
209. In reading The FederalistPapers, Hamilton in particular changes his tone when he
addresses Antifederalist opponents that he believes raised legitimate issues versus those he
considers as not having done their homework, not thinking very clearly, or perhaps having some
motive other than engaging in principled dialogue.
2 10. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. Even then, scholars may adopt different
styles. Compare Carey's approach in Carey, Separation, supra note 99, with Raoul Berger's
virtuoso but much more polemic performance in Raoul Berger, The Scope of JudicialReview:
An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527 (1979). Or, perhaps, with Yale Kamisar's
approach. Like Publius, Kamisar combines cool logic while simultaneously pulling on one's
heartstrings. See Kamisar,Letters, supra note 99. Scholars can learn valuable lessons from each.
211. Publius preserves a legacy of knowledge about human nature, politics, power,
freedom, honor, faith in one's fellow citizens, and "whether societies of men are really capable
or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." THE FEDERALIST No.
1, supra note 22, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Should they not do so, it is far more likely they will misinterpret the
Constitution's design, which in turn will increase the prospects of producing
inferior scholarship. Furthermore, if driven primarily by assumptions of
constitutional inadequacy without accurately understanding the framers'
design the resulting scholarship is bound to be somehow defective and
thereby more likely to lead to unanticipated consequences. Once at least
initially understood from the ratifiers' perspective, scholars are free to identify
felt constitutional deficiencies in their design and should address them
separately and directly. After all, that is precisely what the framers did when
they argued to replace the Articles of Confederation. Finally, differentiate
personal preferences from scholarly obligations, 212 while refusing to suppress
relevant questions. 213 Unless otherwise bound by the Constitution, leave the
door open to political resolution, that is, to self-government, 214 even in those
areas that personally concern you. 2 15 That is what Chief Justice John Marshall

suggested.216

212. Elsewhere I examine the various arguments modern judicial power proponents put
forth and contrast them with how Publius might have replied. GANGI, supra note 36, at 194-

225.
213. For a recent example of question suppression in an otherwise fine piece of
scholarship, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995). In
the book, Redish applies one set of interpretive rules to political structures while another is used
in personal rights cases; the distinction relies solely on the author's assumptions and hierarchy

of values. William Gangi, Book Review, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 200, 200 (1996) (reviewing
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995)).
214. GANGI, supranote 36, at 269-76.
215. See George W. Carey, Abortion and the American Political Crisis, in CAREY,
DEFENSE supra note 99, at 174, 191-94 (noting acceptance of different theories by separate
portions of the population, resulting in no clear answer "for resolving the inevitable conflicts
between the values and goods a society cherishes").
216. Proponents of increased judicial power frequently rely on Chief Justice John
Marshall's advice that it "is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 407 (1819) (emphasis omitted). They interpret those words to sanction a broader
interpretation of judicial review than the facts would bear.
Gerald Gunther who discovered Marshall's "Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland,"
commented, "[I]f virtually unlimited congressional [or judicial] discretion is indeed
required to meet twentieth century needs, candid argument to that effect, rather than
ritual invoking of Marshall's authority, would seem to me more closely in accord with
the Chief Justice's stance.'
Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. L. REv 311, 37071 (1979) [hereinafter Berger, Fourteenth] (alteration in original) (quoting RAOUL BERGER,
supra note 109, at 378 n.19). Chief Justice Marshall's classic statement appears perfectly
consistent with Professor Gunther's conclusions:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that
its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the
constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will
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THE MADISONIAN PERSPECTIVE

A.

Prologue

From my perspective, many conservative and liberal legal scholars assert
that, if properly interpreted, the Constitution compels adoption of one or
another desirable public policy. The American people have been repeatedly
lectured by fluctuating Supreme Court majorities that the policies imposed are
the logical consequences of our nation's commitment to one liberty or
another, or that our tradition has always consisted of the expansion of liberty,
or equality, or both. But what of our tradition of self-government?
Until recently, many liberal policy advocates preferred to rely on judicial
imposition rather than on elected representatives to advance their public
policy agenda.2 17 One might accurately observe that conservative public
policy advocates seem prepared to do the same. There are certainly exceptions
to that assessment. Nevertheless, a disproportionate number of scholaradvocates in both camps today seem to say "look how smart we are we can
isolate phrases from the Constitution and interpretthem to require judicialimposition of policies long considered to be within the electorate's
discretion." Instead, once these policies are mandated by the Supreme Court,
their often landmark decisions consist of national lectures that are
intentionally or unintentionally incorporate unproven assumptions, employ
intricate but defective analogies (constructed to validate those assumptions),
or put forth a seemingly limitless number of suggestions with respect to what
must be done to make our governing system (from their perspective) what it
ought to be. And as did their laissez-faire predecessors-these critics once
again suggest to the American people that these judicial determinations lie
beyond the people's competence because they, it is again alleged, are what the
Constitution demands. 218

enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. at 421.
217. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also infra Part XI and accompanying
sources. I refer of course to the possibility that under a Trump administration the judiciary will
be in hands hostile to the liberal/progressive agenda.
218. These premises or analogies (often historically inaccurate or incomplete) are posited
or constructed as being essential to our legacy of rights or equality. However, if the premises
upon which they are based are proven to be false or defective, the entire structure collapses.
Similarly, the analogies posited are also usually based upon only a fragment of relevant
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But, much of their reasoning is fundamentally flawed because it is
inconsistent with the framers' understanding of their republican design. True
enough, the framers left the judiciary unaccountable directly to the electorate.
But they did so, not because they intended to create a judicial oligarchy, or to
deceive the people by abandoning the created republican regime. On the
contrary they did so because it was the only means of doing so while providing
an independent branch of qualified (and temperamentally suited) individuals
capable of keeping the legislature and executive, separately or collusively,
within the confines of the powers granted by the people to each in the
Constitution. Assured of its structural independence, 2 19 it was uniquely
suitable to police the Constitution's boundaries. While the framers considered
the judiciary the weakest of the three branches of government, its lack of
coercive powers was intentional. What made their pronouncements so
compelling was precisely that the judiciary lacked a direct power of
enforcement. In rendering a judgement, it was presumed they had nothing to
gain. Had the judiciary possessed a coercive power, its judgments would more
likely engender civil war than obedience. 220

experience. While these analogies often begin with experiential truths before long, they are
distorted by over extension. See generally Gangi, Exclusionary, supra note 72, at 90-117
(discussing legitimate role of Supreme Court during development of exclusionary rule); GANGI,
supra note 36, at 181-90 (examining Justice Lousi Brandeis's analogy that the government is
an omnipresent teacher and concluding this was not incorporated in the Constitution). In Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1857), a Court majority decided such a measure was beyond
Congress's competency.
219. Perhaps Publius, in the context of the Framers concern with governmental tyranny
(see text and comments accompanying notes 99-110, supra), expressed it most succinctly: "No
legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that
the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his mater; that the representative
of the people is superior to the people themselves." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, at 467. The
judiciary is a distinct institution and its distinct task is to interpret the law. To secure their
independence in pursuing that task, the Constitution prohibited any legislative attempt to lower
their compensation. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Thus, the framers included structural components
so that members of the judiciary would do their job. But, that position does not require
diminishing the people's right to self-government, which is to say the framers never authorized
the judiciary to make public policy, or to substitute their judgments for those of the legislature
unless those actions violated the "manifest tenor" of the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
supra note 22, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton).
220. Publius observed:
The judiciary . .. has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even
for the efficacy of its judgments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 22, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). Raoul Berger suggests
that the scope of judicial review was significantly circumscribed: "[T]hejudicial fimction
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Today, neither the judiciary's unrepublican character nor its
independence are perceived as inherent limitations on the scope of its power;
rather, these features are instead perceived as empowering the judiciary to do
(in the mind of one advocate or another) the right thing without fear of voter
reprisal. If, on one particular or another, the Framers' intent is demonstrated
to be clearly to the contrary, they reply, "why should that restrict us today?"
If one demonstrates that there are precedents contrary to the proposed
imposition, those precedents are overruled, ignored, or reinterpreted. In effect,
the reply is, "so what?" 221 Show them that a pivotal premise or assumption is
historically or otherwise shaky, they reply, "how can we know for sure?"
Prove historical assumptions faulty, or that, in pursuing the object of their
heart's desire, other constitutional considerations are obliterated or
unjustifiably minimized, more often than not the response (some more subtly
than others) is that those considerations are of little consequence, since-in
the big picture (the one their preferences create)-the net results are good.
This brief synopsis is the aggregate alternative put forth by a significant
portion of contemporary constitutional scholars, which I wish now to contrast
to the complexity of politics put forth by James Madison.
B. How Well Do We Understandthe Framers'Design?
Perhaps thirty years ago, I ran across a seminal article: The "Intensity"
Problem and Democratic Theory (Intensity).222 Sadly, then and for two
decades thereafter, I did not fully appreciate its content. That is itself a lesson
for scholars: be prepared to re-immerse yourself in materials already
consumed because time and other research may prompt greater appreciation
of what insights eventually you realize had eluded you. The Intensity article
not only challenged post-World War II reinterpretations of democratic theory,

was topolice constitutional boundaries, to prevent the other departments from 'overleaping'
their bounds, not to interfere with the legislative or executive discretion within those bounds."
Berger, supra note 210, at 537 (citing BERGER, supra note 109, at 305). It was precisely because
the judiciary lacked the powers of the purse and sword that Publius believed that the people
would accept the Justices' judgments. They, individually or institutionally, had nothing at stake.
If the judiciary had coercive power, as had the legislature or executive, it simply would increase
prospects of civil war because we have no reason to believe that citizens would not continue to
divide over one decision or another. See GANGI, supra note 36, at 202-05. I suggest that the
high stakes game now surrounding appointments to the Supreme Court (and perhaps Appeals
Courts) are the most obvious result of new perspectives of an expanded judicial role. Certainly,
barely beneath the surface, in rhetoric (ifnot action) are harbingers of civil war rhetoric on both
the left and right.
221. GANGI, supra note 36, at 154 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,73
VA. L. REv. 659, 662 (1987)).
222. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208.
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but it also brought into high relief the contrast between those theories and the
Founders' view of republicanism.223 The article raised this penetrating
question: why does the Constitution place "severe limitations upon temporary
majorities, and le[ave] the path to the statute-book open only to serious,
deliberate majorities-that is, majorities able to keep themselves in being long
enough to gain control of both houses of Congress, of the Presidency, and of
the Supreme Court[?]" 224

Perhaps readers nurtured exclusively in contemporary democratic theory
find the question baffling. Putting aside a more substantive discussion on that
issue, I focus on how the Intensity article affected my own scholarship. 225
First, the article suggests that scholars master mindsets other than their own,
and in doing so one need not subscribe to the mindset studied. Instead, that
acquired skill contributes to sounder subject mastery, providing a practical
means by which scholars put aside the conventional wisdom of their time and
place, enabling them to better grasp how those in other eras viewed the same
materials.226
Second, the authors advise scholars to be cautious before applying
insights borrowed from one field and applying them to another. 227 More
frequently than not such applications are dependent upon accident, that is,
scholars whose personal curiosity crosses multiple fields. Such crosspollination is invigorating-for a time. But once such cross-overs occur, it
may take a generation or more before succeeding scholars (with the same
curiosity and set of competencies) point out that the now-accepted criterion in

223. One feature of the Intensity article, not particularly germane here, was the authors'
rejection of the criticism of certain congressional practices as undemocratic. While I have a
limited knowledge of contemporary Congressional practices, I continue to be perplexed by the
Senate rule requiring sixty votes for passage of substantive legislation. The fact that this ruleI am told was initiated by Republicans, some allegedly conservative, adds embarrassment to
the noted perplexity. Senate legislation should, unless otherwise specified in the Constitution,
pass by a majority vote regardless of which party, or if any party (there are independents)
controls the Senate. The initial sixty vote cloture rule had provided a means to end filibusters
wherein a minority of senators could thwart majority rule. The sixty votes necessary at the time
assured a suitable majority would prevail while still affording a minority of senators the ability
to delay but not permanently obstruct the legislation. The strategy is a common one in Madison's
republican schema: cause delay essential for additional reflection on a proposal's merits. Now a
minority enjoys the same institutional benefits without having to expend any effort.
224. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 5.
225. See generally Gangi, supra note 1, at 67-75 (discussing and citing the Intensity
article).
226. I ignore here the authors' suggestion that scholars acquire a broad historical
grounding. See supra note 142 and accompanying comment. See also Rothstein, supra note 140
(discussing James Madison, "a man of his time," and the legacy of slavery).
227. A topic already discussed. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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the second or third field has been found wanting, or totally discarded, in the
field where it originated.228
Third, as demonstrated earlier, scholars are less likely to engage in thesis
book writing if they habitually avoid judgments of intellectual deficiency or
hypocrisy. 229 Instead, when a people's historical actions (whether right or
wrong in the investigating scholar's mind) apparently conflict with that
scholar's understanding of the words and beliefs explored, the scholar should
consider alternate explanations. They should not pluck a phrase from the
Constitution, as previously noted (like "free speech"), and then, by logical
explication, define what in their mind that phrase should mean, or apply a
definition of what the phrase has come to mean, to the historical situation
investigated. 230 instead, the scholar should attempt to understand what the
people did at the time while reconciling those actions with professed
adherence to the values that the words used imply. Intriguing assertions and
speculations are very different from the obligations associated with
scholarship, and the scholar should clearly make those distinctions.231

228. Gangi, supra note 1, at 61-62 n.284. The initiators of these conceptual crossovers
often are top-notch scholars. Scholars who succeed them, logically extending original premises
and adding considerable imagination in the process, are not necessarily as competent as the
initiators. The common flaw seems to be an overemphasis on one aspect of reality and the
downplaying or eliminating of other portions. Alas, of course, the possibilities enunciated here
are equally applicable to my preceding evaluation; hence, the continuing responsibility of
scholars to reexamine premises and confront opposition arguments. Gangi, supra note 1, at 62.
229. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
230. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 66.
23 1. Earlier I commented on scholars who inappropriately attribute a meaning to freedom
of speech that in fact did not exist during the period investigated. See supra notes 146-48 and
accompanying text. The general rule may be stated thusly: Begin with what the words meant to
the dominant experts using it; then put that meaning into the larger context of republican
structures (the legislative and executive powers and competition among those branches). From
my periodic immersions in the legal literature on specific subjects, I conclude that contemporary
legal scholars remain dominated by scholars elevating logic and imagination above our historical
experience and tradition of self-government. These scholars unquestionably possess outstanding
intellects, but consciously or instinctively more frequently engage in system-building (masking
their speculations under economic, philosophical, or theological assumptions) than contribute to
the body of constitutional expertise. Instead, they often focus on abstract rights stripped of
historical context. Thus, in my opinion, each expends an inordinate amount of energy trying to
convince their readers that their speculation, unlike those of competing scholars, is important to
the health of the body politic. Distracted thusly, my fear is that the truly gifted will ignore
experience and self-awareness, which is to say (given Plato's description of society is man writ
large), that much of the legal literature today has become increasingly shallow, regardless of its
apparent sophistication. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 68-69. Plato comments: "And do you realize
that of necessity there are as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or
do you think that constitutions are born "from oak or rock" and not from the characters of the
people who live in the cities governed by them, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss2/6

74

Gangi: Scholars and Our Craft
2018]

SCHOLARS AND OUR CRAFT

421

Fourth, and perhaps the most difficult lesson for some contemporary
scholars to embrace, is this: in a republican government, rightly or wrongly,
morally justified or not, the people are legally entitled to prevail.232 "But."
Yes, I fully appreciate the desire to add reservations. Nevertheless, that is a
fundamental constitutional truth we forget only at our and our successors
peril. No one can anticipate the unintended consequences that might ensue if
that truth is not embraced, and worse still, no one can predict how over time
it might be cured.
Fifth, that understanding of Madison's schema helped those like myself
avoid a temptation among my contemporaries, namely, to characterize the
framers as anti-democratic. On the contrary, once one puts their fears about
dangerous democratic tendencies in their proper context, the framers are
nothing less than wise democrats. 233 The framers refused to ignore historical
experience (English and Colonial) or the inherent weaknesses of past popular
governments. Many contemporary democratic theorists seem to ignore the
framers' English heritage and Colonial experience and concerns, or they

rest along with them?" PLATO, REPUBLIC, reprintedin PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS, 951, 1157

(John M. Cooper ed., G.M.A. Grube, trans., rev. C.D.C. Reeve 1997). That observation
reinforces an earlier suggestion that all scholars must be aware of their personality preferences
and how it might unduly influence their scholarship.
232. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 117, 129 (1978).
233. At the time slaves and women were disfranchised, and scholars today cannot undo
that fact. We cannot know whether or not, had those facts been different, it would have
materially altered the Framers' perspectives on pure democracies versus republican
governments, or the tendency of all governments toward consolidation. Republican governments
combined the danger of consolidation while simultaneously embracing majority rule. Of course,
contemporary views of democratic theory, as Kendall and Carey noted a half-century ago,
cannot quite address the inherent dilemma at least not in the context of the republican schema.
Instead of coming to grips with the issue of how better to reconcile the desire for good, just,
moral, and effective government with the need for majority rule, some scholars prefer to dismiss
Madison's solution or assume that contemporary democratic forms will somehow do so, or that
aspects of the Framer's republican design ought to be abandoned without fully exploring the
consequences, or they substitute an unauthorized judiciary to remedy establish a regime never
authorized or to address any unanticipated consequences. The subtext here is that, instead of
addressing the danger of majority tyranny as much as practical, as did Madison in providing a
republican cure for a republican disease, they expect courts to check popular passion injection
better than Madison's reliance on interest versus interest over an extended territory. The only
thing that protects proponents of modern democratic theory from disastrous consequences is the
American people's continued allegiance to the Constitution as they understand it. Should the
people come to believe, as I do, that many public policy choices imposed by the Supreme Court
often rest solely on the predilections of the Court's majority, and are not constitutionally
mandated, they will better understand how circumscribed their right to govern themselves has
become. If that occurs, our constitutional crisis may well move in unanticipated directions. See
Gangi, supra note 11, at 52-55 (discussing the Supreme Court acting as a "Legiscourt").
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minimized any risks associated with those experiences. Instead, they focus on
what they perceive as good results (outcomes), and whether these advocates
be progressive or conservative, each explicitly or implicitly desire to obtain
better policies or a better governmental system, though often it is one that
exists only in their imagination. The framers, however, forthrightly addressed
those weaknesses and provided cures consistent with republicanism. Though
those cures perhaps remain imperfect, the framers left the tradition of selfgovernment intact. The intricate power-sharing and inter-branch checks were
"intentionally designed to foster deliberation and . .. consensual politics,"
simultaneously creating delay, and in doing so, specifically and cogently
addressed the problems of majority tyranny, the intensity of factions, and the
dangers associated with passion injection. 234 Can we improve upon their
work? Through constitutional amendment we certainly have tried, and
nothing prevents us from repeatedly doing so. But, before correcting felt
deficiencies, we should demonstrate a far better understanding of the Framers'
design than the views that dominate the legal literature today.

234. With respect contemporary scholars often focusing on "good results," see text and
comment accompanying notes 16 (the remarks of Michael Perry on the choice scholars must
make between interpretive consistency and good results), supra note 71 (to the growing concern
among liberal and progressives particular Supreme Court decisions such as on campaign finance
and a Second Amendment right made applicable to the States) and, supra note 97 (referencing
Revisionist contentions that the Framers were motivated, not by patriotism, but instead personal
gain and they had little faith in democratic government). Years earlier I had identified "results"
as a distinct symbol in the literature. See Gangi, supra note 11 , at 208-12. Of course, related to
republicanism is the ever-present possibility of passion injection. See Gangi, supra note 1, at 51.
Frankly put, our system was intentionally designed to delay legislative proposals
(although that comment elicits surprise from some law students). Delay, I remind my
students (with a glint in my eye), has the tendency to diminish all passion! It provides
time for reflection (such as, "Do we really want to do that?"; "In the way proposed?";
"What happens if . . ?"), as well as an opportunity for opposing forces to coalesce.
That, in turn, usually leads to better (more moderate) laws-ones that enjoy wider
subscription (and therefore, greater conformity with its dictates). In sum, Publius
reasoned that it was far better to consistently delay and perhaps defeat many bad laws,
even if as a result, a few good laws were temporarily thwarted. Different constituents,
staggered terms, and competition amongst the three branches were intended to
prevent public passion from being immediately injected into public policy making
an occurrence that had rendered past popular governments ineffective, indecisive, or
erratic. Our system integrates institutional delay with the faith that, given adequate
time, most Americans will opt for justice.
Id. at 68-69 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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C. Politics: The Art ofAccommodating Preferences
The intensity problem needs to be probed further by going beyond the
structural provisions devised by the framers. Preferences, whether personal or
societal Kendall and Carey remind us "must be weighed as well as
counted, and weighed in such a manner that the heavier ones tip the scale more
than the lighter ones."2 35 That is to say, as noted in our introductory
remarks, 236 if reason is to prevail as the preferred basis of decision-making, it
is probably best if those not feeling intensely have a pivotal voice in public
policy determinations. Deliberation is cooler when the relatively apathetic
control it. 237 That perspective, I suspect, is alien to many modem scholars, so
we must explore it more thoroughly.
I realize today that, upon my first reading of the Intensity piece, I
dismissed as simplistic the illustrative device put forth by its authors-an
analogy that reduced all citizens in a society to just two persons, "X and Y." 238
Returning to the piece again, decades later, I better appreciate that even in a
two-person political society, complexity emerges. 239 That greater appreciation
prompted a closer examination of the consensus-building skillset.
We know from experience that different people have different
preferences. Standing in line at the local Starbucks and listening to customer
coffee orders is sufficient evidence to establish this point. People disagree
about the simplest things. 240 Try raising this question among your meat-eating

235. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 8.
236. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
237. I do not imply that cooler heads are always right or those feeling intensely about one
thing or another are always wrong. Neither of those propositions can be sustained. I am
suggesting that, should the population to one degree or another be divided, the relatively
apathetic may be in a better position to weigh on one side or the other. One might speculate that
an essential distinction between Madison and contemporary democratic theorists is that, in
Madison's schema, decision-making was placed in the hands of the relatively indifferent, while
under contemporary democratic theory it is at least to be guided by those who are its most
passionate advocates. Publius cautions:
Every unbiased observer may infer . .
that, unfortunately, passion, not reason, must
have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely
on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some
of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they are so
to be called, will be the same.
THE FEDERALIST No. 50, supra note 22, at 319 (James Madison) (emphases omitted).
238. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 12.
239. Perhaps, by that time, having been in a relationship for thirty years or more
contributed to an understanding of the complexities involved.
240. Regarding an adequate explanation for such disagreeableness, Publius again proves
succinct when stating that "[t]he latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man."
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 79.
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friends: Should beef be served rare or well done, or somewhere in-between?
Record the variety (and intensity) of the answers. See if substituting lamb for
beef changes those responses. The more apathetic among the group (at least
on this issue) might conclude that people are entitled to eat meat however they
prefer. Compare the degree of indifference on that subject to other
contemporary public policy issues: building a wall on the Mexican border;
restricting immigrant entry into the United States; repealing Obamacare;
affirmative action in higher education; instituting an effective and fair tax
stimulus package; the desirability of abortion or partial birth abortions; how
to equitably reform the Social Security program so as to assure its continued
viability; and establishing professional standards for accountants and lawyers.
Has the incidence of indifference remained the same? Has the intensity of
opinions escalated? Is each individual either as apathetic or indifferent equally
on each topic? 24 1

Madison believed it was dangerous for a popular government to create
public policy based on momentary public passion. Doing so was more likely
to damage the long-term public good. Rapid and alternating public policy
changes fueled by successive waves of passion injection were particularly
dangerous because they created societal instability, as public policy shifts
soon became unpredictable. 242 That precisely had been the primary weakness
of all popular governments preceding the American constitution. They
trembled, one day going in one direction, and within a short time, reversing
or going yet in a completely different direction. Madison understood that a
well-constructed popular government required at least one focal point
responsive to passion injection. To measure voter dissatisfaction and provide
assurance they had been heard, the system provided a means for measurement
for those who perhaps heard the noise but doubted just how widespread and
intense those were vocalizing their dissatisfaction. Only voter sentiments that
endured offered a solid foundation for stable change. 243 Such considerations
are at the core of Madison's thinking and the Intensity article.

241. Before concluding my remarks on the Madisonian model as sketched in the Intensity
piece, let's contrast it with the modern penchant for poll-taking. At best, polls rely on first
impressions-responses that more often than not depend upon knee-jerk attitude reactions, as
well as emotions, most susceptible to manipulation. I ignore here other associated issues such as
lying to pollsters.
242. GANGI, supra note 36, at 10-13. One senses this phenomenon surrounding passage
and attempted repeal of the Affordable Care Act.
243. The "focal point" referred to in the text is of course elections to House of
Representatives, occurring every two years. They often provide a first opportunity to measure
the extent of voter-dissatisfaction. They also provide a measure to ascertain the degree of support
dissatisfied voters had from their fellow citizens. Under the Framers' design, a passion would
have to be sustained for at most four consecutive years to take complete control of our

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss2/6

78

Gangi: Scholars and Our Craft
2018]

SCHOLARS AND OUR CRAFT

425

For example, in an inflamed environment (one where the passions were
intense, but different for X and Y), cooperation between them might
deteriorate except on the most serious matters (e.g., survival as a distinct
society), and then only if one or the other did not see a long-term advantage
by seeking a foreign alliance. Consensus-building is a complex process
because human nature is what it is.
But is consensus-building the object of modem democratic theory? Not
from my perspective.2 44 Simply put, in contrast, under the Madisonian model,
decision-making shifts from the most opinionated to the least opinionated. To
reach a reasoned consensus requires adequate time for reflection, a cooling
down, assessing one's intensities as well as those of one's opponents, and
coalition building-all factors that operate equally in family as well as societal
disputes. The two-person society device conveys the complexity of the
Madisonian model, whereas much of contemporary democratic theory does
not.
Considerations of justice and fairness are certainly important. They
undoubtedly play a role even in a two-person society. But practical, not
theoretical, skills are essential for consensus-building. The Intensity authors
accordingly identify two of those requisite skills. First, X or Y each must
assess how important each issue is to them. Second, on each of those same
issues, X and Y also must correctly assess how dear each issue is to the
other. 245 How else could either judge what may be required to obtain the
other's cooperation on an item of common interest? Should either X or Y lack
the skill to accurately make either or both of those determinations, the
prospects for serious miscalculations increase-from an inability to reach a

governmental system, including the Supreme Court since no required number of justices is
specified in the Constitution. Congress can change the number by simple majority vote. Ignored
here are other factors. Changes in the House, Senate or Presidency alone may be sufficient to
satisfy voter discontent. Even if voter discontent persists, it may not crystalize behind any
proposals and, while initially appearing unified, it turns out that it is more fragmented than it
first appeared. See supra note 223 and accompanying comment.
244. I do not wish here to discuss or analyze modern democratic theorist premises. All
these theories seem to assume the equality of all opinions and perhaps equal intensity. An
implicit assumption seems to be that the most opinionated are right, either because justice or
history is on their side, or they are more qualified to judge such matters. I cannot explore the
topic more thoroughly in this Article. I will say this: The Madisonian schema was never
considered inconsistent with majority rule. It was perceived to be consistent with republican
government and to provide as much of a cure for the dangers of popular government as possible.
The majority eventually would prevail in enacting their policy preferences should advocates
convince the relatively indifferent that policy changes were warranted. I have my doubts about
modern democratic theory, at least with respect to using the judiciary to obtain their public policy
preferences. The tactic undermines the objective.
245. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 13-14.
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consensus on topics of common concern, to the equivalent of a civil war
between them. 246
But that is only the beginning. From the very first page of the Intensity
article, 247 Kendall and Carey remind readers why relative indifference plays
an important role in the Madisonian schema. "Let's go to 'Z' restaurant," one
member of your group suggests, only to find that either one, a few, or many
in your group are indifferent to that proposal. Some members of the group
might be willing to consider the suggestion, but with few exceptions, it
receives only a lukewarm reception. For simplicity's sake, we put aside other
concerns that might influence acceptance of the suggestion to one degree or
another, such as wishing that the group stay together (which, on that issue
some members of the group might feel more intensely about than others, not
to mention perhaps more intensely than on the restaurant suggestion). Or
perhaps some members of the group (silently) are concerned that a divided
decision on the matter might result in hurt feelings of one or more members
of the group (again, the avoidance of which some members of the group may
believe is more important than either sticking together, going to dinner, or the
restaurant selection). Another possibility arises-one specifically entertained
in this Article. By coming down on one side or the other, one or more of the
previously indifferent members of the group may tip the balance sufficiently
to form a majority. In return for their support, however, they might extract a
concession from the others. "Okay, we will go to restaurant 'Z,"' they suggest,
"if next week we go to the jazz club."
Finally, we cannot ignore another possibility mentioned by the authors.
X or Y also might choose to "fake" (manufacture) an intensity that they are
not actually experiencing, that is, engage in a calculated ploy to obtain some
advantage (i.e., to get a little more, or give a little less), than might have been
otherwise conceded. This faking also can be used to get something entirely
different-something one or the other knows (or guesses) the other party feels
less intensely about. 248 All this faking occurs, mind you, in an environment in

246. Such occurrences are hardly new or surprising in either the personal or the
international arenas. The former may well be reflected in our nation's divorce rate (an inability
of at least one, but probably both parties, to assess the others' intensity). And with respect to the
latter, diplomatic miscalculations have had the same impact on international relations since the
dawn of time.
247. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 5.
248. Id. at 10. Of course, all these issues are simplified. Lin Manuel's lyrics in Hamilton
are instructive: "No one was in the room when it happened," conveys that, in a meeting between
Hamilton and Jefferson, an agreement was reached wherein Hamilton would obtain Jefferson's
support for his financial plan in return for Hamilton's support for relocating the nation's capital
to Washington, D.C. LIN MANUEL MIRANDA, HAMILTON, act 2, sc. 5.
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which most citizens on most issues are apathetic. 249 By that I mean that, at
any point in time, on an infinite number of possible public policy issues
typically before us, most Americans rarely feel intensely one way or another
about more than a few if any.
Along with the observations in the preceding paragraphs, the authors
conclude: Isn't this what usually occurs at the end of congressional sessions?
Congressmen and senators engaging in horse-trading within and between
issues, within the context of an externally imposed time constraint (the end of
session)? Play the cards you have or fold them. Either one articulates what
they want and puts a reasonable "price" for their cooperation on a proposed
compromise, or one risks another majority coalition coalescing around them.
Certainly, other options exist. One can simply refuse to, from their
perspective, compromise their principles: i.e., refuse to participate in any crass
(unprincipled) bargaining, or set the price so high for their cooperation that it
makes any deal unattractive to other participants. (Even then one might
employ a negotiation tactic such as: What the hell, let's ask for . . .? What do
we have to lose?) But, in either of those situations, one risks being excluded
from the process altogether should other bargaining participants offer either
lesser costs, or less rigid principles (depending on perspective), or perhaps,
they might remain open to compromise if accommodated on something
entirely separate from the issue being discussed. Thus, instead of perhaps
getting something for joining a coalescing majority, they are excluded from a
law's enactment. True enough, they may retain their principles into their next
election without knowing whether or not one's constituents will find that
approach sufficient.250 They call that majority rule. 25

249. Kendall & Carey, Intensity, supra note 208, at 13.
250. Such decisions can be tactical, that is, hoping to gain even more of what one party
(elected official) may want at some later date, or, in a partisan atmosphere, to strengthen one's
own position in a primary contest, or to solidify one's position with constituents sympathetic on
a subject from an opposition party.
251. I again note that this passage was written well before either the 2016 presidential or
2018 midterm elections. I also put aside another facet of the schema mentioned earlier, that is,
Madison's insistence on fewer representatives. See supra note 207. There also is this
consideration: Intense opposition may divide the population evenly, posing a serious threat to
governmental stability. It is the milieu for civil war. That is why the Intensity authors suggest
that modern democratic theorists cannot adequately address intensity issues, and why, since
elected officials are far better at it, Madison believed consensus-building was best practiced
when the relatively indifferent played a pivotal public policymaking role.

Published by Scholar Commons,

81

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
428
X.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 347

SCHOLARS Do NOT HAVE THE FINAL SAY: NEVER HAVE, NEVER WILL

Ideally, scholars pursue truth for its own sake.252 Some academicians
simultaneously pursue scholarship and advocacy. Very few scholars can do
both well. We again must paint with a broad brush. Scholarship and advocacy
have different objectives, processes, and skillsets. The primary objective of
scholarship is comprehension. It requires the sorting of multiple opinions,
weighing credibility, and the obligation to render as dispassionate a judgment
as possible. For the most part, however, all the related processes occur only in
the scholar's mind where reconciliation of disparate opinions are judged by
the reasonableness of the scholar's conclusions.
Although similarities exist, the objective of advocacy is action, political
or otherwise: to advocate change, or defend the status quo. Hence, one seeks
to move public policy opinions in one direction or another, to depart from or
to return to existing principles, standards, and values. In the political arena,
although scholars enter a thicket of opinions similar to that encountered in the
academy, what is distinctly different is that competing opinions are no longer
juggled solely in their head. Now, they are lodged in human beings,
infuriatingly capable of exercising free will. While the conclusions reached in
both situations may be identical, the processes are certainly not. Both scholars
and citizens are equally susceptible to having their prejudices cloud their
judgment. But, voters are not compelled to reach conclusions based
exclusively on the information provided by scholars. Voters are perfectly
entitled to add their life experiences and, of course, their sense of right or
wrong, into the mix. At the ballot box, all opinions are equally weighed.
That reality frustrates many scholars. Voters (like jurors) are not required
to defend their verdicts. They are not required to base their vote on what others
(perhaps smarter than they) consider a sounder or more rational basis. In the
election process, voters, not scholars, hear competing points of view and sift
them thorough their belief prisms and prejudices (perhaps one and the same),
and upon that basis, cast their vote. The ballot box is final-at least for that
election-on who will represent them. 253

252. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
253. In Madison's schema, the emphasis fell on who would represent voters; not
necessarily on what policy the voter preferred. The reasoning seems simple enough. Most of us
do not hold firm believes on every conceivable issue of public concern. We often defer to an
elected representative's judgement because we assume they are better qualified to make such
judgments. This is not much different than what the good citizens of Massachusetts did when
they accorded discretion to the General Court in applying The Body ofLiberties. See supra notes
156-64 and accompanying text. Today we blend contemporary democratic theory with earlier
perceptions. And so, post-election analyses stubbornly attempt to derive one mandate or another
instead of focusing in on a continuing dialogue an occurrence today perhaps frustrated by party
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Madison, as I have demonstrated in the last section, understood that, and
having taken as many precautions as possible consistent with republican
government, embraced it. He believed dialogue on public policies would truly
begin in earnest only after those elected took their seats. Hence, there would
be yet another weighing of competing public policy arguments. 25 4 Elected
representatives may be right or wrong for good or bad reasons, or right or
wrong for no reason at all. Most troubling, from the perspective of the
academician, of course, is that the electorate may choose someone favoring
the "wrong" policies. 255 But Madison understood there was no other possible
approach consistent with republican government. 25 6 No government can
guarantee that the best idea will always prevail. That truth frustrates and
disappoints intellectuals of every political stripe. But it is not a uniquely
contemporary dilemma. The framers confronted that same reality at the
Philadelphia Convention, and it resurfaced at every twist and turn in our
nation's history. We too must embrace it. Self-government was not a right
given to our predecessors; it was won on the battlefield, and we were lucky
enough to have those bright enough, practical enough, and wise enough to
secure it-and keep it for more than two centuries.
Under the Constitution, every citizen has an identical obligation: to pass
down to our children's children the lessons they have learned from governing
themselves. Many scholars are uncomfortable (sometimes arrogantly so) with
the fact that idea implementation requires a very different skillset than does
idea construction. Governing is an imprecise and very complex business.

loyalty. That is not new either. First, the political character of the United States still is not
programmatic compared to European parliamentary systems. Although the media may posit
otherwise (perhaps because they were trained that way) in the United States expectations are not
very high that campaign promises will be exactly translated into law should the political party
making those promises be victorious in the election. Today, there are appeals to "classes" of
citizens with an ever-increasing emphasis on race, or gender, or other group-centered appeal
rather than to the judgment of individuals on this or that policy. To what extent this has modified
the Madisonian schema I will leave to others to discern. I also do not discount citizens voting
for representatives they perceive are motivated by the public good.
254. I am aware of those pointing to the continued dysfunction in our national
representative institutions. While the subject certainly is outside the scope of this Article, it is
admittedly a consideration. But, I think the matter should be considered through fresh eyes. For
most of my career I have had "interest group" advocates assume that only self-interest motivates
voters. In my experience that is not true. I have encountered many from very different
perspectives clearly and sincerely concerned with the common good, and they are quite willing
to suffer some personal disadvantage for pursuing it.
255. This section also was penned well before the 2016 Presidential election and its
aftermath.
256. Madison of course rejected any structural solution as more appropriate to a hereditary
form of government, but after some fifty years as a scholar, I certainly do not view scholars, or
the intelligentsia, as possessing any special powers that immunize them from error.
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Publius understood that, and so should we. Uncertainties abound, and
republicanism makes matters far more difficult, placing as it does ultimate
responsibility in the hands of the very people who "get frightened, embrace
stereotypes, and [to] one intensity or another hold certain beliefs based
on ... experiences and ... intelligence (though, Lord knows, the latter is
exceedingly fragile)." 25 7 Complex indeed. As Publius observed: "[Y]ou must
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself." 258 All this, mind you, in the context of being
prepared for eventualities so numerous that they were and remain impossible
to catalogue. At times, it is even difficult to draw the line between statesman
and demagogue.

25 9

Scholars and political practitioners usually possess distinct skillsets and
play different roles within the American republic. When scholars attempt to
sell their public policy preferences directly to the people, or to the people's
representatives, more frequently than not they are met at least initially with
stifling apathy. Instead of doggedly pursuing the long, arduous task of
persuasion required by self-government, most politically active scholars
prefer having their preferences imposed though the judiciary. 260 They see
themselves as engaged in an improvement project, one promising better
results sooner than does our existing model. I suggest an alternate explanation:
they lack the Framers' faith (and that is precisely what it is) in the judgment

257. Gangi, supra note 1, at 72.
258. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 22, at 322 (James Madison). See William A.
Galston, Turns Out Governing Is Hard, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2017, 6:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/turns-out-governing-is-hard- 1500417736.
259. Publius noted: "Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often
that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the
formidable title of dictator. . . ." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 22, at 423 (Alexander
Hamilton) (emphasis added). And, do not for a moment forget that all constitutional provisions
may fall before exigencies that confront a nation's self-existence. With respect to the matter of
national defense Publius notes: "If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds
to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its
own government and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety." THE FEDERALIST No. 41,
supra note 22, at 257 (James Madison). Elsewhere, Publius added:
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could
prohibit in like manner the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation?
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack.
They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules and by no others. It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.
Id.; see also STRAUSS, supranote 85, at 160-61 (discussing Aristotelian tradition that exceptions
to a rule is as just as the rule itself).
260. You can get the ball rolling by convincing a single judge because every federal judge
has the same authority as do Justices of the Supreme Court. The latter, however, speak last.
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of American people. 261 So, preferring to avoid the admittedly difficult task of
persuading a majority in a few, some, or all the states, or Congress (with the
accompanying probability of failure), many instead have turned to the
courts-citing inadequate structures of representation (they have polls to
prove it!) or the cumbersomeness of the legislative and amendment processes,
or the evident prejudice or self-interestedness of opponents of their public
policy preferences. 262 All these obstacles, they argue, prevent good, moral,
and sound legislation from getting a fair hearing in our existing and obviously
defective political process. Our constitutional system, they charge, resists
change, and they are certainly right on that score. 263
XI. CONCLUSION

To help scholars approach their craft with greater objectivity, a number
of important considerations have been addressed. Each was dissected to better
illuminate the challenge posed. In doing so, we have briefly contrasted
contemporary democratic theory with the suggestion that it is obscuring the
fact that republicanism ultimately is as much about the American people as it
is about our governing structures. It is about what principles we embrace as a
people and how we rank them as surely as it is about self-interest, justice, or
rights. Instead of the simplicity of modem democratic theorists (disguised
under an illusion of complexity), we have relied upon scholars who embrace
political complexity (disguised under an illusion of simplicity). 264

Madison of course appreciated that, in a liberty rich, well-constructed
republican government, citizens' opinions fragment. That is only human.
Furthermore, he anticipated alliances that would materialize, and when they
did, would not always be or remain as cohesive or long-lasting as one might

261. After all, they had utilized the very same political structures we use today. We are
reminded of that fact, in the play, Hamilton, when as Secretary of the Treasury, enactment of his
financial plan for the Union (recognized as brilliant) could have been thwarted because he didn't
"have the votes." MIRANDA, supra note 248, at act 2, sc. 2.
262. These are of course substantive conclusions based on an examination of various
material. For example, see Gangi, supra note 11, at 37-39 and GANGI, supra note 36, at 21214.
263. Publius observed: "It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial. . . ." THE FEDERALIST No.
62, supra note 22, at 378 (James Madison).
264. See generally George W. Carey, James Madison and the PrincipleofFederalism, in
CAREY, DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 77 (discussing Madison's theories on federalism); George
W. Carey, Majority Rule and the Extended Republic Theory of James Madison, in CAREY,
DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 34 (discussing Madison's theories on majority rule); George W.
Carey, Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics, in CAREY,
DEFENSE, supra note 99, at 53 (discussing Madison's theories on separation of powers).
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presume they would.265 Indeed, Madison depended upon such occurrences.
He recognized that people engage more than logic in politics, just as they do
in their daily lives, and, much to the chagrin of system-builders (academic or
political), people also are inconsistent. Should any of us become jammed in
traffic, we (probably meaning we "A-type" personality types) often rile in
disgust at rubberneckers who obviously are slowing things down, only to find
ourselves inexorably sneaking a glance as we pass the accident scene-this or
the next time. One might say, "That's only human nature." Exactly my point.
Humans conduct themselves by more than simple logic, and a good
government our Madisonian one was designed with that in mind.266
In many ways, my journey as a scholar has rekindled an appreciation for
the complexity of American politics, citizen participation in self-government,
and our uniqueness as a nation. All of these require an understanding of our
history, 267 the principles of our founding, and how the Constitution, including

265. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 22, at 77-79 (James Madison). Citizens are
also, for example, fathers, sons, brothers, mothers, daughters, sisters, male or female, of different
races, religions and ethnic backgrounds, professions and skills, economic or employment status,
and much more, all making up a complex tapestry. But, of course this observation breaks no
new ground. See id.
266. Elsewhere I comment:
[W]hether you are pro-choice or anti-abortion; for or against capital punishment; for
or against legal recognition of gay rights or affirmative action-do not some of your
bedfellows' proposals appear to go too far? Do you not shy away (if not cringe) at
seeing your beliefs carried out to their logical end? And, even if you do not, surely
you recognize that some of your bedfellows will. Single-minded advocates may judge
their potential allies weak-minded or illogical, and that may be infuriating, but
Madison depended upon a disinclination towards the extreme, to moderate the
adverse consequences of factions. For Americans who believe that tempering
principles is itselfunprincipled or illogical, those individuals often find themselves
condemned to political irrelevancy, that is, at least those who seek election. Every
husband and wife (or those who cohabitate), as do participants in organizations or
businesses (especially family-run businesses), recognizes the realities of intensity,
even if they do not fully comprehend it. If relationships are to endure, compromise is
required. As Billy Joel astutely observed in Piano Man, even the waitress practices
politics.
Gangi, supra note 1, at 71 (other citation omitted) (citing BILLY JOEL, PIANO MAN (Columbia
1973)).
267. As Carey notes "given its origins, the expression 'law of the land' . . .was not
intended to limit the legislatures; instead, the expression 'law of the land': embraces the laws
duly enacted by the legislature that apply to executive and judicial proceedings." George W.
Carey, Due Process, Liberty, and the Fifth Amendment: OriginalIntent, in CAREY, DEFENSE,
supra note 99, at 139, 165. Put another way, the Massachusetts Body ofLiberties contributes
mightily to understanding the status of rights. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text
and comments.
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the Bill of Rights, embodies those principles. 268 Losing sight of any of these
components leads us astray, not just temporarily (for that is inevitable), but
permanently, which is the present danger.

268. Carey notes: "We can say that . . the prevailing view of 'due process' and 'liberty'
was firmly anchored in the common law tradition." Carey, supra note 267, at 176. I agree with
Carey's conclusion that there is no foundation for "substantive" rights and courts are not
authorized to "perfect" our system. Id. at 139-40. With respect to perfecting our Constitution
see Monaghan, supranote 232.
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